Jc's Librivox Texts

The Charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava

2010-07-12T20:25:00.001-04:00

by Alfred, Lord Tennyson
October 25, 1854.

I.

The charge of the gallant three hundred, the Heavy Brigade!
Down the hill, down the hill, thousands of Russians,
Thousands of horsemen, drew to the valley — and stay'd ;
For Scarlett and Scarlett's three hundred were riding by
When the points of the Russian lances arose in the sky;
And he call'd 'Left wheel into line!' and they wheel'd and obey'd.
Then he look'd at the host that had halted he knew not why,
And he turn'd half round, and he bad his trumpeter sound
To the charge, and he rode on ahead, as he waved his blade
To the gallant three hundred whose glory will never die —
'Follow,' and up the hill, up the hill, up the hill,
Follow'd the Heavy Brigade.

II.
The trumpet, the gallop, the charge, and the might of the fight!
Thousands of horsemen had gather'd there on the height,
With a wing push'd out to the left, and a wing to the right,
And who shall escape if they close? but he dash'd up alone
Thro' the great gray slope of men,
Sway'd his sabre, and held his own
Like an Englishman there and then ;
All in a moment follow'd with force
Three that were next in their fiery course,
Wedged themselves in between horse and horse,
Fought for their lives in the narrow gap they had made —
Four amid thousands! and up the hill, up the hill,
Gallopt the gallant three hundred, the Heavy Brigade.

III.

Fell like a cannonshot,
Burst like a thunderbolt,
Crash'd like a hurricane,
Broke thro' the mass from below,
Drove thro' the midst of the foe,
Plunged up and down, to and fro,
Rode flashing blow upon blow,
Brave Inniskillens and Greys
Whirling their sabres in circles of light!
And some of us, all in amaze,
Who were held for a while from the fight,
And were only standing at gaze,
When the dark-muffled Russian crowd
Folded its wings from the left and the right,
And roll'd them around like a cloud, —
O mad for the charge and the battle were we,
When our own good redcoats sank from sight,
Like drops of blood in a dark-gray sea,
And we turn'd to each other, whispering, all dismay'd,
'Lost are the gallant three hundred of Scarlett's Brigade!'

IV.

'Lost one and all' were the words
Mutter'd in our dismay ;
But they rode like Victors and Lords
Thro' the forest of lances and swords
In the heart of the Russian hordes,
They rode, or they stood at bay —
Struck with the sword-hand and slew,
Down with the bridle-hand drew
The foe from the saddle and threw
Underfoot there in the fray —
Ranged like a storm or stood like a rock
In the wave of a stormy day ;
Till suddenly shock upon shock
Stagger'd the mass from without,
Drove it in wild disarray,
For our men gallopt up with a cheer and a shout,
And the foeman surged, and waver'd, and reel'd
Up the hill, up the hill, up the hill, out of the field,
And over the brow and away.

V.

Glory to each and to all, and the charge that they made !
Glory to all the three hundred, and all the Brigade !

* * *
Note. — The ' three hundred ' of the ' Heavy Brigade ' who made this famous charge were the Scots Greys and the 2nd squadron of Inniskillings ; the remainder of the ' Heavy Brigade ' subsequently dashing up to their support.

The ' three ' were Scarlett's aide-de-camp, Elliot, and the trumpeter and Shegog the orderly, who had been close behind him.

Source: Archive.org

Snow in the Suburbs, by Thomas Hardy

2010-02-26T18:42:00.000-05:00

SNOW IN THE SUBURBS

Every branch big with it,
Bent every twig with it;
Every fork like a white web-foot;
Every street and pavement mute:
Some flakes have lost their way, and grope back upward, when
Meeting those meandering down they turn and descend again.
The palings are glued together like a wall,
And there is no waft of wind with the fleecy fall.
A sparrow enters the tree,
Whereon immediately
A snow-lump thrice his own slight size
Descends on him and showers his head and eyes.

Original text: virginia.edu

Poem: Lips That Touch Liquor Shall Never Touch Mine

2009-11-16T23:26:00.000-05:00

Alice Lee stood awaiting her lover one night,
Her cheeks flushed and glowing, her eyes full of light.
She had placed a sweet rose 'mid her wild flowing hair;
No flower of the forest e'er looked half so fair
As she did that night, as she stood by the door
Of the cot where she dwelt by the side of the moor.

She heard a quick step coming over the moor,
And a merry voice which she had oft heard before;
And ere she could speak a strong arm held her fast,
And a manly voice whispered, "I've come, love, at last.
I'm sorry that I've kept you waiting like this,
But I know you'll forgive me, then give me a kiss."

But she shook the bright curls on her beautiful head,
And she drew herself up while quite proudly she said,
"Now, William, I'll prove if you really are true,
For you say that you love me -- I don't think you do;
If really you love me you must give up the wine,
For the lips that touch liquor shall never touch mine."

He looked quite amazed, "Why, Alice, 'tis clear
You really are getting quite jealous, my dear."
"In that you are right," she replied; "for, you see,
You'll soon love the liquor far better than me.
I'm jealous, I own, of the poisonous wine,
For the lips that touch liquor shall never touch mine."

He turned, then, quite angry. "Confound it!" he said,
"What nonsense you've got in your dear little head;
But I'll see if I cannot remove it from hence."
She said, "'Tis not nonsense, 'tis plain common-sense:
And I mean what I say, and this you will find,
I don't often change when I've made up my mind."

He stood all irresolute, angry, perplexed:
She never before saw him look half so vexed;
But she said, "If he talks all his life I won't flinch";
And he talked, but he never could move her an inch.
He then bitterly cried, with a look and a groad,
"O Alice, your heart is as hard as a stone."

But though her heart beat in his favour quite loud,
She still firmly kept to the vow she had vowed;
And at last, without even a tear or sigh,
She said, "I am going, so, William, goodbye."
"Nay stay," he then said, "I'll choose one of the two --
I'll give up the liquor in favour of you."

Now, William had often great cause to rejoice
For the hour he had made sweet Alice his choice;
And he blessed through the whole of a long, useful life,
The fate that had given him his dear little wife.
And she, by her firmness, won to us that night
One who in our cause is an ornament bright.

Oh! that each fair girl in our abstinence band
Would say: "I'll ne'er give my heart or my hand
Unto one who I ever had reason to think
Would taste one small drop of the vile, cursed drink";
But say, when youare wooed, "I'm a foe to the wine,
And the lips that touch liquor shall never touch mine."

(Source)

Essais 1, ch 18

2008-12-18T17:47:00.003-05:00

CHAPITRE XVIII
Qu'il ne faut juger de notre heur qu'après la mort

Scilicet ultima semper
Expectanda dies homini est; dicique beatus
Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debet.

Les enfants savent le conte du Roy Croesus à ce propos : lequel ayant été pris par Cyrus, et condamné à la mort, sur le point de l'exécution, il s'écria, O Solon, Solon : Cela rapporté à Cyrus, et s'étant enquis que c'était à dire, il lui fit entendre, qu'il verifiait lors à ses dépens l'avertissement qu'autrefois lui avait donné Solon : que les hommes, quelque beau visage que fortune leur face, ne se peuvent appeller heureux, jusques à ce qu'on leur ait vu passer le dernier jour de leur vie, pour l'incertitude et varieté des choses humaines, qui d'un bien léger mouvement se changent d'un état en autre tout divers. Et pourtant Agesilaus, à quelqu'un qui disait heureux le Roy de Perse, de ce qu'il était venu fort jeune à un si puissant état : Oui-mais, dit-il, Priam en tel âge ne fut pas malheureux. Tantôt des Roys de Macédoine, successeurs de ce grand Alexandre, il s'en fait des menuisiers et greffiers à Rome : des tyrans de Sicile, des pédants à Corinthe : d'un conquérant de la moitié du monde, et Empereur de tant d'armées, il s'en fait un misérable suppliant des belitres officiers d'un Roy d'Ægypte : tant coûta à ce grand Pompeius la prolongation de cinq ou six mois de vie. Et du temps de nos pères ce Ludovic Sforce dixième Duc de Milan, sous qui avait si long temps branslé toute l'Italie, on l'a vu mourir prisonnier à Loches : mais après y avoir vécu dix ans, qui est le pis de son marché. La plus belle Royne, veuve du plus grand Roy de la Chrestienté, vient elle pas de mourir par la main d'un Bourreau ? indigne et barbare cruauté ! Et mille tels exemples. Car il semble que comme les orages et tempêtes se piquent contre l'orgueil et hautaineté de nos bâtiments, il y ait aussi là haut des esprits envieux des grandeurs de ça bas.

Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, et pulchros fasces sævasque secures
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Et semble que la fortune quelquefois guette à point nommé le dernier jour de notre vie, pour montrer sa puissance, de renverser en un moment ce qu'elle avait bâti en longues années ; et nous fait crier après Laberius, Nimirum hac die una plus vixi, mihi quàm vivendum fuit.

Ainsi se peut prendre avec raison, ce bon avis de Solon. Mais d'autant que c'est un Philosophe, à l'endroit desquels les faveurs et disgrâces de la fortune ne tiennent rang, ni d'heur ni de malheur : et sont les grandeurs, et puissances, accidents de qualité à peu pres indifférente, je trouve vraisemblable, qu'il ait regardé plus avant ; et voulu dire que ce même bonheur de notre vie, qui dépend de la tranquillité et contentement d'un esprit bien né, et de la résolution et assurance d'une âme réglée ne se doive jamais attribuer à l'homme, qu'on ne lui ait vu jouer le dernier acte de sa comédie : et sans doute le plus difficile. En tout le reste il y peut avoir du masque : Ou ces beaux discours de la Philosophie ne sont en nous que par contenance, ou les accidents ne nous essayant pas jusques au vif, nous donnent loisir de maintenir toujours notre visage rassis. Mais à ce dernier rôle de la mort et de nous, il n'y a plus que faindre, il faut parler Français ; il faut montrer ce qu'il y a de bon et de net dans le fond du pot.

Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Ejiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res.

Voila pourquoi se doivent à ce dernier trait toucher et éprouver toutes les autres actions de notre vie. C'est le maître jour, c'est le jour juge de tous les autres : c'est le jour, dit un ancien, qui doit juger de toutes mes années passées. Je remets à la mort l'essai du fruit de mes études. Nous verrons là si mes discours me partent de la bouche, ou du coeur.

J'ai vu plusieurs donner par leur mort réputation en bien ou en mal à toute leur vie. Scipion beau-père de Pompeius rabilla en bien mourant la mauvaise opinion qu'on avait eu de lui jusques alors. Epaminondas interrogé lequel des trois il estimait le plus, ou Chabrias, ou Iphicrates, ou soi-même : Il nous faut voir mourir, dit-il, avant que d'en pouvoir résoudre. De vrai on déroberait beaucoup à celui là, qui le poserait sans l'honneur et grandeur de sa fin. Dieu l'a voulu comme il lui a plu : mais en mon temps trois les plus exécrables personnes, que je connusse en toute abomination de vie, et les plus infâmes, ont eu des morts reglées, et en toute circonstance composées jusques à la perfection.

Il est des morts braves et fortunées. Je lui ai vu trancher le fil d'un progrès de merveilleux avancement : et dans la fleur de son croît, à quelqu'un, d'une fin si pompeuse, qu'à mon avis ses ambitieux et courageux desseins, n'avaient rien de si haut que fut leur interruption. Il arriva sans y aller, ou il prétendait, plus grandement et glorieusement, que ne portait son désir et espérance. Et devança par sa chute, le pouvoir et le nom, ou il aspirait par sa course.

Au jugement de la vie d'autrui, je regarde toujours comment s'en est porté le bout, et des principaux études de la mienne, c'est qu'il se porte bien, c'est a dire quietement et sourdement.

Essais 1, ch 17

2008-12-18T17:46:00.005-05:00

CHAPITRE XVII
De la peur

Obstupui, steteruntque comæ, et vox faucibus hæsit.

Je ne suis pas bon naturaliste (qu'ils disent) et ne sais guère par quels ressorts la peur agit en nous, mais tant y a que c'est une étrange passion : et disent les médecins qu'il n'en est aucune, qui emporte plutôt notre jugement hors de sa due assiette. De vrai, j'ai vu beaucoup de gens devenus insensés de peur : et au plus rassis il est certain pendant que son accès dure, qu'elle engendre de terribles éblouissements. Je laisse à part le vulgaire, à qui elle représente tantôt les bisaïeuls sortis du tombeau enveloppés en leur suaire, tantôt des Loups-garoups, des Lutins, et des Chimeres. Mais parmi les soldats même, où elle devrait trouver moins de place, combien de fois à elle changé un troupeau de brebis en escadron de corselets ? des roseaux et des cannes en gendarmes et lanciers ? nos amis en nos ennemis ? et la croix blanche à la rouge ?

Lors que Monsieur de Bourbon prit Rome, un port'enseigne, qui était à la garde du bourg saint Pierre, fut saisi de tel effroi à la première alarme, que par le trou d'une ruine il se jeta, l'enseigne au poing, hors la ville droit aux ennemis, pensant tirer vers le dedans de la ville ; et à peine en fin voyant la troupe de Monsieur de Bourbon se ranger pour le soutenir, estimant que ce fut une sortie que ceux de la ville fissent, il se reconnut, et tournant tête rentra par ce même trou, par lequel il était sorti, plus de trois cens pas avant en la campagne. Il n'en advint pas du tout si heureusement à l'enseigne du Capitaine Julle, lors que Saint Paul fut pris sur nous par le Comte de Bures et Monsieur du Reu. Car étant si fort éperdu de frayeur, que de se jeter à tout son enseigne hors de la ville, par une canonnière, il fut mis en pièces par les assaillants. Et au même siège, fut mémorable la peur qui serra, saisit, et glaça si fort le coeur d'un gentilhomme, qu'il en tomba raide mort par terre à la brèche, sans aucune blessure.

Pareille rage pousse par fois toute une multitude. En l'une des rencontres de Germanicus contre les Allemands, deux grosses troupes prirent d'effroi deux routes opposites, l'une fuyait d'où l'autre partait.

Tantôt elle nous donne des ailes aux talons, comme aux deux premiers : tantôt elle nous cloue les pieds, et les entrave : comme on lit de l'Empereur Théophile, lequel en une bataille qu'il perdit contre les Agarenes, devint si étonné et si transi, qu'il ne pouvait prendre parti de s'enfuir : adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat : jusques à ce que Manuel l'un des principaux chefs de son armée, l'ayant tirassé et secoué, comme pour l'éveiller d'un profond somme, lui dit : Si vous ne me suivez je vous tuerai : car il vaut mieux que vous perdiez la vie, que si étant prisonnier vous veniez à perdre l'Empire.

Lors exprime elle sa dernière force, quand pour son service elle nous rejette à la vaillance, qu'elle a soustraite à notre devoir et à notre honneur. En la première juste bataille que les Romains perdirent contre Hannibal, sous le Consul Sempronius, une troupe de bien dix mille hommes de pied, qui prit l'épouvante, ne voyant ailleurs par où faire passage à sa lâcheté, s'alla jeter au travers le gros des ennemis : lequel elle perça d'un merveilleux effort, avec grand meurtre de Carthaginois : achetant une honteuse fuite, au même prix qu'elle eut eu une glorieuse victoire. C'est ce dequoi j'ai le plus de peur que la peur.

Aussi surmonte elle en aigreur tous autres accidents.

Quelle affection peut être plus âpre et plus juste, que celle des amis de Pompeius, qui étaient en son navire, spectateurs de cet horrible massacre ? Si est-ce que la peur des voiles Egyptiennes, qui commençaient à les approcher, l'étouffa de manière, qu'on a remarqué, qu'ils ne s'amusèrent qu'à hâter les mariniers de diligenter, et de se sauver à coups d'aviron ; jusques à ce qu'arrivés à Tyr, libres de crainte, ils eurent loi de tourner leur pensée à la perte qu'ils venaient de faire, et lâcher la bride aux lamentations et aux larmes, que cette autre plus forte passion avait suspendues.

Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat.

Ceux qui auront été bien frottés en quelque étour de guerre, tous blessés encore et ensanglantés, on les ramène bien le lendemain à la charge. Mais ceux qui ont conçu quelque bonne peur des ennemis, vous ne les leur feriez pas seulement regarder en face. Ceux qui sont en pressante crainte de perdre leur bien d'être exilés, d'être subjugués, vivent en continuelle angoisse, en perdant le boire, le manger, et le repos. Là où les pauvres, les bannis, les serfs, vivent souvent aussi joyeusement que les autres. Et tant de gens, qui de l'impatience des pointures de la peur, se sont pendus, noyés, et précipités, nous ont bien appris qu'elle est encores plus importune et plus insupportable que la mort.

Les Grecs en reconnaissent une autre espèce, qui est outre l'erreur de notre discours : venant, disent-ils, sans cause apparente, et d'une impulsion céleste. Des peuples entiers s'en voyent souvent frappés, et des armées entières. Telle fut celle qui apporta à Carthage une merveilleuse désolation. On n'y oyait que cris et voix effrayés : on voyait les habitants sortir de leurs maisons, comme à l'alarme, et se charger, blesser et entretuer les uns les autres, comme si ce fussent ennemis, qui vinssent à occuper leur ville. Tout y était en désordre, et en fureur : jusques à ce que par oraisons et sacrifices, ils eussent appaisé l'ire des dieux. Ils nomment cela terreurs Paniques.

Essais 1, ch 16

2008-12-18T17:46:00.003-05:00

CHAPITRE XVI
Un traict de quelques Ambassadeurs

J'OBSERVE en mes voyages cette pratique, pour apprendre toujours quelque chose, par la communication d'autrui (qui est une des plus belles écoles qui puisse être) de ramener toujours ceux, avec qui je confère, aux propos des choses qu'ils savent le mieux.

Basti al nocchiero ragionar de' venti,
Al bifolco dei tori, et le sue piaghe
Conti'l guerrier, conti'l pastor gli armenti.

Car il advient le plus souvent au contraire, que chacun chosit plutôt à discourir du métier d'un autre que du sien : estimant que c'est autant de nouvelle réputation acquise : témoin le reproche qu'Archidamus fit à Periander, qu'il quittait la gloire d'un bon médecin, pour acquérir celle de mauvais poète.

Voyez combien Cesar se déploie largement à nous faire entendre ses inventions à bâtire ponts et engins : et combien au prix il va se serrant, où il parle des offices de sa profession, de sa vaillance, et conduite de sa milice. Ses exploits le vérifient assez capitaine excellent : il se vut faire connaître excellent ingénieur ; qualité aucunement étrangère.

Le vieil Dionysius était très grand chef de guerre, comme il convenait à sa fortune : mais il se travaillait à donner principale recommendation de soi, par la poésie : et si n'y savait guère. Un homme de vacation juridique, mené ces jours passés voir une étude fournie de toutes sortes de livres de son métier, et de tout autre métier, n'y trouva nulle occasion de s'entretenir : mais il s'arrêta à gloser rudement et magistralement une barricade logée sur la vis de l'étude, que cent capitaines et soldats reconnaîssent tous les jours, sans remarque et sans offense.

Optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus.

Par ce train vous ne faites jamais rien qui vaille.

Ainsi, il faut travailler de rejetter toujours l'architecte, le peintre, le cordonnier, et ainsi du reste chacun à son gibier. Et à ce propos, à la lecture des histoires, qui est le subjet de toutes gens, j'ai accoutumé de considérer qui en sont les écrivains : Si ce sont personnes, qui ne fassent autre profession que de lettrès, j'en apprends principalement le style et le langage : si ce sont médecins, je les crois plus volontiers en ce qu'ils nous disent de la température de l'air, de la santé et complexion des Princes, des blessures et maladies : si Jurisconsultes, il en faut prendre les controverses des droits, les lois, l'établissement des polices, et choses pareilles : si Théologiens, les affaires de l'Eglise, censures Ecclésiastiques, dispences et mariages : si courtisans, les meurs et les cérémonies : si gens de guerre, ce qui est de leur charge, et principalement les déductions des exploits où ils se sont trouvés en personne : si Ambassadeurs, les menées, intelligences, et praticques, et manière de les conduire.

A cette cause, ce que j'eusse passé à un autre, sans m'y arrêter, je l'ai posé et remarqué en l'histoire du Seigneur de Langey, très-entendu en telles choses. C'est qu'après avoir conté ces belles remontrances de l'Empereur Charles cinquième, faites au consistoire à Rome, présent l'Evêque de Macon, et le Seigneur du Velly nos Ambassadeurs, où il avait mêlé plusieurs paroles outrageuses contre nous ; et entre autres, que si ses Capitaines et soldats n'étaient d'autre fidelité et suffisance en l'art militaire, que ceux du Roy, tout sur l'heure il s'attacherait la corde au col, pour lui aller demander miséricorde. Et de ceci il semble qu'il en crut quelque chose : car deux ou trois fois en sa vie depuis il lui advint de redire ces mêmes mots. Aussi qu'il défia le Roy de le combatre en chemise avec l'épée et le poignard, dans un batteau. Ledit Seigneur de Langey suivant son histoire, ajoute que lesdicts Ambassadeurs faisant une dépêche au Roy de ces choses, lui en dissimulerent la plus grande partie, mêmes lui celerent les deux articles précédents. Or j'ai trouvé bien étrange, qu'il fut en la puissance d'un Ambassadeur de dispenser sur les avertissemens qu'il doit faire à son maître, même de telle conséquence, venant de telle personne, et dits en si grand' assemblée. Et m'eut semblé l'office du serviteur être, de fidelement représenter les choses en leur entier, comme elles sont advenuës : afin que la liberté d'ordonner, juger, et choisir demeurast au maître. Car de lui alterer ou cacher la verité, de peur qu'il ne la preigne autrement qu'il ne doit, et que cela ne le pousse à quelque mauvais party, et ce pendant le laisser ignorant de ses affaires, cela m'eut semblé appartenir à celui, qui donne la loi, non à celui qui la reçoit, au curateur et maître d'école, non à celui qui se doit penser inférieur, comme en autorité, aussi en prudence et bon conseil. Quoi qu'il en soit, je ne voudrai pas être servi de cette façon en mon petit fait.

Nous nous soustrayons si volontiers du commandement sous quelque prétexte, et usurpons sur la maîtrise : chacun aspire si naturellement à la liberté et autorité, qu'au superieur nulle utilité ne doibt être si chère, venant de ceux qui le servent, comme lui doit être chère leur simple et naive obéissance.

On corrompt l'office du commander, quand on y obéit par discrétion, non par subjection. Et P. Crassus, celui que les Romains estimèrent cinq fois heureux, lors qu'il était en Asie consul, ayant mandé à un Ingénieur Grec, de lui faire mener le plus grand des deux mâts de Navire, qu'il avait vu à Athenes, pour quelque engin de batterie, qu'il en voulait faire. Cetuy cy sous titre de sa science, se donna loi de choisir autrement, et mena le plus petit, et selon la raison de art, le plus commode. Crassus, ayant patiemment oui ses raisons, lui fit très-bien donner le fouet : estimant l'intérêt de la discipline plus que l'intérêt de l'ouvrage.

D'autre part pourtant on pourrait aussi considérer, que cette obeïssance si contrainte, n'appartient qu'aux commandements précis et prefix. Les Ambassadeurs ont une charge plus libre, qui en plusieurs parties dépend souverainement de leur disposition. Ils n'exécutent pas simplement, mais forment aussi, et dressent par leur conseil, la volonté du maître. J'ai vu en mon temps des personnes de commandement, repris d'avoir plutôt obéi aux paroles des lettres du Roy, qu'à l'occasion des affaires qui étaient près deux.

Les hommes d'entendement accusent encore aujourd'hui, l'usage des Roys de Perse, de tailler les morceaux si courts à leurs agents et lieutenans, qu'aux moindres choses ils eussent à recourir à leur ordonnance. Ce delai, en une si longue étendue de domination, ayant souvent apporté des notables dommages à leurs affaires.

Et Crassus, écrivant à un homme du métier, et lui donnant avis de l'usage auquel il destinait ce mât, semblait-il pas entrer en confèrence de sa déliberation, et le convier à interposer son décrêt ?

Essais 1, ch 15

2008-12-18T17:45:00.001-05:00

CHAPITRE XV
De la punition de la couardise

J'OUIS autrefois tenir à un Prince, et trèsgrand Capitaine, que pour lâcheté de coeur un soldat ne pouvait être condamné à mort : lui étant à table fait récit du procès du Seigneur de Vervins, qui fut condamné à mort pour avoir rendu Boulogne.

A la vérité c'est raison qu'on face grande différence entre les fautes qui viennent de notre faiblesse, et celles qui viennent de notre malice. Car en celles ici nous nous sommes bandés à notre escient contre les règles de la raison, que nature a empreintes en nous : et en celles là, il semble que nous puissions appeller à garant cette même nature pour nous avoir laissé en telle imperfection et défaillance. De manière que prou de gens ont pensé qu'on ne se pouvait prendre à nous, que de ce que nous faisons contre notre conscience : Et sur cette règle est en partie fondée l'opinion de ceux qui condamnent les punitions capitales aux hérétiques et mécréans : et celle qui établit qu'un Avocat et un Juge ne puissent être tenus de ce que par ignorance ils ont failli en leur charge.

Mais quant à la couardise, il est certain que la plus commune façon est de la châtier par honte et ignominie. Et tient-on que cette règle a été premièrement mise en usage par le législateur Charondas : et qu'avant lui les lois de Grece punissaient de mort ceux qui s'en étaient fuis d'une bataille : là où il ordonna seulement qu'ils fussent par trois jours assis emmi la place publique, vêtus de robe de femme : espérant encores s'en pouvoir servir, leur ayant fait revenir le courage par cette honte. Suffundere malis hominis sanguinem quam effundere. Il semble aussi que les lois Romaines punissaient anciennement de mort, ceux qui avaient fui. Car Ammianus Marcellinus dit que l'Empereur Julien condamna dix de ses soldats, qui avaient tourné le dos à une charge contre les Parthes, à être dégradés, et apres à souffrir mort, suivant, dit-il, les lois anciennes. Toutes-fois ailleurs pour une pareille faute il en condamne d'autres, seulement à se tenir parmi les prisonniers sous l'enseigne du bagage. L'âpre châtiment du peuple Romain contre les soldats échappés de Cannes, et en cette même guerre, contre ceux qui accompagnèrent Cn. Fulvius en sa défaite, ne vint pas à la mort.

Si est-il à craindre que la honte les désespère, et les rende non froids amis seulement, mais ennemis.

Du temps de nos Pères le Seigneur de Franget, jadis Lieutenant de la compagnie de Monsieur le Maréchal de Chastillon, ayant par Monsieur le Maréchal de Chabannes été mis Gouverneur de Fontarabie au lieu de Monsieur du Lude, et l'ayant rendue aux Espagnols, fut condamné à être dégradé de noblesse, et tant lui que sa posterité declaré roturier, taillable et incapable de porter armes : et fut cette rude sentence executée à Lyon. Depuis souffrirent pareille punition tous les gentils-hommes qui se trouvèrent dans Guyse, lors que le Conte de Nansau y entra : et autres encore depuis.

Toutesfois quand il y aurait une si grossière et apparente ou ignorance ou couardise, qu'elle surpassât toutes les ordinaires, ce serait raison de la prendre pour suffisante preuve de méchanceté et de malice, et de la châtier pour telle.

Essais 1, ch 14

2008-12-18T17:44:00.002-05:00

CHAPITRE XIV
On est puni pour s'opiniâtrer en une place sans raison

LA vaillance a ses limites, comme les autres vertus : lesquels franchis, on se trouve dans le train du vice : en manière que par chez elle on se peut rendre à la témérité, obstination et folie, qui n'en sait bien les bornes, malaisés en vérité à choisir sur leurs confins. De cette considération est née la coutume que nous avons aux guerres, de punir, voire de mort, ceux qui s'opiniâtrent à défendre une place, qui par les règles militaires ne peut être soutenue. Autrement sous l'espérance de l'impunité il n'y aurait poullier qui n'arrêtât une armée. Monsieur le Connestable de Mommorency au siège de Pavie, ayant été commis pour passer le Tesin, et se loger aux fauxbourgs S. Antoine, étant empêché d'une tour au bout du pont, qui s'opiniâtra jusques à se faire battre, fit pendre tout ce qui était dedans : Et encore depuis accompagnant Monsieur le Dauphin au voyage delà les monts, ayant pris par force le château de Villane, et tout ce qui était dedans ayant été mis en pièces par la furie des soldats, hormis le Capitaine et l'enseigne, il les fit pendre et étrangler pour cette même raison : Comme fit aussi le Capitaine Martin du Bellay lors gouverneur de Turin, en cette même contrée, le Capitaine de S. Bony : le reste de ses gens ayant été massacré à la prise de la place. Mais d'autant que le jugement de la valeur et faiblesse du lieu, se prend par l'estimation et contrepoids des forces qui l'assaillent (car tel s'opiniâtrerait justement contre deux coulevrines, qui ferait l'enragé d'attendre trente canons) ou se met encore en conte la grandeur du Prince conquérant, sa réputation, le respect qu'on lui doit : il y a danger qu'on presse un peu la balance de ce côté là. Et en advient par ces mêmes termes, que tels ont si grande opinion d'eux et de leurs moyens, que ne leur semblant raisonnable qu'il y ait rien digne de leur faire tête, ils passent le couteau par tout où ils trouvent résistance, autant que fortune leur dure : Comme il se voit par les formes de sommation et défi, que les Princes d'Orient et leurs successeurs, qui sont encore, ont en usage, fière, hautaine et pleine d'un commandement barbaresque.

Et au quartier par où les Portugais écornèrent les Indes, ils trouvèrent des états avec cette loi universelle et inviolable, que tout ennemi vaincu par le Roy en présence, ou par son Lieutenant est hors de composition de rançon et de merci.

Ainsi sur tout il se faut garder qui peut, de tomber entre les mains d'un Juge ennemi, victorieux et armé.

Essais 1, ch 13

2008-12-18T17:43:00.005-05:00

CHAPITRE XIII
Cérémonie de l'entrevue des Rois

IL n'est sujet si vain, qui ne mérite un rang en cette rapsodie. A nos règles communes, ce serait une notable discourtoisie et à l'endroit d'un pareil, et plus à l'endroit d'un grand, de faillir à vous trouver chez vous, quand il vous aurait averti d'y devoir venir : Voire ajoutait la Royne de Navarre Marguerite a ce propos, que c'était incivilité à un Gentilhomme de partir de sa maison, comme il se fait le plus souvent, pour aller au devant de celui qui le vient trouver, pour grand qu'il soit : et qu'il est plus respectueux et civil de l'attendre, pour le recevoir, ne fut que de peur de faillir sa route : et qu'il suffit de l'accompagner à son partement.

Pour moi j'oublie souvent l'un et lautre de ces vains offices : comme je retranche en ma maison autant que je puis de la cérémonie. Quelqu'un s'en offense : qu'y ferais-je ? Il vaut mieux que je l'offense pour une fois, que moi tous les jours : ce serait une sujetion continuelle. A quoi faire fuit-on la servitude des cours, si on l'entraîne jusques en sa tanière ?

C'est aussi une règle commune en toutes assemblées, qu'il touche aux moindres de se trouver les premiers à l'assignation, d'autant qu'il est mieux dû aux plus apparents de se faire attendre. Toutesfois à l'entrevue qui se dressa du Pape Clement, et du Roy François à Marseille, le Roy y aiant odonné les apprêts nécessaires, s'éloigna de la ville, et donna loisir au Pape de deux ou trois jours pour son entrée et refraîchissement, avant qu'il le vint trouver. Et de même à l'entrée aussi du Pape et de l'Empereur à Boulogne, l'Empereur donna moyen au Pape d'y être le premier et y survint après lui. C'est, disent-ils, une cérémonie ordinaire aux abouchemens de tels Princes, que le plus grand soit avant les autres au lieu assigné, voire avant celui chez qui se fait l'assemblée : et le prennent de ce biais, que c'est afin que cette apparence témoigne, que c'est le plus grand que les moindres vont trouver, et le recherchent, non pas lui eux.

Non seulement chaque pays, mais chaque cité et chaque vacation a sa civilité particulière : J'y ai été assez soigneusement dressé en mon enfance, et ai vécu en assez bonne compagnie, pour n'ignorer pas les lois de la nôtre Françoise : et en tiendrais école. J'aime à les ensuivre, mais non pas si couardement, que ma vie en demeure contrainte. Elles ont quelques formes pénibles, lesquelles pourvu qu'on oublie par discrétion, non par erreur, on n'en a pas moins de grâce. J'ai vu souvent des hommes incivils par trop de civilité, et importuns de courtoisie.

C'est au demeurant une très-utile science que la science de l'entregent. Elle est, comme la grâce et la beauté, conciliatrice des premiers abords de la societé et familiarité : et par conséquent nous ouvre la porte à nous instruire par les exemples d'autrui, et à exploiter et produire notre exemple, s'il a quelque chose d'instruisant et communicable.

Essais 1, ch 12

2008-12-18T17:43:00.003-05:00

CHAPITRE XII
De la constance

LA loi de la résolution et de la constance ne porte pas que nous ne nous devions couvrir, autant qu'il est en notre puissance, des maux et inconvéniens qui nous menassent, ni par conséquent d'avoir peur qu'ils nous surprennent. Au rebours, tous moyens honnêtes de se garantir des maux, sont non seulement permis, mais louables. Et le jeu de la constance se joue principalement à porter de pied ferme, les inconvéniens où il n'y a point de remède. De manière qu'il n'y a souplesse de corps, ni mouvement aux armes de main, que nous trouvions mauvais, s'il sert à nous garantir du coup qu'on nous rue.

Plusieurs nations très-belliqueuses se servaient en leurs faits d'armes, de la fuite, pour avantage principal, et montraient le dos à l'ennemi plus dangereusement que leur visage.

Les Turcs en retiennent quelque chose.

Et Socrates en Platon se moque de Laches, qui avait défini la fortitude, se tenir ferme en son rang contre les ennemis. Quoi, fait-il, serait ce donc lâcheté de les battre en leur faisant place ? Et lui allègue Homere, qui loue en Æneas la science de fuir. Et par ce que Laches se ravisant, avoue cet usage aux Scythes, et en fin généralement à tous gens de cheval : il lui allègue encore l'exemple des gens de pied Lacedemoniens (nation sur toutes duitte à combattre de pied ferme) qui en la journée de Platées, ne pouvant ouvrir la phalange Persienne, s'avisèrent de s'écarter et sier arrière : pour, par l'opinion de leur fuite, faire rompre et dissoudre cette masse, en les poursuivant. Par où ils se donnèrent la victoire.

Touchant les Scythes, on dit d'eux, quand Darius alla pour les subjuguer, qu'il manda à leur Roy force reproches, pour le voir toujours reculant devant lui, et gauchissant la mêlée. A quoi Indathyrsez (car ainsi se nommait-il) fit réponse, que ce n'était pour avoir peur de lui, ni d'homme vivant : mais que c'était la façon de marcher de sa nation : n'ayant ni terre cultivée, ni ville, ni maison à défendre, et à craindre que l'ennemi en put faire profit. Mais s'il avait si grand faim d'en manger, qu'il approchât pour voir le lieu de leurs anciennes sépultures, et que là il trouverait à qui parler tout son saoul.

Toutefois aux canonnades, depuis qu'on leur est planté en butte, comme les occasions de la guerre portent souvent, il est méséant de s'ébranler pour la menace du coup : d'autant que par sa violence et vitesse nous le tenons inévitable : et en y a meint un qui pour avoir ou haussé la main, ou baissé la teste, en a pour le moins apprêté à rire à ses compagnons.

Si est-ce qu'au voyage que l'Empereur Charles cinquième fit contre nous en Provence, le Marquis de Guast étant allé recognaître la ville d'Arle, et s'étant jetté hors du couvert d'un moulin à vent, à la faveur duquel il s'était approché, fut apperçu par les Seigneurs de Bonneval et Seneschal d'Agenois, qui se promenaient sus le théâtre aux arènes : lesquels l'ayant montré au Sieur de Villiers Commissaire de l'artillerie, il braqua si à propos une coulevrine, que sans ce que ledict Marquis voyant mettre le feu se lança à quartier, il fut tenu qu'il en avait dans le corps. Et de même quelques années auparavant, Laurent de Medicis, Duc d'Urbin, père de la Royne mère du Roy, assiégeant Mondolphe, place d'Italie, aux terres qu'on nomme du Vicariat, voyant mettre le feu à une pièce qui le regardait, bien lui servit de faire la cane : car autrement le coup, qui ne lui rasa que le dessus de la tête, lui donnait sans doute dans l'estomac. Pour en dire le vrai, je ne crois pas que ces mouvements se fissent avec discours : car quel jugement pouvez-vous faire de la mire haute ou basse en chose si soudaine ? et est bien plus aisé à croire, que la fortune favorisa leur frayeur : et que ce serait moyen une autre fois aussi bien pour se jeter dans le coup, que pour l'éviter.

Je ne me puis défendre si le bruit éclatant d'une harquebusade vient à me fraper les oreilles à l'imprévu, en lieu où je ne le dusse pas attendre, que je n'en tressaille : ce que j'ai vu encore avenir à d'autres qui valent mieux que moi.

Ni n'entendent les Stoiciens, que l'âme de leur sage puisse résister aux premières visions et fantaisies qui lui surviennent : ains comme à une subjection naturelle consentent qu'il cède au grand bruit du ciel, ou d'une ruine, pour exemple, jusques à la pâleur et contraction : Ainsi aux autres passions, pourvu que son opinion demeure sauve et entière, et que l'assiette de son discours n'en souffre atteinte ni altération quelconque, et qu'il ne prête nul consentement à son effroi et souffrance. De celui qui n'est pas sage, il en va de même en la première partie, mais tout autrement en la seconde. Car l'impression des passions ne demeure pas en lui superficielle : ains va pénétrant jusques au siège de sa raison, l'infectant et la corrompant. Il juge selon icelles, et s'y conforme. Voyez bien disertement et plainement l'état du sage Stoique :

Mens immota manet, lacrymæ volvuntur inanes.

Le sage Peripateticien ne s'exempte pas des perturbations, mais il les modère.

Essais 1, ch 11

2008-12-18T17:42:00.002-05:00

CHAPITRE XI
Des Prognostications

QUANT aux oracles, il est certain que bonne pièce avant la venue de Jésus Christ, ils avaient commencé à perdre leur crédit : car nous voyons que Cicéro se met en peine de trouver la cause de leur défaillance. Et ces mots sont à lui : Cur isto modo jam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo nostra ætate, sed jamdiu, ut nihil possit esse contemptius ? Mais quant aux autres prognostics, qui se tiraient de l'anatomie des bêtes aux sacrifices auxquels Platon attribue en partie la constitution naturelle des membres internes d'icelles, du trépignement des poulets, du vol des oiseaux, Aves quasdam rerum augurandarum causa natas esse putamus, des foudres, du tournoiement des rivières, Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis declarantur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis, et autres sur lesquels l'ancienneté appuyait la plupart des entreprises, tant publiques que privées ; notre Religion les a abolies. Et encore qu'il reste entre nous quelques moyens de divination és astres, és esprits, és figures du corps, és songes, et ailleurs notable exemple de la forcenée curiosité de notre nature, s'amusant à préoccuper les choses futures, comme si elle n'avait pas assez affaire à digérer les présentes :

cur hanc tibi rector Olympi
Sollicitis visum mortalibus addere curam,
Noscant venturas ut dira per omina clades.
Sit subitum quodcunque paras, sit cæca futuri
Mens hominum fati, liceat sperare timenti.

Ne utile quidem est scire quid futurum sit : Miserum est enim nihil proficientem angi. Si est-ce qu'elle est de beaucoup moindre autorité.

Voilà pourquoi l'exemple de François Marquis de Sallusse m'a semblé remarquable : car Lieutenant du Roy François en son armée delà les monts, infiniment favorisé de notre cour, et obligé au Roy du Marquisat mêmes, qui avait été confisqué de son frère : au reste ne se présentant occasion de le faire, son affection même y contredisant, se laissa si fort épouvanter, comme il a été averé, aux belles prognostications qu'on faisait lors courir de tous côtés à l'avantage de l'Empereur Charles cinquième, et à notre désavantage (mêmes en Italie, où ces folles prophéties avaient trouvé tant de place, qu'à Rome fut baillée grande somme d'argent au change, pour cette opinion de notre ruine) qu'après s'être souvent condolu à ses privés, des maux qu'il voyait inévitablement préparés à la couronne de France, et aux amis qu'il y avait, se révolta, et changea de parti : à son grand dommage pourtant, quelque constellation qu'il y eut. Mais il s'y conduisit en homme combatu de diverses passions : car ayant et villes et forces en sa main, l'armée ennemie sous Antoine de Leve à trois pas de lui, et nous sans soupçon de son fait, il estait en lui de faire pis qu'il ne fit. Car pour sa trahison nous ne perdîmes ni homme, ni ville que Fossan : encore après l'avoir long temps contestée.

Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus,
Ridétque si mortalis ultra
Fas trepidat.
Ille potens sui
Lætusque deget, cui licet in diem
Dixisse, vixi, cras vel atra
Nube polum pater occupato,
Vel sole puro.
Lætus in præsens animus, quod ultra est,
Oderit curare.

Et ceux qui croient ce mot au contraire, le croient à tort. Ista sic reciprocantur, ut Et si divinatio sit, dii sint : Et si dii sint, sit divinatio. Beaucoup plus sagement Pacuvius :

Nam istis qui linguam avium intelligunt,
Plusque ex alieno jecore sapiunt, quam ex suo,
Magis audiendum quam auscultandum censeo.

Cette tant celébrée art de deviner des Toscans naquit ainsi. Un laboureur perçant de son coultre profondément la terre, en veid sourdre Tages demi-dieu, d'un visage enfantin, mais de sénile prudence. Chacun y accourut, et furent ses paroles et science recueillie et conservée à plusieurs siècles, contenant les principes et moyens de cet art. Naissance conforme à son progrès.

J'aimerais bien mieux régler mes affaires par le sort des dés que par ces songes.

Et de vrai en toutes républiques on a toujours laissé bonne part d'autorité au sort. Platon en la police qu'il forge à discrétion, lui attribue la décision de plusieurs effects d'importance, et veut entre autres choses, que les mariages se fassent par sort entre les bons. Et donne si grand poids à cette élection fortuite, que les enfans qui en naissent, il ordonne qu'ils soient nourris au païs : ceux qui naissent des mauvais, en soient mis hors : Toutefois si quelqu'un de ces bannis venait par cas d'adventure à montrer en croissant quelque bonne espérance de soi, qu'on le puisse rappeller, et exiler aussi celui d'entre les retenus, qui montrera peu d'espérance de son adolescence.

J'en vois qui étudient et glosent leurs Almanacs, et nous en allèguent l'autorité aux choses qui se passent. A tant dire, il faut qu'ils dient et la verité et le mensonge. Quis est enim, qui totum diem jaculans, non aliquando conlineet ? Je ne les estime de rien mieux, pour les voir tomber en quelque rencontre. Ce serait plus de certitude s'il y avait règle et vérité à mentir toujours. Joint que personne ne tient registre de leurs mescontes, d'autant qu'ils sont ordinaires et infinis : et fait-on valoir leurs divinations de ce qu'elles sont rares, incroyables, et prodigieuses. Ainsi répondit Diagoras, qui fut surnommé l'Athée, étant en la Samothrace, à celui qui en lui montrant au Temple force voeux et tableaux de ceux qui avaient échappé le naufrage, lui dit : Et bien vous, qui pensez que les Dieux mettent à nonchaloir les choses humaines, que dittes vous de tant d'hommes sauvés par leur grace ? Il se fait ainsi, répondit-il : Ceux là ne sont pas peints qui sont demeurés noyés, en bien plus grand nombre. Cicéro dit, que le seul Xenophanes Colophonien entre tous les Philosophes, qui ont avoué les Dieux, a essayé de déraciner toute sorte de divination. D'autant est-il moins de merveille, si nous avons vu par fois à leur dommage, aucunes de nos ames principesques s'arrêter à ces vanités.

Je voudrais bien avoir reconnu de mes yeux ces deux merveilles, du livre de Joachim Abbé Calabrois, qui prédisait tous les Papes futurs ; leurs noms et formes : Et celui de Leon l'Empereur qui prédisait les Empereurs et Patriarches de Grèce. Ceci ai-je reconnu de mes yeux, qu'és confusions publiques, les hommes étonnés de leur fortune, se vont rejettant, comme à toute superstition, à rechercher au ciel les causes et menaces anciennes de leur malheur : et y sont si étrangement heureux de mon temps, qu'ils m'ont persuadé, qu'ainsi que c'est un amusement d'esprits aigus et oisifs, ceux qui sont duicts à cette subtilité de les replier et dénouer, seraient en tous écrits capables de trouver tout ce qu'ils y demandent. Mais sur tout leur prête beau jeu, le parler obscur, ambigu et fantastique du jargon prophétique, auquel leurs autheurs ne donnent aucun sens clair, afin que la postérité y en puisse appliquer de tel qu'il lui plaira.

Le démon de Socrates était à l'avanture certaine impulsion de volonté, qui se presentait à lui sans le conseil de son discours. En une âme bien épurée, comme la sienne, et preparée par continu exercice de sagesse et de vertu, il est vraisemblale que ces inclinations, quoi que téméraires et indigestes, étaient toujours importantes et dignes d'être suivies. Chacun sent en soi quelque image de telles agitations d'une opinion prompte, véhémente et fortuite. C'est à moi de leur donner quelque authorité, qui en donne si peu à notre prudence. Et en ai eu de pareillement faibles en raison, et violentes en persuasion, ou en dissuasion, qui était plus ordinaire à Socrates, auxquelles je me laissai emporter si utilement et heureusement, qu'elles pourraient être jugées tenir quelque chose d'inspiration divine.

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Essais 1, ch 9

2008-12-18T17:40:00.007-05:00

CHAPITRE IX
Des Menteurs

IL n'est homme à qui il sise si mal de se mêler de parler de mémoire. Car je n'en reconnais quasi trace en moi : et ne pense qu'il y en ait au monde, une autre si merveilleuse en défaillance. J'ai toutes mes autres parties viles et communes, mais en cette-là je pense être singulier et très-rare, et digne de gagner nom et réputation.

Outre l'inconvénient naturel que j'en souffre (car certes, vu sa nécessité, Platon a raison de la nommer une grande et puissante déesse) si en mon pays on veut dire qu'un homme n'a point de sens, ils disent, qu'il n'a point de mémoire : et quand je me plains du défaut de la mienne : ils me reprennent et mescroient, comme si je m'accusais d'être insensé : Ils ne voient pas de choix entre mémoire et entendement. C'est bien empirer mon marché : Mais ils me font tort : car il se voit par expérience plutôt au rebours, que les mémoires excellentes se joignent volontiers aux jugements débiles. Ils me font tort aussi en ceci, qui ne sait rien si bien faire qu'être ami, que les mêmes paroles qui accusent ma maladie, représentent l'ingratitude. On se prend de mon affection à ma mémoire, et d'un défaut naturel, on en fait un défaut de conscience. Il a oublié, dit-on, cette prière ou cette promesse : il ne se souvient point de ses amis : il ne s'est point souvenu de dire, ou faire, ou taire cela, pour l'amour de moi. Certes je puis aisément oublier : mais de mettre à nonchalloir la charge que mon ami m'a donnée, je ne le fais pas. Qu'on se contente de ma misère, sans en faire une espèce de malice : et de la malice autant ennemie de mon humeur.

Je me console aucunement. Premièrement sur ce, que c'est un mal duquel principalement j'ai tiré la raison de corriger un mal pire, qui se fut facilement produit en moi : Savoir est l'ambition, car cette défaillance est insupportable à qui s'empêtre des négociations du monde. Que comme disent plusieurs pareils exemples du progrès de nature, elle a volontiers fortifié d'autres facultés en moi, à mesure que cette-ci s'est affaiblie, et irait facilement couchant et alanguissant mon esprit et mon jugement, sur les traces d'autrui, sans exercer leurs propres forces, si les inventions et opinions étrangères m'étaient présentes par le bénéfice de la mémoire. Que mon parler en est plus court : Car le magasin de la mémoire, est volontiers plus fourni de matière, que n'est celui de l'invention. Si elle m'eut tenu bon, j'eusse assourdi tous mes amis de babil : les sujets éveillant cette telle quelle faculté que j'ai de les manier et employer, échauffant et attirant mes discours. C'est pitié : je l'essaye par la preuve d'aucuns de mes privés amis : à mesure que la mémoire leur fournit la chose entière et présente, ils reculent si arrière leur narration, et la chargent de tant de vaines circonstances, que si le conte est bon, ils en étouffent la bonté : s'il ne l'est pas, vous êtes à maudire ou l'heur de leur mémoire, ou le malheur de leur jugement. Et c'est chose difficile, de fermer un propos, et de le couper depuis qu'on est arroutté. Et n'est rien, où la force d'un cheval se connaisse plus, qu'à faire un arrêt rond et net. Entre les pertinents mêmes, j'en vois qui veulent et ne se peuvent défaire de leur course. Ce pendant qu'ils cherchent le point de clore le pas, ils s'en vont balivernant et traînant comme des hommes qui défaillent de faiblesse. Sur tout les vieillards sont dangereux, à qui la souvenance des choses passées demeure, et ont perdu la souvenance de leurs redites. J'ai vu des récits bien plaisants, devenir très-ennuyeux, en la bouche d'un seigneur, chacun de l'assistance en ayant été abreuvé cent fois. Secondement qu'il me souvient moins des offenses reçues, ainsi que disait cet ancien. Il me faudrait un protocole, comme Darius, pour n'oublier l'offense qu'il avait reçue des Athéniens, faisait qu'un page à tous les coups qu'il se mettait à table, lui vint rechanter par trois fois à l'oreille, Sire, souvenez vous des Athéniens, et que les lieux et les livres que je revois, me rient toujours d'une fraîche nouvelleté.

Ce n'est pas sans raison qu'on dit, que qui ne se sent point assez ferme de mémoire, ne se doit pas mêler d'être menteur. Je sais bien que les grammairiens font différence, entre dire mensonge, et mentir : et disent que dire mensonge, c'est dire chose fausse, mais qu'on a pris pour vraie, et que la définition du mot de mentir en Latin, d'où notre Français est parti, porte autant comme aller contre sa conscience : et que par conséquent cela ne touche que ceux qui disent contre ce qu'ils savent, desquels je parle. Or ceux ici, ou ils inventent marc et tout, ou ils déguisent et altèrent un fonds véritable. Lors qu'ils déguisent et changent, à les remettre souvent en ce même conte, il est mal-aisé qu'ils ne se déferrent : par ce que la chose, comme elle est, s'étant logée la première dans la mémoire, et s'y étant empreinte, par la voie de la connaissance et de la science, il est mal-aisé qu'elle ne se représente à l'imagination, délogeant la fausseté, qui n'y peut avoir le pied si ferme, ni si rassis : et que les circonstances du premier aprentissage, se coulant à tous coups dans l'esprit, ne fassent perdre le souvenir des pièces raportées fausses ou abâtardies. En ce qu'ils inventent tout à fait, d'autant qu'il n'y a nulle impression contraire, qui choque leur fausseté, ils semblent avoir d'autant moins à craindre de se méconter. Toutefois encore ceci, par ce que c'est un corps vain, et sans prise, échappe volontiers à la mémoire, si elle n'est bien assurée. Dequoi j'ai souvent vu l'expérience, et plaisamment, aux dépens de ceux qui font profession de ne former autrement leur parole, que selon qu'il sert aux affaires qu'ils négocient, et qu'il plaît aux grands à qui ils parlent. Car ces circonstances à quoi ils veulent asservir leur foi et leur conscience, étant sujettes à plusieurs changements, il faut que leur parole se diversifie quand et quand : d'où il advient que de même chose, ils disent, tantôt gris, tantôt jaune : à tel homme d'une sorte, à tel d'une autre : et si par fortune ces hommes rapportent en butin leurs instructions si contraires, que devient ce bel art ? Outre ce qu'imprudemment ils se déferrent eux-mêmes si souvent : car quelle mémoire leur pourrait suffire à se souvenir de tant de diverses formes, qu'ils ont forgées en un même sujet ? J'ai vu plusieurs de mon temps, envier la réputation de cette belle sorte de prudence : qui ne voient pas, que si la réputation y est, l'effet n'y peut être.

En verité le mentir est un maudit vice. Nous ne sommes hommes, et ne nous tenons les uns aux autres que par la parole. Si nous en connaissions l'horreur et le poids, nous le poursuivrions à feu, plus justement que d'autres crimes. Je trouve qu'on s'amuse ordinairement à châtier aux enfants des erreurs innocentes, très mal à propos, et qu'on les tourmente pour des actions téméraires, qui n'ont ni impression ni suite. La menterie seule, et un peu au dessous, l'opiniâtreté, me semblent être celles desquelles on devrait à toute instance combattre la naissance et le progrès, elles croissent quand et eux : et depuis qu'on a donné ce faux train à la langue, c'est merveille combien il est impossible de l'en retirer. Par où il advient, que nous voyons des honnêtes hommes d'ailleurs, y être sujets et asservis. J'ai un bon garçon de tailleur, à qui je n'ouïs jamais dire une verité, non pas quand elle s'offre pour lui servir utilement.

Si comme la vérité, le mensonge n'avait qu'un visage, nous serions en meilleurs termes : car nous prendrions pour certain l'opposé de ce que dirait le menteur. Mais le revers de la varité a cent mille figures, et un champ indéfini.

Les Pythagoriens font le bien certain et fini, le mal infini et incertain. Mille routes dévient du blanc : une y va. Certes je ne m'assure pas, que je puisse venir à bout de moi, à garantir un danger évident et extrême, par une effrontée et solenne mensonge.

Un ancien père dit, que nous sommes mieux en la compagnie d'un chien connu, qu'en celle d'un homme, duquel le langage nous est inconnu. Ut externus alieno non sit hominis vice. Et de combien est le langage faux moins sociable que le silence ?

Le Roy François premier, se vantait d'avoir mis au rouet par ce moyen, Francisque Taverna, ambassadeur de François Sforce Duc de Milan, homme très-fameux en science de parlerie. Cettui-ci avait été dépêché pour excuser son maître envers sa Majesté, d'un fait de grande conséquence ; qui était tel. Le Roy pour maintenir toujours quelques intelligences en Italie, d'où il avait été dernièrement chassé, même au Duché de Milan, avait avisé d'y tenir près du Duc un Gentilhomme de sa part, ambassadeur par effet, mais par apparence homme privé, qui fit la mine d'y être pour ses affaires particulières : d'autant que le Duc, qui dépendait beaucoup plus de l'Empereur (lors principalement qu'il était en traité de mariage avec sa nièce, fille du Roy de Danemark, qui est à présent douairière de Lorraine) ne pouvait découvrir avoir aucune pratique et conférence avec nous, sans son grand intérêt. A cette commission, se trouva propre un Gentil-homme Milannois, écuyer d'écurie chez le Roy, nommé Merveille. Cettui-ci dépêché avec lettres secrètes de créance, et instructions d'ambassadeur ; et avec d'autres lettres de recommendation envers le Duc, en faveur de ses affaires particulières, pour le masque et la montre, fut si long temps auprès du Duc, qu'il en vint quelque ressentiment à l'Empereur : qui donna cause à ce qui s'ensuivit après, comme nous pensons : Ce fut, que sous couleur de quelque meurtre, voila le Duc qui lui fait trancher la tête de belle nuit, et son procès fait en deux jours. Messire Francisque étant venu près d'une longue déduction contrefaite de cette histoire ; car le Roy s'en était adressé, pour demander raison, à tous les Princes de Chrétienneté, et au Duc même : fut ouï aux affaires du matin, et ayant établi pour le fondement de sa cause, et dressé à cette fin, plusieurs belles apparences du fait : Que son maître n'avait jamais pris notre homme, que pour gentil-homme privé, et sien sujet, qui était venu faire ses affaires à Milan, et qui n'avait jamais vécu là sous autre visage : désavouant même avoir su qu'il fut en état de la maison du Roy, ni connu de lui, tant s'en faut qu'il le prit pour ambassadeur. Le Roy à son tour le pressant de diverses objections et demandes, et le chargeant de toutes parts, l'accula en fin sur le point de l'exécution faite de nuit, et comme à la dérobée. A quoi le pauvre homme embarrassé, répondit, pour faire l'honnête, que pour le respect de sa Majesté, le Duc eut été bien marri, que telle exécution se fut faite de jour. Chacun peut penser, comme il fut relevé, s'étant si lourdement coupé, à l'endroit d'un tel nez que celui du Roy François.

Le Pape Jule second, ayant envoyé un ambassadeur vers le Roy d'Angleterre, pour l'animer contre le Roy François, l'ambassadeur ayant été ouï sur sa charge, et le Roy d'Angleterre s'étant arrêté en sa réponse, aux difficultés qu'il trouvait à dresser les préparatifs qu'il faudrait pour combattre un Roy si puissant, et en alléguant quelques raisons : l'ambassadeur répliqua mal à propos, qu'il les avait aussi considérées de sa part, et les avait bien dites au Pape. De cette parole si éloignée de sa proposition, qui était de le pousser incontinent à la guerre, le Roy d'Angleterre prit le premier argument de ce qu'il trouva depuis par effet, que cet ambassadeur, de son intention particulière pendait du côté de France, et en ayant averti son maître, ses biens furent confisqués, et ne tint à guère qu'il n'en perdit la vie.

Essais 1, ch 10

2008-12-18T17:40:00.006-05:00

CHAPITRE X
Du parler prompt ou tardif

Onc ne furent à tous toutes graces données.

AUSSI voyons nous qu'au don d'éloquence, les uns ont la facilité et la promptitude, et ce qu'on dit, le boutehors si aisé, qu'à chaque bout de champ ils sont prêts : les autres plus tardifs ne parlent jamais rien qu'élaboré et prémédité. Comme on donne des règles aux dames de prendre les jeux et les exercices du corps, selon l'avantage de ce qu'elles ont le plus beau. Si j'avais à conseiller de mêmes, en ces deux divers avantages de l'éloquence, de laquelle il semble en notre siècle, que les prêcheurs et les avocats fassent principale profession, le tardif serait mieux prêcheur, ce me semble, et l'autre mieux avocat : Par ce que la charge de celui-là lui donne autant qu'il lui plaît de loisir pour se preparer ; et puis sa carrière se passe d'un fil et d'une suite, sans interruption : là où les commodités de l'avocat le pressent à toute heure de se mettre en lice : et les réponses imprévues de sa partie adverse, le rejettent de son branle, où il lui faut sur le champ prendre nouveau parti.

Si est-ce qu'à l'entrevue du Pape Clément et du Roy François à Marseille, il advint tout au rebours, que monsieur Poyet, homme toute sa vie nourri au barreau, en grande réputation, ayant charge de faire la harangue au Pape, et l'ayant de longue main pourpensée, voire, à ce qu'on dit, apportée de Paris toute prête, le jour même qu'elle devait être prononcée, le Pape se craignant qu'on lui tint propos qui put offenser les ambassadeurs des autres Princes qui étaient autour de lui, manda au Roy l'argument qui lui semblait être le plus propre au temps et au lieu, mais de fortune, tout autre que celui, sur lequel monsieur Poyet s'était travaillé : de façon que sa harangue demeurait inutile, et lui en fallait promptement refaire une autre. Mais s'en sentant incapable, il fallut que Monsieur le Cardinal du Bellay en prit la charge.

La part de l'Avocat est plus difficile que celle du Prêcheur : et nous trouvons pourtant ce m'est avis plus de passables Avocats que Prêcheurs, au moins en France.

Il semble que ce soit plus le propre de l'esprit, d'avoir son opération prompte et soudaine, et plus le propre du jugement, de l'avoir lente et posée. Mais qui demeure du tout muet, s'il n'a loisir de se préparer : et celui aussi, à qui le loisir ne donne avantage de mieux dire, ils sont en pareil degré d'étrangeté. On récite de Severus Cassius, qu'il disait mieux sans y avoir pensé : qu'il devait plus à la fortune qu'à sa diligence : qu'il lui venait à profit d'être troublé en parlant : et que ses adversaires craignaient de le piquer, de peur que la colère ne lui fit redoubler son éloquence. Je connais par expérience cette condition de nature, qui ne peut soutenir une véhémente préméditation et laborieuse : si elle ne va gayement et librement, elle ne va rien qui vaille. Nous disons d'aucuns ouvrages qu'ils puent à l'huile et à la lampe, pour certaine âpreté et rudesse, que le travail imprime en ceux où il a grande part. Mais outre cela, la solicitude de bien faire, et cette contention de l'âme trop bandée et trop tendue à son entreprise, la rompt et l'empêche, ainsi qu'il advient à l'eau, qui par force de se presser de sa violence et abondance, ne peut trouver issue en un goulet ouvert.

En cette condition de nature, de quoi je parle, il y a quant et quant aussi cela, qu'elle demande à être non pas ébranlée et piquée par ces passions fortes, comme la colère de Cassius, (car ce mouvement serait trop âpre) elle veut être non pas secouée, mais sollicitée : elle veut être échauffée et réveillée par les occasions étrangères, présentes et fortuites. Si elle va toute seule, elle ne fait que traîner et languir : l'agitation est sa vie et sa grâce.

Je ne me tiens pas bien en ma possession et disposition : le hasard y a plus de droit que moi, l'occasion, la compagnie, le branle même de ma voix, tire plus de mon esprit, que je n'y trouve lors que je le sonde et emploie à part moi.

Ainsi les paroles en valent mieux que les écrits, s'il y peut avoir choix où il n'y a point de prix.

Ceci m'advient aussi, que je ne me trouve pas où je me cherche : et me trouve plus par rencontre, que par l'inquisition de mon jugement. J'auray élancé quelque subtilité en écrivant. J'entends bien, mornée pour un autre, affilée pour moi. Laissons toutes ces honnêtetés. Cela se dit par chacun selon sa force. Je l'ai si bien perdue que je ne sais ce que j'ai voulu dire : et l'a l'étranger découverte parfois avant moi. Si je portais le rasoir par tout où cela m'advient, je me déferais tout. Le rencontre m'en offrira le jour quelque autre fois, plus apparent que celui du midi : et me fera étonner de ma hésitation.

index

Essais 1, ch 8

2008-12-18T17:38:00.002-05:00

CHAPITRE VIII
De l'Oysiveté

COMME nous voyons des terres oisives, si elles sont grasses et fertiles, foisonner en cent mille sortes d'herbes sauvages et inutiles, et que pour les tenir en office, il les faut assujettir et employer à certaines semences, pour notre service. Et comme nous voyons, que les femmes produisent bien toutes seules, des amas et pièces de chair informes, mais que pour faire une génération bonne et naturelle, il les faut embesogner d'une autre semence : ainsi est-il des esprits, si on ne les occupe à certain sujet, qui les bride et contraigne, ils se jettent déréglés, par-ci par là, dans le vague champ des imaginations.

Sicut aquæ tremulum labris ubi lumen ahenis
Sole repercussum, aut radiantis imagine Lunæ,
Omnia pervolitat latè loca, jamque sub auras
Erigitur, summique ferit laquearia tecti.
(Comme l'eau tremblante d'un vase de bronze
reflète les rayons du soleil et la face de la lune,
la lumière vole partout, s'élève dans les airs
frappe les plafonds lambrisés. )

Et n'est folie ni rêverie, qu'ils ne produisent en cette agitation,

velut ægri somnia, vanæ
Finguntur species.
(Ils se créent des chimères
Comme les songes des malades)

L'âme qui n'a point de but établi, elle se perd : Car comme on dit, c'est n'être en aucun lieu, que d'être par tout.

Quisquis ubique habitat, Maxime, nusquam habitat.

Dernièrement que je me retirai chez moi, délibéré autant que je pourrai, ne me mêler d'autre chose, que de passer en repos, et à part, ce peu qui me reste de vie : il me semblait ne pouvoir faire plus grande faveur à mon esprit, que de le laisser en pleine oisiveté, s'entretenir soi-mêmes, et s'arrêter et rasseoir en soi : Ce que j'espérais qu'il put meshuy faire plus aisément, devenu avec le temps, plus pesant, et plus mûr : Mais je trouve,

variam semper dant otia mentem,

qu'au rebours faisant le cheval échappé, il se donne cent fois plus de carrière à soi-mêmes, qu'il ne prenait pour autrui : et m'enfante tant de chimères et monstres fantasques les uns sur les autres, sans ordre, et sans propos, que pour en contempler à mon aise l'ineptie et l'étrangeté, j'ai commencé de les mettre en rôle : espérant avec le temps, lui en faire honte à lui mêmes.

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Essais 1, ch 7

2008-12-18T17:37:00.002-05:00

CHAPITRE VII
Que l'intention juge nos actions

LA mort, dit-on, nous acquitte de toutes nos obligations. J'en sais qui l'ont pris en diverse façon. Henry septième Roy d'Angleterre fit composition avec Dom Philippe fils de l'Empereur Maximilian, ou pour le confronter plus honorablement, père de l'Empereur Charles cinquième, que ledit Philippe remettait entre ses mains le Duc de Suffolk de la Rose blanche, son ennemi, lequel s'en était fui et retiré au Pays Bas, moyennant qu'il promettait de n'attenter rien sur la vie dudit Duc : toutefois venant à mourir, il commanda par son testament à son fils, de le faire mourir, soudain après qu'il serait décédé.

Dernièrement en cette tragédie que le Duc d'Albe nous fit voir à Bruxelles és Contes de Horne et d'Aiguemond, il y eut tout plein de choses remarquables : et entre autres que ledit Comte d'Aiguemond, sous la foi et assurance duquel le Comte de Horne s'était venu rendre au Duc d'Albe, requit avec grande instance, qu'on le fit mourir le premier : afin que sa mort l'affranchît de l'obligation qu'il avait audit Comte de Horne. Il semble que la mort n'ait point déchargé le premier de sa foi donnée, et que le second en était quitte, mêmes sans mourir. Nous ne pouvons être tenus au delà de nos forces et de nos moyens. A cette cause, par ce que les effets et exécutions ne sont aucunement en notre puissance, et qu'il n'y a rien en bon escient en notre puissance, que la volonté : en celle là se fondent par necessité et s'établissent toutes les règles du devoir de l'homme. Par ainsi le Comte d'Aiguemond tenant son âme et volonté endettée à sa promesse, bien que la puissance de l'effectuer ne fût pas en ses mains, était sans doute absous de son devoir, quand il eut survécu le Comte de Horne. Mais le Roy d'Angleterre faillant à sa parole par son intention, ne se peut excuser pour avoir retardé jusque après sa mort l'exécution de sa déloyauté : Non plus que le maçon de Hérodote, lequel ayant loyalement conservé durant sa vie le secret des trésors du Roy d'Egypte son maître, mourant les découvrit à ses enfans.

J'ai vu plusieurs de mon temps convaincus par leur conscience retenir de l'autrui, se disposer à y satisfaire par leur testament et après leur décès. Ils ne font rien qui vaille. Ni de prendre terme à chose si pressante, ni de vouloir rétablir une injure avec si peu de leur ressentiment et interêt. Ils doivent du plus leur. Et d'autant qu'ils payent plus pesamment, et incommodément : d'autant en est leur satisfaction plus juste et méritoire. La pénitence demande à charger.

Ceux là font encore pis, qui réservent la déclaration de quelque haineuse volonté envers le proche à leur dernière volonté, l'ayant cachée pendant la vie. Et montrent avoir peu de soin du propre honneur, irritant l'offensé à l'encontre de leur mémoire : et moins de leur conscience, n'ayant pour le respect de la mort même, su faire mourir leur maltalent : et en étendant la vie outre la leur. Iniques juges, qui remettent à juger alors qu'ils n'ont plus connaissance de cause.

Je me garderai, si je puis, que ma mort dise chose, que ma vie n'ait premièrement dit et apertement.

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Essais ch 6

2008-12-18T16:34:00.005-05:00

CHAPITRE VI
L'heure des parlemens dangereuse

TOUTES-FOIS je vis dernièrement en mon voisinage de Mussidan, que ceux qui en furent délogés à force par notre armée, et autres de leur parti, criaient comme de trahison, de ce que pendant les entremises d'accord, et le traité se continuant encore, on les avait surpris et mis en pièces. Chose qui eut eu à l'aventure apparence en autre siècle ; mais, comme je viens de dire, nos façons sont entièrement éloignées de ces règles : et ne se doit attendre fiance des uns aux autres, que le dernier s(c)eau d'obligation n'y soit passé : encore y a il lors assez affaire.

Et a toujours été conseil hasardeux, de fier à la licence d'une armée victorieuse l'observation de la foi, qu'on a donnée à une ville, qui vient de se rendre par douce et favorable composition, et d'en laisser sur la chaude, l'entrée libre aux soldats. L(ucius) Æmylius Regillus Prêteur Romain, ayant perdu son temps à essayer de prendre la ville de Phocées à force, pour la singulière prouesse des habitants à se bien défendre, fit pache avec eux, de les recevoir pour amis du peuple Romain, et d'y entrer comme en ville confédérée : leur ôtant toute crainte d'action hostile. Mais y ayant quand et lui introduit son armée, pour s'y faire voir en plus de pompe, il ne fut en sa puissance, quelque effort qu'il y employât, de tenir la bride à ses gens : et vit devant ses yeux fourrager bonne partie de la ville : les droits de l'avarice et de la vengeance, suppéditant ceux de son autorité et de la discipline militaire.

Cléomènes disait, que quelque mal qu'on puisset faire aux ennemis en guerre, cela estait par dessus la justice, et non sujet à icelle, tant envers les dieux, qu'envers les hommes : et ayant fait trève avec les Argiens pour sept jours, la troisième nuit après il les alla charger tous endormis, et les défit, alleguant qu'en sa trève il n'avait pas été parlé des nuits : Mais les dieux vengèrent cette perfide subtilité.

Pendant le Parlement, et qu'ils musaient sur leurs sûretés, la ville de Casilinum fut saisie par surprise. Et cela pourtant au siècle et des plus justes Capitaines et de la plus parfaite milice Romaine : Car il n'est pas dit, qu'en temps et lieu il ne soit permis de nous prévaloir de la sottise de nos ennemis, comme nous faisons de leur lâcheté. Et certes la guerre a naturellement beaucoup de privilèges raisonnables au préjudice de la raison. Et ici faut la règle, neminem id agere, ut ex alterius prædetur inscitia. (on ne doit pas chercher à profiter de l'ignorance d'autrui)

Mais je m'étonne de l'étendue que Xénophon leur donne, et par les propos, et par divers exploits de son parfait Empereur : auteur de merveilleux poids en telles choses, comme grand Capitaine et Philosophe des premiers disciples de Socrates, et ne consens pas à la mesure de sa dispense en tout et par tout.

Monsieur d'Aubigny assiégeant Capoue, et après y avoir fait une furieuse batterie, le Seigneur Fabrice Colonne, Capitaine de la ville, ayant commencé à parlementer de dessus un bastion, et ses gens faisants plus molle garde, les nôtres s'en emparèrent, et mirent tout en pieces. Et de plus fresche memoire à Yvoy, le seigneur Julian Rommero, ayant fait ce pas de clerc de sortir pour parlementer avec Monsieur le Connétable, trouva au retour sa place saisie. Mais afin que nous ne nous en allions pas sans revanche, le Marquis de Pesquaire assiégeant Gênes, ou le Duc Octavian Fregose commandait sous notre protection, et l'accord entre eux ayant été poussé si avant, qu'on le tenait pour fait, sur le point de la conclusion, les Espagnols s'étans coulés dedans, en usèrent comme en une victoire plénière : et depuis à Ligny en Barrois, où le Comte de Brienne commandait, l'Empereur l'ayant assiegé en personne, et Bertheuille Lieutenant dudit Comte étant sorti pour parlementer, pendant le parlement la ville se trouva saisie.

Fu il vincer sempre mai laudabil cosa,
Vincasi o per fortuna o per ingegno,
(Vaincre est toujours chose louable,
Que ce soit par chance ou par ingéniosité)

disent-ils : Mais le Philosophe Chrysippus n'eut pas été de cet avis : et moi aussi peu. Car il disait que ceux qui courent à l'envie, doivent bien employer toutes leurs forces à la vistesse, mais il ne leur est pourtant aucunement loisible de mettre la main sur leur adversaire pour l'arrêter : ni de lui tendre la jambe, pour le faire choir.

Et plus généreusement encore ce grand Alexandre, à Polypercon, qui lui (per)suadait de se servir de l'avantage que l'obscurité de la nuit lui donnait pour assaillir Darius. Point, dit-il, ce n'est pas à moi de chercher des victoires dérobées : malo me fortunæ poeniteat, quam victoriæ pudeat. (je préfère souffrir de la fortune, que d'avoir honte de ma victoire)

Atque idem fugientem haud est dignatus Orodem
Sternere, nec jacta cæcum dare cuspide vulnus :
Obvius, adversoque occurrit, seque viro vir
Contulit, haud furto melior, sed fortibus armis.
(Il ne daigna pas frapper Orode dans sa fuite
Ni le blesser d'une lance qu'il ne verrait pas
Il courut vers lui, et le confronta face à face
Il ne gagna pas par la ruse, mais par les armes)

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Essais, Ch 5

2008-12-13T19:02:00.003-05:00

CHAPITRE V
Si le chef d'une place assiegee, doit sortir pour parlementer

LUCIUS MARCIUS Légat des Romains, en la guerre contre Perséus, Roy de Macédoine, voulant gagner le temps qu'il lui fallait encore à mettre en point son armée, sema des entregets d'accord, desquels le Roy endormi accorda trève pour quelques jours fournissant par ce moyen son ennemi d'opportunité et loisir pour s'armer : d'où le Roy encourut sa dernière ruine. Si est-ce, que les vieux du Sénat, mémoratifs des moeurs de leurs pères, accusèrent cette pratique, comme ennemie de leur style ancien : qui fut, disaient-ils, combattre de vertu, non de finesse, ni par surprises et rencontres de nuit, ni par fuites apostées, et recharges inopinées : n'entreprenant guerre, qu'après l'avoir dénoncée, et souvent après avoir assigné l'heure et lieu de la bataille. De cette conscience ils renvoyèrent à Pyrrhus son traître Médecin, et aux Phalisques leur déloyal maître d'école. C'étaient les formes vraiement Romaines, non de la Grecque subtilité et astuce Punique, ou le vaincre par force est moins glorieux que par fraude. Le tromper peut servir pour le coup : mais celui seul se tient pour surmonté, qui sait l'avoir été ni par ruse, ni de sort, mais par vaillance, de troupe à troupe, en une franche et juste guerre. Il appert bien par ce langage de ces bonnes gens, qu'ils n'avaient encore reçu cette belle sentence :

dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat ?

Les Achaïens, dit Polybe, detestaient toute voie de tromperie en leurs guerres, n'estimant victoire, sinon où les courages des ennemis sont abbatus. Eam vir sanctus et sapiens sciet veram esse victoriam, quæ salva fide, et integra dignitate parabitur, dit un autre :

Vos ne velit, an me regnare hera : quidve ferat fors
Virtute experiamur.

Au Royaume de Ternate, parmi ces nations que si à pleine bouche nous appelons Barbares, la coutume porte, qu'ils n'entreprennent guerre sans l'avoir denoncée : y ajoutant ample déclaration des moyens qu'ils ont à y employer, quels, combien d'hommes, quelles munitions, quelles armes, offensives et défensives. Mais aussi cela fait, ils se donnent loi de se servir à leur guerre, sans reproche, de tout ce qui aide à vaincre.

Les anciens Florentins étaient si éloignés de vouloir gagner avantage sur leurs ennemis par surprise, qu'ils les avertissaient un mois avant que de mettre leur exercite aux champs, par le continuel son de la cloche qu'ils nommaient, Martinella.

Quant à nous moins superstitieux, qui tenons celui avoir l'honneur de la guerre, qui en a le profit, et qui après Lysander, disons que, où la peau du Lyon ne peut suffire, il y faut coudre un lopin de celle du Renard, les plus ordinaires occasions de surprise se tirent de cette pratique : et n'est heure, disons nous, où un chef doive avoir plus l'oeil au guet, que celle des parlements et traités d'accord. Et pour cette cause, c'est une règle en la bouche de tous les hommes de guerre de notre temps, Qu'il ne faut jamais que le gouverneur en une place assiègée sorte lui même pour parlementer. Du temps de nos pères cela fut reproché aux seigneurs de Montmord et de l'Assigni, défendant Mouson contre le Conte de Nansau. Mais aussi à ce conte, celui là serait excusable, qui sortirait en telle façon, que la sûreté et l'avantage demeurât de son côté : Comme fit en la ville de Regge, le Comte Guy de Rangon (s'il en faut croire du Bellay, car Guicciardin dit que ce fut lui même) lors que le Seigneur de l'Escut s'en approcha pour parlementer : car il abandonna de si peu son fort, qu'un trouble s'étant ému pendant ce parlement, non seulement Monsieur de l'Escut et sa troupe, qui était approchée avec lui, se trouva le plus faible, de façon qu'Alexandre Trivulce y fut tué, mais lui même fut contraint, pour le plus sûr, de suivre le Comte, et se jetter sur sa foi à l'abri des coups dans la ville.

Eumenes en la ville de Nora pressé par Antigonus qui l'assiègeait, de sortir pour lui parler, alléguant que c'était raison qu'il vînt devers lui, attendu qu'il était le plus grand et le plus fort : après avoir fait cette noble réponse : Je n'estimerai jamais homme plus grand que moi, tant que j'aurai mon épée en ma puissance, n'y consentit, qu'Antigonus ne lui eut donné Ptolomæus son propre neveu otage, comme il demandait.

Si est-ce qu'encore en y a-il, qui se sont trèsbien trouvés de sortir sur la parole de l'aissaillant : Témoin Henry de Vaux, Chevalier Champenois, lequel étant assiègé dans le Château de Commercy par les Anglais, et Barthélémy de Bonnes, qui commandait au siège, ayant par dehors fait saper la plupart du Château, si qu'il ne restait que le feu pour accabler les assiègés sous les ruines, somma ledit Henry de sortir à parlementer pour son profit, comme il fit lui quatrième ; et son évidente ruine lui ayant été montrée à l'oeil, il s'en sentit singulièrement obligé à l'ennemi : à la discrétion duquel, après qu'il se fut rendu et sa troupe, le feu étant mis à la mine, les étançons de bois venus à faillir, le Château fut emporté de fond en comble.

Je me fie aisément à la foi d'autrui : mais mal-aisément le ferai-je, lors que je donnerais à juger l'avoir plutôt fait par désespoir et faute de coeur, que par franchise et fiance de sa loyauté.

***
Texte original ici.

Essais, Ch 4

2008-12-10T13:38:00.004-05:00

CHAPITRE IV
Comme l'ame descharge ses passions
sur des objects faux, quand les vrais luy defaillent

UN gentilhomme des nôtres merveilleusement sujet à la goutte, étant pressé par les médecins de laisser du tout l'usage des viandes salées, avait accoutumé de répondre plaisamment, que sur les efforts et tourments du mal, il voulait avoir à qui s'en prendre ; et que s'écriant et maudissant tantôt le cervelat, tantôt la langue de boeuf et le jambon, il s'en sentait d'autant allégé. Mais en bon escient, comme le bras étant haussé pour frapper, il nous deult si le coup ne rencontre, et qu'il aille au vent : aussi que pour rendre une vue plaisante, il ne faut pas qu'elle soit perdue et écartée dans le vague de l'air, ains qu'elle ait butte pour la soutenir à raisonnable distance,

Ventus ut amittit vires, nisi robore densæ
Occurrant silvæ spatio diffusus inani,

de même il semble que l'âme ébranlee et émue se perde en soi-même, si on ne lui donne prise : et faut toujours lui fournir d'objet où elle s'abutte et agisse. Plutarque dit à propos de ceux qui s'affectionnent aux guenons et petits chiens, que la partie amoureuse qui est en nous, à faute de prise légitime, plutôt que de demeurer en vain, s'en forge ainsi une fausse et frivole. Et nous voyons que l'âme en ses passions se pipe plutôt elle même, se dressant un faux sujet et fantastique, voire contre sa propre créance, que de n'agir contre quelque chose.

Ainsi emporte les bêtes leur rage à s'attaquer à la pierre et au fer, qui les a blessées : et à se venger à belles dents sur soi-mêmes du mal qu'elles sentent,

Pannonis haud aliter post ictum sævior ursa
Cui jaculum parva Lybis amentavit habena,
Se rotat in vulnus, telùmque irata receptum
Impetit, Et secum fugientem circuit hastam.

Quelles causes n'inventons nous des malheurs qui nous adviennent ? à quoi ne nous prenons nous à tort ou à droit, pour avoir où nous escrimer ? Ce ne sont pas ces tresses blondes, que tu déchires, ni la blancheur de cette poitrine, que despitée tu bats si cruellement, qui ont perdu d'un malheureux plomb ce frère bien aimé : prends t'en ailleurs. Livius parlant de l'armée Romaine en Espagne, aprés la perte des deux frères ses grands Capitaines, Flere omnes repente, et offensare capita. C'est un usage commun. Et le Philosophe Bion, de ce Roy, qui de deuil s'arrachait le poil, fut plaisant, Cetuy-cy pense-il que la pelade soulage le deuil ? Qui n'a vu mâcher et engloutir les cartes, se gorger d'une balle de dés, pour avoir où se venger de la perte de son argent ? Xerxes fouetta la mer, et écrivit un cartel de défi au mont Athos : et Cyrus amusa toute une armée plusieurs jours à se venger de la rivière de Gyndus, pour la peur qu'il avait eu en la passant : et Caligula ruina une trèsbelle maison, pour le plaisir que sa mère y avait eu.

Le peuple disait en ma jeunesse, qu'un Roy de nos voisins, ayant reçu de Dieu une bastonnade, jura de s'en venger : ordonnant que de dix ans on ne le priât, ni parlât de lui, ni autant qu'il était en son autorité, qu'on ne crût en lui. Par où on voulait peindre non tant la sottise, que la gloire naturelle à la nation, dequoi était le compte. Ce sont vices toujours conjoints : mais telles actions tiennent, à la verité, un peu plus encore d'outrecuidance, que de bêtise.

Augustus Cesar ayant été battu de la tempête sur mer, se prit à défier le Dieu Neptunus, et en la pompe des jeux Circenses fit ôter son image du rang où elle était parmi les autres dieux, pour se venger de lui. Enquoi il est encore moins excusable, que les précédents, et moins qu'il ne fut depuis, lors qu'ayant perdu une bataille sous Quintilius Varus en Allemaigne, il allait de colère et de désespoir, choquant sa tête contre la muraille, en s'écriant, Varus rends moi mes soldats : car ceux là surpassent toute folie, d'autant que l'impiété y est jointe, qui s'en adressent à Dieu mêmes, ou à la fortune, comme si elle avait des oreilles sujettes à notre batterie. A l'exemple des Thraces, qui, quand il tonne ou éclaire, se mettent à tirer contre le ciel d'une vengeance Titanienne, pour ranger Dieu à raison, à coups de flèche. Or, comme dit cet ancien Poète chez Plutarque,

Point ne se faut courroucer aux affaires.
Il ne leur chaut de toutes nos choleres.

Mais nous ne dirons jamais assez d'injures au dérèglement de notre esprit.

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Essais, Ch 3

2008-12-08T13:08:00.005-05:00

CHAPITRE III
Nos affections s'emportent au delà de nous

CEUX qui accusent les hommes d'aller toujours béant après les choses futures, et nous apprennent à nous saisir des biens présents, et nous rasseoir en ceux-là : comme n'ayant aucune prise sur ce qui est à venir, voire assez moins que nous n'avons sur ce qui est passé, touchent la plus commune des humaines erreurs : s'ils osent appeller erreur, chose à quoi nature même nous achemine, pour le service de la continuation de son ouvrage, nous imprimant, comme assez d'autres, cette imagination fausse, plus jalouse de notre action, que de notre science. Nous ne sommes jamais chez nous, nous sommes toujours au delà. La crainte, le désir, l'espérance, nous élancent vers l'avenir : et nous dérobent le sentiment et la considération de ce qui est, pour nous amuser à ce qui sera, voire quand nous ne serons plus. Calamitosus est animus futuri anxius.

Ce grand précepte est souvent allegué en Platon, « Fais ton fait, et te connais. » Chacun de ces deux membres enveloppe généralement tout notre devoir : et semblablement enveloppe son compagnon. Qui aurait à faire son fait, verrait que sa première leçon, c'est connaître ce qu'il est, et ce qui lui est propre. Et qui se connaît, ne prend plus l'étranger fait pour le sien : s'aime, et se cultive avant toute autre chose : refuse les occupations superflues, et les pensées, et propositions inutiles. Comme la folie quand on lui octroiera ce qu'elle desire, ne sera pas contente : aussi est la sagesse contente de ce qui est présent, ne se déplaît jamais de soi.

Epicurus dispense son sage de la prévoyance et souci de l'avenir.

Entre les lois qui regardent les trépassés, celle ici me semble autant solide, qui oblige les actions des Princes à être examinées après leur mort : Ils sont compagnons, sinon maîtres des lois : ce que la Justice n'a pu sur leurs têtes, c'est raison qu'elle l'ait sur leur réputation, et biens de leurs successeurs : choses que souvent nous préférons à la vie. C'est une usance qui apporte des commodités singulières aux nations où elle est observée, et désirable à tous bons Princes : qui ont à se plaindre de ce, qu'on traite la mémoire des méchants comme la leur. Nous devons la subjection et obéissance également à tous Rois : car elle regarde leur office : mais l'estimation, non plus que l'affection, nous ne la devons qu'à leur vertu. Donnons à l'ordre politique de les souffrir patiemment, indignes : de celer leurs vices : d'aider de notre recommandation leurs actions indifférentes, pendant que leur auctorité a besoin de notre appui. Mais notre commerce fini, ce n'est pas raison de refuser à la justice, et à notre liberté, l'expression de nos vrais ressentiments. Et nommément de refuser aux bons sujects, la gloire d'avoir révérémment et fidèlement servi un maître, les imperfections duquel leur étaient si bien connues : frustrant la posterité d'un si utile exemple. Et ceux, qui, par respect de quelque obligation privée, épousent iniquement la mémoire d'un Prince mesloüable, font justice particulière aux dépends de la justice publique. Titus Livius dit vrai, que le langage des hommes nourris sous la Royauté, est toujours plein de vaines ostentations et faux témoignages : chacun élevant indifféremment son Roi, à l'extrême ligne de valeur et grandeur souveraine.

On peut réprouver la magnanimité de ces deux soldats, qui répondirent à Neron, à sa barbe, l'un enquit de lui, pourquoi il lui voulait mal : Je t'aimais quand tu le valais : mais depuis que tu es devenu parricide, boutefeu, bateleur, cochier, je te hais, comme tu mérites. L'autre, pourquoi il le voulait tuer ; Par ce que je ne trouve autre remède à tes continuels maléfices. Mais les publics et universels témoignages, qui après sa mort ont été rendus, et le seront à tout jamais, à lui, et à tous méchans comme lui, de ses tiranniques et vilains déportements, qui de sain entendement les peut réprouver ?

Il me déplaît, qu'en une si sainte police que la Lacédémonienne, se fût mêlée une si feinte cérémonie à la mort des Rois. Tous les confédéres et voisins, et tous les Ilotes, hommes, femmes, pêle-mêle, se découpaient le front, pour témoignage de deuil : et disaient en leurs cris et lamentations, que celui là, quel qu'il eût été, estait le meilleur Roi de tous les leurs : attribuant au rang, le lot qui appartenait au mérite ; et, qui appartient au premier mérite, au postrême et dernier rang. Aristote, qui remue toutes choses, s'enquiert sur le mot de Solon, Que nul avant mourir ne peut être dit heureux, Si celui-là même, qui a vécu, et qui est mort à souhait, peut être dit heureux, si sa renommée va mal, si sa posterité est misérable. Pendant que nous nous remuons, nous nous portons par préoccupation où il nous plaît : mais étant hors de l'être, nous n'avons aucune communication avec ce qui est. Et serait meilleur de dire à Solon, que jamais homme n'est donc heureux, puis qu'il ne l'est qu'après qu'il n'est plus.

Quisquam
Vix radicitus è vita se tollit, et ejicit :
Sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse,
Nec removet satis à projecto corpore sese, et
Vindicat.

Bertrand du Glesquin mourut au siège du château de Rancon, près du Puy en Auvergne : les assiégés s'étant rendus après, furent obligés de porter les clefs de la place sur le corps du trépassé.

Barthelemy d'Alviane, Général de l'armée des Vénitiens, étant mort au service de leurs guerres en la Bresse, et son corps ayant été rapporté à Venise par le Véronais, terre ennemie la plupart de ceux de l'armée étaient d'avis, qu'on demandât sauf-conduit pour le passage à ceux de Vérone : mais Théodore Trivulce y contredit ; et choisit plutôt de le passer par vive force, au hasard du combat : n'étant convenable, disait-il, que celui qui en sa vie n'avait jamais eu peur de ses ennemis, étant mort fit démonstration de les craindre.

De vrai, en chose voisine, par les lois Grecques, celui qui demandait à l'ennemi un corps pour l'inhumer, renonçait à la victoire, et ne lui était plus loisible d'en dresser trophée : à celui qui en était requis, c'était titre de gain. Ainsi perdit Nicias l'avantage qu'il avait nettement gagné sur les Corinthiens : et au rebours, Agesilaus assura celui qui lui était bien douteusement acquis sur les Bæotiens.

Ces traits se pourraient trouver étranges, s'il n'étoit reçu de tout temps, non seulement d'étendre le soin de nous, au delà cette vie, mais encore de croire, que bien souvent les faveurs célestes nous accompagnent au tombeau, et continuent à nos reliques. Dequoi il y a tant d'exemples anciens, laissant à part les nôtres, qu'il n'est besoin que je m'y étende. Edouard premier Roi d'Angleterre, ayant essayé aux longues guerres d'entre lui et Robert Roy d'Escosse, combien sa présence donnait d'avantage à ses affaires, rapportant toujours la victoire de ce qu'il entreprenait en personne ; mourant, obligea son fils par solennel serment, à ce qu'étant tréassé, il fit bouillir son corps pour déprendre sa chair d'avec les os, laquelle il fit enterrer : et quant aux os, qu'il les réservât pour les porter avec lui, et en son armée, toutes les fois qu'il lui adviendrait d'avoir guerre contre les Écossais : comme si la destinée avoit fatalement attaché la victoire à ses membres.

Jean Vischa, qui troubla la Bohème pour la défence des erreurs de VViclef, voulut qu'on l'écorchât après sa mort, et de sa peau qu'on fit un tabourin à porter à la guerre contre ses ennemis : estimant que cela aiderait à continuer les avantages qu'il avait eues aux guerres, par lui conduites contre eux. Certains Indiens portaient ainsi au combat contre les Espagnols ; les ossements d'un de leurs Capitaines, en considération de l'heure qu'il avait eu en vivant. Et d'autres peuples en ce même monde, traînent à la guerre les corps des vaillans hommes, qui sont morts en leurs batailles, pour leur servir de bonne fortune et d'encouragement.

Les premiers exemples ne réservent au tombeau, que la réputation acquise par leurs actions passées : mais ceux-ci y veulent encore mêler la puissance d'agir. Le fait du Capitaine Bayard est de meilleure composition, lequel se sentant blessé à mort d'une harquebusade dans le corps, conseillé de se retirer de la mêlée, répondit qu'il ne commencerait point sur sa fin à tourner le dos à l'ennemi : et ayant combattu autant qu'il eut de force, se sentant défaillir, et échapper du cheval, commanda à son maître d'hôtel, de le coucher au pied d'un arbre : mais que ce fût en façon qu'il mourût le visage tourné vers l'ennemi : comme il fit.

Il me faut ajouter cet autre exemple aussi remarquable pour cette considération, que nul des precédents. L'Empereur Maximilian bisayeul du Roy Philippes, qui est à présent, estait Prince doué de tout plein de grandes qualités, et entre autres d'une beauté de corps singulière : mais parmi ces humeurs, il avait cette ci bien contraire à celle des Princes, qui pour dépêcher les plus importants affaires, font leur trône de leur chaire percée : c'est qu'il n'eut jamais valet de chambre, si privé, à qui il permit de le voir en sa garderobe : Il se dérobait pour tomber de l'eau, aussi religieux qu'une pucelle à ne découvrir ni à Medecin ni à qui que ce fût les parties qu'on a accoutumé de tenir cachées. Moi qui ai la bouche si effrontée, suis pourtant par complexion touché de cette honte : Si ce n'est à une grande suasion de la necessité ou de la volupté, je ne communique guère aux yeux de personne, les membres et actions, que notre coustume ordonne être couvertes : J'y souffre plus de contrainte que je n'estime bien séant à un homme, et sur tout à un homme de ma profession : Mais lui en vint à telle superstition, qu'il ordonna par paroles expresses de son testament, qu'on lui attachât des caleçons, quand il serait mort. Il devait ajouter par codicille, que celui qui les lui monterait eût les yeux bandés. L'ordonnance que Cyrus fait à ses enfans, que ni eux, ni autre, ne voie et touche son corps, après que l'âme en sera séparée : je l'attribue à quelque sienne dévotion : Car et son Historien et lui, entre leurs grandes qualités, ont semé par tout le cours de leur vie, un singulier soin et révérence à la religion.

Ce conte me déplut, qu'un grand me fit d'un mien allié, homme assez connu et en paix et en guerre. C'est que mourant bien vieil en sa cour, tourmenté de douleurs extrêmes de la pierre, il amusa toutes ses heures dernières avec un soin véhément, à disposer l'honneur et la cérémonie de son enterrement : et somma toute la noblesse qui le visitait, de lui donner parole d'assister à son convoi. A ce Prince même, qui le vit sur ces derniers traits, il fit une instante supplication que sa maison fût commandée de s'y trouver ; employant plusieurs exemples et raisons, à prouver que c'était chose qui appartenait à un homme de sa sorte : et sembla expirer content ayant retiré cette promesse, et ordonné à son gré la distribution, et ordre de sa montre. Je n'ai guère vu de vanité si persévérante.

Cette autre curiosité contraire, en laquelle je n'ai point aussi faute d'exemple domestique, me semble germaine à cette-ci : d'aller se soignant et passionnant à ce dernier point, à régler son convoi, à quelque particulière et inusitée parcimonie, à un serviteur et une lanterne. Je voi louer cett'humeur, et l'ordonnance de Marcus Æmylius Lepidus, qui défendit à ses héritiers d'employer pour lui les cérémonies qu'on avait accoutumé en telles choses. Est-ce encore tempérance et frugalité, d'éviter la dépense et la volupté, desquelles l'usage et la connaissance nous est imperceptible ? Voilà une aisée réformation et de peu de coût. S'il estait besoin d'en ordonner, je serai d'advis, qu'en celle là, comme en toutes actions de la vie, chacun en rapportât la règle, au degré de sa fortune. Et le Philosophe Lycon prescrit sagement à ses amis, de mettre son corps où ils aviseront pour le mieux : et quant aux funérailles, de les faire ni superflues ni mécaniques. Je lairrais purement la coutume ordonner de cette cérémonie, et m'en remettrai à la discrétion des premiers à qui je tomberai en charge. Totus hic locus est contemnendus in nobis, non negligendus in nostris. Et est saintement dit à un saint : Curatio funeris, conditio sepulturæ, pompa exequiarum, magis sunt vivorum solatia, quàm subsidia mortuorum. Pourtant Socrates à Criton, qui sur l'heure de sa fin lui demande, comment il veut être enterré : Comme vous voudrez, répond-il. Si j'avais à m'en empêcher plus avant, je trouverais plus galand, d'imiter ceux qui entreprennent vivant et respirant, jouir de l'ordre et honneur de leur sépulture : et qui se plaisent de voir en marbre leur morte contenance. Heureux qui sachent réjouir et gratifier leur sens par l'insensibilité, et vivre de leur mort !

A peu, que je n'entre en haine irréconciliable contre toute domination populaire : quoi qu'elle me semble la plus naturelle et équitable : quand il me souvient de cette inhumaine injustice du peuple Athénien : de faire mourir sans rémission, et sans les vouloir seulement ouïr en leurs défenses, ces braves capitaines, venants de gagner contre les Lacédémoniens la bataille navale près les Isles Arginenses : la plus contestée, la plus forte bataille, que les Grecs aient onques donnée en mer de leurs forces : par ce qu'après la victoire, ils avaient suivi les occasions que la loi de la guerre leur presentait, plutôt que de s'arrêter à recueillir et inhumer leurs morts. Et rend cette exécution plus odieuse, le fait de Diomédon. Cettui ci est l'un des condamnés, homme de notable vertu, et militaire et politique : lequel se tirant avant pour parler, après avoir ouï l'arrêt de leur condamnation, et trouvant seulement lors temps de paisible audience, au lieu de s'en servir au bien de sa cause, et à découvrir l'évidente iniquité d'une si cruelle conclusion, ne représenta qu'un soin de la conservation de ses juges : priant les Dieux de tourner ce jugement à leur bien, et à fin que, par faute de rendre les voeux que lui et ses compagnons avaient voué, en reconnaissance d'une si illustre fortune, ils n'attirassent l'ire des Dieux sur eux : les avertissant quels voeux c'étaient. Et sans dire autre chose, et sans marchander, s'achemina de ce pas courageusement au supplice. La fortune quelques années après les punit de même pain soupe. Car Chabrias capitaine général de leur armée de mer, ayant eu le dessus du combat contre Pollis Admiral de Sparte, en l'isle de Naxe, perdit le fruit tout net et content de sa victoire, très-important à leurs affaires, pour n'encourir le malheur de cet exemple, et pour ne perdre peu de corps morts de ses amis, qui flottaient en mer ; laissa voguer en sauveté un monde d'ennemis vivants, qui depuis leur firent bien acheter cette importune superstition.

Quoeris, quo jaceas, post obitum, loco ?
Quo non nata jacent.

Cet autre redonne le sentiment du repos, à un corps sans âme,

Neque sepulcrum, quo recipiat, habeat portum corporis :
Ubi, remissa humana vita, corpus requiescat à malis.

Tout ainsi que nature nous fait voir, que plusieurs choses mortes ont encore des relations occultes à la vie. Le vin s'altère aux caves, selon aucunes mutations des saisons de sa vigne. Et la chair de venaison change d'état aux saloirs et de goût, selon les lois de la chair vive, à ce qu'on dit.

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Essais 1, Ch 2

2008-11-30T11:30:00.003-05:00

CHAPITRE II
De la Tristesse

JE suis des plus exempts de cette passion, et ne l'aime ni l'estime : quoi que le monde ait entrepris, comme à prix fait, de l'honorer de faveur particulière. Ils en habillent la sagesse, la vertu, la conscience. Sot et vilain ornement. Les Italiens ont plus sortablement baptisé de son nom la malignité. Car c'est une qualité toujours nuisible, toujours folle : et comme toujours couarde et basse, les Stoïciens en défendent le sentiment à leurs sages.

Mais le conte dit que Psammenitus Roy d'Égypte, ayant été défait et pris par Cambysez Roy de Perse, voyant passer devant lui sa fille prisonnière habillée en servante, qu'on envoyait puiser de l'eau, tous ses amis pleurant et lamentant autour de lui, se tint coi sans mot dire, les yeux fichés en terre : et voyant encore tantôt qu'on menait son fils à la mort, se maintint en cette même contenance : mais qu'ayant apperçu un de ses domestiques conduit entre les captifs, il se mit à battre sa tête, et mener un deuil extreme.

Ceci se pourrait apparier à ce qu'on vit dernièrement d'un Prince des nôtres, qui ayant ouï à Trente, où il était, nouvelles de la mort de son frère aîné, mais un frère en qui consistait l'appui et l'honneur de toute sa maison, et bien tôt après d'un puîné, sa seconde espérance, et ayant soutenu ces deux charges d'une constance exemplaire, comme quelques jours après un de ses gens vint à mourir, il se laissa emporter à ce dernier accident ; et quitant sa résolution, s'abandonna au deuil et aux regrets ; en manière qu'aucuns en prirent argument, qu'il n'avait été touché au vif que de cette dernière secousse : mais à la vérité ce fut, qu'étant d'ailleurs plein et comblé de tristesse, la moindre surcharge brisa les barrières de la patience. Il s'en pourrait (dis-je) autant juger de notre histoire, n'était qu'elle ajoute, que Cambyses s'enquérant à Psammenitus, pourquoi ne s'étant ému au malheur de son fils et de sa fille, il portait si impatiemment celui de ses amis : C'est, répondit-il, que ce seul dernier déplaisir se peut signifier par larmes, les deux premiers surpassant de bien loin tout moyen de se pouvoir exprimer.

A l'aventure reviendrait à ce propos l'invention de cet ancien peintre, lequel ayant à représenter au sacrifice de Iphigenia le deuil des assistants, selon les degrés de l'intérêt que chacun apportait à la mort de cette belle fille innocente : ayant épuisé les derniers efforts de son art, quand ce vint au père de la vierge, il le peignit le visage couvert, comme si nulle contenance ne pouvait rapporter ce degré de deuil. Voila pourquoi les Poètes feignent cette misérable mère Niobé, ayant perdu premièrement sept fils, et puis de suite autant de filles, surchargée de pertes, avoir été en fin transmuée en rocher,

diriguisse malis,

pour exprimer cette morne, muette et sourde stupidité, qui nous transsit, lors que les accidents nous accablent surpassant notre portée.

De vrai, l'effort d'un déplaisir, pour être extrême, doit étonner toute l'âme, et lui empêcher la liberté de ses actions : Comme il nous advient à la chaude alarme d'une bien mauvaise nouvelle, de nous sentir saisis, transsis, et comme perclus de tous mouvements : de façon que l'âme se relâchant après aux larmes et aux plaintes, semble se déprendre, se démêler, et se mettre plus au large, et à son aise,

Et via vix tandem voci laxata dolore est.

En la guerre que le Roy Ferdinand mena contre la veuve du Roy Jean de Hongrie, autour de Bude, un gendarme fut particulièrement remarqué de chacun, pour avoir excessivement bien fait de sa personne, en certaine mêlée : et inconnu, hautement loué, et plaint y étant demeuré. Mais de nul tant que de Raiscïac seigneur Allemand, épris d'une si rare vertu : le corps étant rapporté, cetuici d'une commune curiosité, s'approcha pour voir qui c'était : et les armes ôtées au trépassé, il reconut son fils. Cela augmenta la compassion aux assistans : lui seul, sans rien dire, sans ciller les yeux, se tint debout, contemplant fixement le corps de son fils : jusqu'à ce que la véhémence de la tristesse, ayant accablé ses esprits vitaux, le porta raide mort par terre.

Chi puo dir com'egli arde è in picciol fuoco,

disent les amoureux, qui veulent representer une passion insupportable :

misero quod omnes
Eripit sensus mihi. Nam simul te
Lesbia aspexi, nihil est super mi
Quod loquar amens.
Lingua sed torpet, tenuis sub artus
Flamma dimanat, sonitu suopte
Tinniunt aures, gemina teguntur
Lumina nocte.

Aussi n'est ce pas en la vive, et plus cuisante chaleur de l'accès, que nous sommes propres à déployer nos plaintes et nos persuasions : l'âme est lors aggravée de profondes pensées, et le corps abbatu et languissant d'amour.

Et de là s'engendre par fois la défaillance fortuite, qui surprend les amoureux si hors de saison ; et cette glace qui les saisit par la force d'une ardeur extrême, au giron même de la jouissance. Toutes passions qui se laissent goûter, et digérer, ne sont que médiocres,

Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent.

La surprise d'un plaisir inespéré nous étonne de même,

Ut me conspexit venientem, Et Troïa circum
Arma amens vidit, magnis exterrita monstris,
Diriguit visu in medio, calor ossa reliquit,
Labitur, et longo vix tandem tempore fatur.

Outre la femme Romaine, qui mourut surprise d'aise de voir son fils revenu de la route de Cannes : Sophocles et Denis le Tyran, qui trépassèrent d'aise : et Talva qui mourut en Corsègue, lisant les nouvelles des honneurs que le Sénat de Rome lui avait décernés. Nous tenons en notre siècle, que le Pape Léon dixième ayant été averti de la prise de Milan, qu'il avait extrêmement souhaitée, entra en tel excès de joie, que la fièvre l'en prit, et en mourut. Et pour un plus notable témoignage de l'imbécilité humaine, il a été remarqué par les anciens, que Diodorus le Dialecticien mourut sur le champ, épris d'une extrême passion de honte, pour en son école, et en public, ne se pouvoir développer d'un argument qu'on lui avait fait.

Je suis peu en prise de ces violentes passions : J'ai l'appréhension naturellement dure ; et l'encroûte et épaissis tous les jours par discours.

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Essais 1, Ch 1

2008-11-29T20:47:00.003-05:00

Chapitre 1

Par divers moyens on arrive à pareille fin

LA plus commune façon d'amollir les coeurs de ceux qu'on a offensés, lors qu'ayant la vengeance en main, ils nous tiennent à leur merci, c'est de les émouvoir par soumission, à commisération et à pitié : Toutefois la braverie, la constance, et la résolution, moyens tous contraires, ont quelquesfois servi à ce même effet.

Edouard Prince de Galles, celui qui régenta si long temps notre Guyenne : personnage duquel les conditions et la fortune ont beaucoup de notables parties de grandeur ; ayant été bien fort offensé par les Limosins, et prenant leur ville par force, ne peut être arrêté par les cris du peuple, et des femmes, et enfants abandonnés à la boucherie, lut criant merci, et se jettant à ses pieds : jusqu'à ce que passant toujours outre dans la ville, il apperçut trois gentils-hommes Français, qui d'une hardiesse incroyable soutenaient seuls l'effort de son armée victorieuse. La considération et le respect d'une si notable vertu, reboucha premièrement la pointe de sa colère : et commença par ces trois, à faire miséricorde à tous les autres habitants de la ville.

Scanderberch, Prince de l'Epire, suivant un soldat des siens pour le tuer, et ce soldat ayant essayé par toute espèce d'humilité et de supplication de l'appaiser, se résolut à toute extrémité de l'attendre l'ééee au poing : cette sienne résolution arrêta sus bout la furie de son maître, qui pour lui avoir vu prendre un si honorable parti, le reçut en grâce. Cet exemple pourra souffrir autre interprétation de ceux, qui n'auront lu la prodigieuse force et vaillance de ce Prince là.

L'Empereur Conrad troisième, ayant assiegé Guelphe Duc de Bavières, ne voulut condescendre à plus douces conditions, quelques viles et lâches satisfactions qu'on lui offrît, que de permettre seulement aux gentils-femmes qui estaient assiègées avec le Duc, de sortir leur honneur sauve, à pied, avec ce qu'elles pourraient emporter sur elles. Elles d'un coeur magnanime, s'avisèrent de charger sur leurs épaules leurs maris, leurs enfans, et le Duc même. L'Empereur prit si grand plaisir à voir la gentillesse de leur courage, qu'il en pleura d'aise, et amortit toute cette aigreur d'inimitié mortelle et capitale qu'il avoit portée contre ce Duc : et dès lors en avant traita humainement lui et les siens. L'un et l'autre de ces deux moyens m'emporterait aisément : car j'ai une merveilleuse lâcheté vers la miséricorde et mansuétude : Tant y a, qu'à mon avis, je serais pour me rendre plus naturellement à la compassion, qu'à l'estimation. Si est la pitié passion vicieuse aux Stoiques : Ils veulent qu'on secoure les affligés, mais non pas qu'on fléchisse et compatisse avec eux.

Or ces exemples me semblent plus à propos, d'autant qu'on voit ces ames assaillies et essayées par ces deux moyens, en soutenir l'un sans s'ébranler, et courber sous l'autre. Il se peut dire, que de rompre son coeur à la commisération, c'est l'effet de la facilité, débonnaireté, et mollesse : d'où il advient que les natures plus faibles, comme celles des femmes, des enfans, et du vulgaire, y sont plus sujettes. Mais (ayant eu à dédain les larmes et les pleurs) de se rendre à la seule révérence de la sainte image de la vertu, que c'est l'effet d'une âme forte et imployable, ayant en affection et en honneur une vigueur mâle, et obstinée. Toutefois ès âmes moins généreuses, l'étonnement et l'admiration peuvent faire naître un pareil effet : Témoin le peuple Thébain, lequel ayant mis en Justice d'accusation capitale, ses capitaines, pour avoir continué leur charge outre le temps qui leur avait été prescrit et préordonné, absolut à toute peine Pelopidas, qui pliait sous le faix de telles objections, et n'employait à se garantir que requêtes et supplications : et au contraire Epaminondas, qui vint à raconter magnifiquement les choses par lui faites, et à les reprocher au peuple d'une façon fière et arrogante, il n'eut pas le coeur de prendre seulement les balotes en main, et se départit : l'assemblée louant grandement la hautesse du courage de ce personnage.

Dionysius le vieil, après des longueurs et difficultés extrêmes, ayant pris la ville de Rège, et en icelle le Capitaine Phyton, grand homme de bien, qui l'avait si obstinément défendue, voulut en tirer un tragique exemple de vengeance. Il lui dit premièrement, comment le jour avant, il avoit fait noyer son fils, et tous ceux de sa parenté. A quoi Phyton répondit seulement, qu'ils en estaient d'un jour plus heureux que lui. Après il le fit dépouiller, et saisir à des Bourreaux, et le traîner par la ville, en le fouettant très ignominieusement et cruellement : et en outre le chargeant de félonnes paroles et contumelieuses. Mais il eut le courage toujours constant, sans se perdre. Et d'un visage ferme, allait au contraire ramentevant à haute voix, l'honorable et glorieuse cause de sa mort, pour n'avoir voulu rendre son pays entre les mains d'un tyran : le menaçant d'une prochaine punition des dieux. Dionysius, lisant dans les yeux de la commune de son armée, qu'au lieu de s'animer des bravades de cet ennemi vaincu, au mépris de leur chef, et de son triomphe : elle allait s'amollissant par l'étonnement d'une si rare vertu, et marchandait de se mutiner, et même d'arracher Phyton d'entre les mains de ses sergents, fit cesser ce martyre : et à cachettes l'envoya noyer en la mer.

Certes c'est un sujet merveilleusement vain, divers, et ondoyant, que l'homme : il est malaisé d'y fonder jugement constant et uniforme. Voila Pompeius qui pardonna à toute la ville des Mamertins, contre laquelle il était fort animé, en considération de la vertu et magnanimité du citoyen Zenon, qui se chargeait seul de la faute publique, et ne requerait autre grâce que d'en porter seul la peine. Et l'hôte de Scylla, ayant usé en la ville de Peruse de semblable vertu, n'y gagna rien, ni pour soi, ni pour les autres.

Et directement contre mes premiers exemples, le plus hardis des hommes et si gracieux aux vaincus Alexandre, forçant après beaucoup de grandes difficultés la ville de Gaza, rencontra Betis qui y commandait, de la valeur duquel il avait, pendant ce siège, senti des preuves merveilleuses, lors seul, abandonné des siens, ses armes despecées, tout couvert de sang et de plaies, combattant encores au milieu de plusieurs Macédoniens, qui le chamaillaient de toutes parts : et lui dit, tout piqué d'une si chère victoire (car entre autres dommages, il avoit reçu deux fraîches blessures sur sa personne) Tu ne mourras pas comme tu as voulu, Betis : fais état qu'il te faut souffrir toutes les sortes de tourments qui se pourront inventer contre un captif. L'autre, d'une mine non seulement assurée, mais rogue et altière, se tint sans mot dire à ces menaces. Lors Alexandre voyant l'obstination à se taire : A il flechi un genou ? lui est-il échappé quelque voix suppliante ? Vraiement je vainquerai ce silence : et si je n'en puis arracher parole, j'en arracherai au moins du gémissement. Et tournant sa colère en rage, commanda qu'on lui perçât les talons, et le fit ainsi traîner tout vif, déchirer et démembrer au cul d'une charrette.

Serait-ce que la force de courage lui fut si naturelle et commune, que pour ne l'admirer point, il la respectât moins ? ou qu'il l'estimât si proprement sienne, qu'en cette hauteur il ne put souffrir de la voir en un autre, sans le dépit d'une passion envieuse ? ou que l'impétuosité naturelle de sa colère fut incapable d'opposition ?

De vrai, si elle eut reçu bride, il est à croire, qu'en la prise et désolation de la ville de Thèbes elle l'eut reçue : à voir cruellement mettre au fil de l'épée tant de vaillants hommes, perdus, et n'ayant plus moyen de défense publique. Car il en fut tué bien six mille, desquels nul ne fut vu ni fuyant, ni demandant merci. Au rebours cherchant, qui çà, qui là, par les rues, à affronter les ennemis victorieux : les provoquant à les faire mourir d'une mort honorable. Nul ne fut vu, qui n'essayât en son dernier soupir, de se venger encore : et à tout les armes du désespoir consoler sa mort en la mort de quelque ennemi. Si ne trouva l'affliction de leur vertu aucune pitié et ne suffit la longueur d'un jour à assouvir sa vengeance. Ce carnage dura jusque à la dernière goute de sang épandable : et ne s'arrêta qu'aux personnes déarmées, vieillards, femmes et enfants, pour en tirer trente mille esclaves.

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Livre 1 - Au lecteur

2008-11-29T14:13:00.006-05:00

Au Lecteur

C'EST ici un livre de bonne foi, lecteur. Il t'advertit dès l'entrée, que je ne m'y suis proposé aucune fin, que domestique et privée : je n'y ai eu nulle considération de ton service, ni de ma gloire : mes forces ne sont pas capables d'un tel dessein. Je l'ai voué à la commodité particulière de mes parents et amis : à ce que m'ayant perdu (ce qu'ils ont à faire bien tôt) ils y puissent retrouver aucuns traits de mes conditions et humeurs, et que par ce moyen ils nourrissent plus entière et plus vive, la connaissance qu'ils ont eu de moi. Si c'eût été pour rechercher la faveur du monde, je me fusse paré de beautés empruntées. Je veux qu'on m'y voie en ma façon simple, naturelle et ordinaire, sans étude et artifice : car c'est moi que je peins. Mes defauts s'y liront au vif, mes imperfections et ma forme naïve, autant que la révérence publique me l'a permis. Que si j'eusse été parmi ces nations qu'on dit vivre encore sous la douce liberté des premières lois de nature, je t'assure que je m'y fusse très-volontiers peint tout entier, et tout nu. Ainsi, Lecteur, je suis moi-même la matière de mon livre : ce n'est pas raison que tu emploies ton loisir en un sujet si frivole et si vain. A Dieu donc.
De Montaigne, ce 12 de juin 1580.

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Essais, par Montaigne - INDEX

2008-11-29T14:06:00.023-05:00

Cette page est l'index pour le projet: Essais, par Michel Eyquem de Montaigne
Livres I, II et III.

Note: version originale: ICI

(Les liens seront ajoutés au fur et à mesure)

NOTE 2: LE BUT DE CETTE VERSION-CI EST DE FOURNIR UNE VERSION MODERNISÉE DU TEXTE. LA MODERNISATION DE L'ORTHOGRAPHE A ÉTÉ FAITE PAR MOI-MÊME. TOUS LES TEXTES RÉSULTANT DE LA MODERNISATION APPARTIENNENT AU DOMAINE PUBLIC.

Table des matières

Livre I

Au lecteur
Chapitre I Par divers moyens on arrive à pareille fin
Chapitre II De la tristesse
Chapitre III Nos affections s'emportent au delà de nous
Chapitre IV Comme l'ame descharge ses passions sur des objets faux, quand les vrais luy defaillent
Chapitre V Si le chef d'une place assiégée doit sortir pour parlementer
Chapitre VI L'heure des parlemens dangereuse
Chapitre VII Que l'intention juge nos actions
Chapitre VIII De l'oisiveté
Chapitre IX Des menteurs
Chapitre X Du parler prompt ou tardif
Chapitre XI Des prognostications
Chapitre XII De la constance
Chapitre XIII Ceremonie de l'entrevuë des roys
Chapitre XIV On est puny pour s'opiniastrer à une place sans raison
Chapitre XV De la punition de la couardise
Chapitre XVI Un traict de quelques ambassadeurs
Chapitre XVII De la peur
Chapitre XVIII Qu'il ne faut juger de nostre heur qu'après la mort
Chapitre XIX Que philosopher, c'est apprendre à mourir
Chapitre XX De la force de l'imagination
Chapitre XXI Le profit de l'un est dommage de l'aultre
Chapitre XXII De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy receüe
Chapitre XXIII Divers evenemens de mesme conseil
Chapitre XXIV Du pedantisme
Chapitre XXV De l'institution des enfans
Chapitre XXVI C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux à nostre suffisance
Chapitre XXVII De l'amitié
Chapitre XXVIII Vingt et neuf sonnets d'Estienne de La Boëtie
Chapitre XXIX De la moderation
Chapitre XXX Des cannibales
Chapitre XXXI Qu'il faut sobrement se mesler de juger des ordonnances divines
Chapitre XXXII De fuir les voluptez au pris de la vie
Chapitre XXXIII La fortune se rencontre souvent au train de la raison
Chapitre XXXIV D'un defaut de nos polices
Chapitre XXXV De l'usage de se vestir
Chapitre XXXVI Du jeune Caton
Chapitre XXXVII Comme nous pleurons et rions d'une mesme chose
Chapitre XXXVIII De la solitude
Chapitre XXXIX Consideration sur Ciceron
Chapitre XL Que le goust des biens et des maux despend en bonne partie de l'opinion que nous en avons
Chapitre XLI De ne communiquer sa gloire
Chapitre XLII De l'inequalité qui est entre nous
Chapitre XLIII Des loix somptuaires
Chapitre XLIV Du dormir
Chapitre XLV De la bataille de Dreux
Chapitre XLVI Des noms
Chapitre XLVII De l'incertitude de nostre jugement
Chapitre XLVIII Des destries
Chapitre XLIX Des coustumes anciennes
Chapitre L De Democritus et Heraclitus
Chapitre LI De la vanité des paroles
Chapitre LII De la parsimonie des anciens
Chapitre LIII D'un mot de Cæsar
Chapitre LIV Des vaines subtilitez
Chapitre LV Des senteurs
Chapitre LVI Des prieres
Chapitre LVII De l'aage

Livre II

Chapitre I De l'inconstance de nos actions
Chapitre II De l'yvrongnerie
Chapitre III Coustume de l'isle de Cea
Chapitre IV A demain les affaires
Chapitre V De la conscience
Chapitre VI De l'exercitation
Chapitre VII Des recompenses d'honneur
Chapitre VIII De l'affection des peres aux enfans
Chapitre IX Des armes de Parthes
Chapitre X Des livres
Chapitre XI De la cruauté
Chapitre XII Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde
Chapitre XIII De juger de la mort d'autruy
Chapitre XIV Comme nostre esprit s'empesche soy-mesme
Chapitre XV Que nostre desir s'accroit par la malaisance
Chapitre XVI De la gloire
Chapitre XVII De la presumption
Chapitre XVIII Du desmentir
Chapitre XIX De la liberté de conscience
Chapitre XX Nous ne goustons rien de pur
Chapitre XXI Contre la faineantise
Chapitre XXII Des postes
Chapitre XXIII Des mauvais moyens employez à bonne fin
Chapitre XXIV De la grandeur romaine
Chapitre XXV De ne contrefaire le malade
Chapitre XXVI Des pouces
Chapitre XXVII Coüardise mere de la cruauté
Chapitre XXVIII Toutes choses ont leur saison
Chapitre XXIX De la vertu
Chapitre XXX D'un enfant monstrueux
Chapitre XXXI De la cholere
Chapitre XXXII Defense de Seneque et de Plutarque
Chapitre XXXIII L'histoire de Spurina
Chapitre XXXIV Observation sur les moyens de faire la guerre de Julius Cæsar
Chapitre XXXV De trois bonnes femmes
Chapitre XXXVI Des plus excellens hommes
Chapitre XXXVII De la ressemblance des enfans aux peres

Livre III

Chapitre I De l'utile et de l'honeste
Chapitre II Du repentir
Chapitre III De trois commerces
Chapitre IV De la diversion
Chapitre V Sur des vers de Virgile
Chapitre VI Des coches
Chapitre VII De l'incommodité de la grandeur
Chapitre VIII De l'art de conferer
Chapitre IX De la vanité
Chapitre X De mesnager sa volonté
Chapitre XI Des boyteux
Chapitre XII De la physionomie
Chapitre XIII De l'experience

Blackstone, ss 14

2008-06-30T14:20:00.001-04:00

II. Next to personal security, the law of England regards,
asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This
personal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing
situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless
by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the same
observations as upon the preceding article; that it is a right
strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it
without sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom it cannot ever
be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the
explicit permission of the laws. Here again the language of the
great charter[g] is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned,

but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the
land. And many subsequent old statutes[h] expressly direct, that
no man shall be taken or imprisoned by suggestion or petition to
the king, or his council, unless it be by legal indictment, or the
process of the common law. By the petition of right, 3 Car. I, is enacted, that no freeman shall be imprisoned or detained
without cause shewn, to which he may make answer according
to law. By 16 Car. I. c. 10. if any person be restrained of his
liberty by order or decree of any illegal court, or by command
of the king's majesty in person, or by warrant of the council
board, or of any of the privy council; he shall, upon demand
of his counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body
before the court of king's bench or common pleas; who shall
determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and
thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by 31 Car. II.
c. 2. commonly called the habeas corpus act, the methods of obtaining
this writ are so plainly pointed out and enforced, that,
so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject of England
can be long detained in prison, except in those cases in which
the law requires and justifies such detainer. And, lest this act
should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail, or sureties for
the prisoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2.
that excessive bail ought not to be required.

Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this
personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any,
the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his
officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily practiced by the
crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.
Some have thought, that unjust attacks, even upon life,
or property, at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, are less dangerous
to the commonwealth, than such as are made upon the
personal liberty of the subject. To bereave a man of life, or by
violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom.
But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol,
where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less public,
a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary
government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real
danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness
of our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power
to determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render
this measure expedient. For the parliament only, or legislative
power, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by
suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to
imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing.
As the senate of Rome was wont to have recourse to a dictator,
a magistrate of absolute authority, when they judged the republic
in any imminent danger. The decree of the senate, which usually
preceded the nomination of this magistrate, "dent operam consules,
nequid respublica detrimenti capiat," was called the senatus
consultum ultimae necessitatis. In like manner this experiment
ought only to be tried in cases of extreme emergency; and in
these the nation parts with it's liberty for a while, in order to
preserve it for ever.

The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment.
So that the keeping a man against his will in a private
house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining
him in the street, is an imprisonment[i]. And the law so much
discourages unlawful confinement, that if a man is under duress
of imprisonment, which we before explained to mean a compulsion
by an illegal restraint of liberty, until he seals a bond or the
like; he may alledge this duress, and avoid the extorted bond.
But if a man be lawfully imprisoned, and either to procure his
discharge, or on any other fair account, seals a bond or a deed,
this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to
avoid it[k]. To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be, by
process from the courts of judicature, or by warrant from some
legal officer, having authority to commit to prison; which warrant
must be in writing, under the hand and seal of the magistrate,
and express the causes of the commitment, in order to be
examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus. If there be
no cause expressed, the goaler[**typo for gaoler?] is not bound to detain the prisoner[l].
For the law judges in this respect, saith sir Edward Coke, like
Festus the Roman governor; that it is unreasonable to send a
prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged against him.

A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty,
is, that every Englishman may claim a right to abide in
his own country so long as he pleases; and not to be driven from
it unless by the sentence of the law. The king indeed, by his
royal prerogative, may issue out his writ ne exeat regnum, and
prohibit any of his subjects from going into foreign parts without
licence[m]. This may be necessary for the public service, and
safeguard of the commonwealth. But no power on earth, except
the authority of parliament, can send any subject of England out
of the land against his will; no not even a criminal. For exile,
or transportation, is a punishment unknown to the common law;
and, wherever it is now inflicted, it is either by the choice of the
criminal himself, to escape a capital punishment, or else by the
express direction of some modern act of parliament. To this
purpose the great charter[n] declares that no freeman shall be banished,
unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land. And by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II. c. 2. (that
second magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties) it is
enacted, that no subject of this realm, who is an inhabitant of
England, Wales, or Berwick, shall be sent prisoner into Scotland,
Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or places beyond the seas; (where
they cannot have the benefit and protection of the common law)
but that all such imprisonments shall be illegal; that the person,
who shall dare to commit another contrary to this law, shall be
disabled from bearing any office, shall incur the penalty of a
praemunire, and be incapable of receiving the king's pardon:
and the party suffering shall also have his private action against
the person committing, and all his aiders, advisers and abettors,
and shall recover treble costs; besides his damages, which no jury
shall assess at less than five hundred pounds.

The law is in this respect so benignly and liberally construed
for the benefit of the subject, that, though within the realm the
king may command the attendance and service of all his liege-*men,
yet he cannot send any man out of the realm, even upon
the public service: he cannot even constitute a man lord deputy
or lieutenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him a foreign
embassador[o]. For this might in reality be no more than an honorable
exile.

III. The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman,
is that of property; which consists in the free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution,
save only by the laws of the land. The original of private
property is probably founded in nature, as will be more fully
explained in the second book of the ensuing commentaries: but
certainly the modifications under which we at present find it, the
method of conserving it in the present owner, and of translating
it from man to man, are entirely derived from society; and are
some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which every individual
has resigned a part of his natural liberty. The laws of
England are therefore, in point of honor and justice, extremely
watchful in ascertaining and protecting this right. Upon this
principle the great charter[p] has declared that no freeman shall be
disseised, or divested, of his freehold, or of his liberties, or free
customs, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land. And by a variety of antient statutes[q] it is enacted, that no
man's lands or goods shall be seised into the king's hands, against
the great charter, and the law of the land; and that no man
shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold,
unless he be duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course
of law; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be redressed,
and holden for none.

So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property,
that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not
even for the general good of the whole community. If a new
road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a
private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the
public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this
without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be
urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of
the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private
man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common
good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides,
the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in
the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled
by the municipal law. In this, and similar cases the legislature
alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the
individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel?
Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary
manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now
considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an
exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an
exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution,
and which nothing but the legislature can perform.

Nor is this the only instance in which the law of the land
has postponed even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable
rights of private property. For no subject of England can be
constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the
realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by
his own consent, or that of his representatives in parliament.
By the statute 25 Edw. I. c. 5 and 6. it is provided, that the king

shall not take any aids or tasks, but by the common assent of the
realm. And what that common assent is, is more fully explained
by 34 Edw. I. st. 4. cap. 1. which enacts, that no talliage or aid
shall be taken without assent of the arch-bishops, bishops, earls,
barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land[r]: and
again by 14 Edw. III. st. 2. c. 1. the prelates, earls, barons, and
commons, citizens, burgesses, and merchants shall not be charged
to make any aid, if it be not by the common assent of the great
men and commons in parliament. And as this fundamental
law had been shamefully evaded under many succeeding princes,
by compulsive loans, and benevolences extorted without a real
and voluntary consent, it was made an article in the petition of
right 3 Car. I, that no man shall be compelled to yield any gift,
loan, or benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common
consent by act of parliament. And, lastly, by the statute 1 W. & M.
st. 2. c. 2. it is declared, that levying money for or to the use of
the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament;
or for longer time, or in other manner, than the same is
or shall be granted, is illegal.

In the three preceding articles we have taken a short view of
the principal absolute rights which appertain to every Englishman.
But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained,
and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution
had provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment.
It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate
rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to protect
and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property. These are,

1. The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament,
of which I shall treat at large in the ensuing chapter.

2. The limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds so
certain and notorious, that it is impossible he should exceed them
without the consent of the people. Of this also I shall treat in
it's proper place. The former of these keeps the legislative power
in due health and vigour, so as to make it improbable that laws
should be enacted destructive of general liberty: the latter is a
guard upon the executive power, by restraining it from acting
either beyond or in contradiction to the laws, that are framed and
established by the other.

3. A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that
of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since
the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty,
and property, courts of justice must at all times be open
to the subject, and the law be duly administred therein. The
emphatical words of magna carta[s], spoken in the person of the
king, who in judgment of law (says sir Edward Coke[t]) is ever
present and repeating them in all his courts, are these; "nulli
vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam:
and therefore every subject," continues the same learned author,
"for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel persona, by
any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal without any
exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, and
have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely without
sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay."
It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts of parliament
wherein justice is directed to be done according to the law of the
land: and what that law is, every subject knows; or may know
if he pleases: for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any
judge; but is permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority
of parliament. I shall however just mention a few negative
statutes, whereby abuses, perversions, or delays of justice,
especially by the prerogative, are restrained. It is ordained by
magna carta[u], that no freeman shall be outlawed, that is, put out
of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the
law of the land. By 2 Edw. III. c. 8. and 11 Ric. II. c. 10. it
is enacted, that no commands or letters shall be sent under the
great seal, or the little seal, the signet, or privy seal, in disturbance
of the law; or to disturb or delay common right: and,
though such commandments should come, the judges shall not
cease to do right. And by 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2. it is declared,
that the pretended power of suspending, or dispensing with laws,
or the execution of laws, by regal authority without consent of
parliament, is illegal.

Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the
law, but also the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot
be altered but by parliament: for if once those outworks were
demolished, there would be no inlet to all manner of innovation
in the body of the law itself. The king, it is true, may erect
new courts of justice; but then they must proceed according to
the old established forms of the common law. For which reason
it is declared in the statute 16 Car. I. c. 10. upon the dissolution of
the court of starchamber, that neither his majesty, nor his privy
council, have any jurisdiction, power, or authority by English
bill, petition, articles, libel (which were the course of proceeding
in the starchamber, borrowed from the civil law) or by any
other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine, or draw into question,
determine or dispose of the lands or goods of any subjects
of this kingdom; but that the same ought to be tried and
determined in the ordinary courts of justice, and by course of
law.

4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement
of the rights beforementioned, which the ordinary course
of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate
right appertaining to every individual, namely, the right
of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament, for the
redress of grievances. In Russia we are told[w] that the czar Peter
established a law, that no subject might petition the throne, till
he had first petitioned two different ministers of state. In case
he obtained justice from neither, he might then present a third
petition to the prince; but upon pain of death, if found to be
in the wrong. The consequence of which was, that no one dared
to offer such third petition; and grievances seldom falling under
the notice of the sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress
them. The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon
petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different; and
while they promote the spirit of peace, they are no check upon
that of liberty. Care only must be taken, lest, under the pretence
of petitioning, the subject be guilty of any riot or tumult;
as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in
1640: and, to prevent this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II.
st. 1. c. 5. that no petition to the king, or either house of parliament,
for any alterations in church or state, shall be signed by
above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by
three justices of the peace or the major part of the grand jury,
in the country; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen,
and common council; nor shall any petition be presented by more
than two persons at a time. But under these regulations, it is
declared by the statute 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2. that the subject hath
a right to petition; and that all commitments and prosecutions
for such petitioning are illegal.

5. The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I
shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence,
suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by
law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M.
st. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions,
of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,
when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to
restrain the violence of oppression.

In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently
termed, the liberties of Englishmen: liberties more
generally talked of, than thoroughly understood; and yet highly
necessary to be perfectly known and considered by every man of
rank or property, lest his ignorance of the points whereon it is
founded should hurry him into faction and licentiousness on the
one hand, or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission
on the other. And we have seen that these rights consist, primarily,
in the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty,
and of private property. So long as these remain inviolate,
the subject is perfectly free; for every species of compulsive tyranny
and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of
these rights, having no other object upon which it can possibly
be employed. To preserve these from violation, it is necessary
that the constitution of parliaments be supported in it's full vigor;
and limits certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative. And,
lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked,
the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to
the regular administration and free course of justice in the courts
of law; next to the right of petitioning the king and parliament
for redress of grievances; and lastly to the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defence. And all these rights
and liberties it is our birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the
laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints.
Restraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear
upon farther enquiry, that no man of sense or probity would
wish to see them slackened. For all of us have it in our choice
to do every thing that a good man would desire to do; and are
restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to
ourselves or our fellow citizens. So that this review of our situation
may fully justify the observation of a learned French author,
who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the spirit of
genuine freedom[x]; and who hash not scrupled to profess, even
in the very bosom of his native country, that the English is the
only nation in the world, where political or civil liberty is the
direct end of it's constitution. Recommending therefore to the
student in our laws a farther and more accurate search into this
extensive and important title, I shall close my remarks upon it
with the expiring wish of the famous father Paul to his country,
"Esto perpetua!"

Blackstone, ss 13

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Book the first.

Of the RIGHTS of PERSONS.

Chapter the first.

Of the absolute RIGHTS of INDIVIDUALS.

The objects of the laws of England are so very
numerous and extensive, that, in order to consider
them with any tolerable ease and perspicuity, it will
be necessary to distribute them methodically, under
proper and distinct heads; avoiding as much as possible divisions
too large and comprehensive on the one hand, and too trifling
and minute on the other; both of which are equally productive
of confusion.
Now, as municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, commanding
what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong; or, as Cicero[a],
and after him our Bracton[b], has expressed it, sanctio justa, jubens
honesta et prohibens contraria; it follows, that the primary and
principal objects of the law are RIGHTS, and WRONGS. In
the prosecution therefore of these commentaries, I shall follow
this very simple and obvious division; and shall in the first place
consider the rights that are commanded, and secondly the wrongs
that are forbidden by the laws of England.

Rights are however liable to another subdivision; being
either, first, those which concern, and are annexed to the persons
of men, and are then called jura personarum or the rights of persons;
or they are, secondly, such as a man may acquire over external
objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are stiled
jura rerum or the rights of things. Wrongs also are divisible into,
first, private wrongs, which, being an infringement merely of particular
rights, concern individuals only, and are called civil injuries;
and secondly, public wrongs, which, being a breach of general
and public rights, affect the whole community, and are called
crimes and misdemesnors.

The objects of the laws of England falling into this fourfold
division, the present commentaries will therefore consist of the
four following parts: 1. The rights of persons; with the means
whereby such rights may be either acquired or lost. 2. The rights
of things; with the means also of acquiring and losing them.
3. Private wrongs, or civil injuries; with the means of redressing
them by law. 4. Public wrongs, or crimes and misdemesnors;
with the means of prevention and punishment.

We are now, first, to consider the rights of persons; with
the means of acquiring and losing them.

Now the rights of persons that are commanded to be observed
by the municipal law are of two sorts; first, such as are due
from every citizen, which are usually called civil duties; and,
secondly, such as belong to him, which is the more popular acceptation
of rights or jura. Both may indeed be comprized in
this latter division; for, as all social duties are of a relative nature,
at the same time that they are due from one man, or set of
men, they must also be due to another. But I apprehend it will
be more clear and easy, to consider many of them as duties required
from, rather than as rights belonging to, particular persons.
Thus, for instance, allegiance is usually, and therefore most
easily, considered as the duty of the people, and protection as the
duty of the magistrate; and yet they are, reciprocally, the rights
as well as duties of each other. Allegiance is the right of the
magistrate, and protection the right of the people.

Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons,
or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature
formed us: artificial are such as created and devised by human
laws for the purposes of society and government; which are called
corporations or bodies politic.

The rights of persons considered in their natural capacities
are also of two sorts, absolute, and relative. Absolute, which
are such as appertain and belong to particular men, merely as individuals
or single persons: relative, which are incident to them
as members of society, and standing in various relations to each
other. The first, that is, absolute rights, will be the subject of
the present chapter.

By the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which
are so in their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong
to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man
is intitled to enjoy whether out of society or in it. But with regard
to the absolute duties, which man is bound to perform considered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any human
municipal laws should at all explain or enforce them. For
the end and intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour
of mankind, as they are members of society, and stand in
various relations to each other, they have consequently no business
or concern with any but social or relative duties. Let a man
therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his
practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does
not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the
reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though
they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as drunkenness,
or the like) they then become, by the bad example they
set, of pernicious effects to society; and therefore it is then the
business of human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance
of publication is what alters the nature of the case. Public sobriety
is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws:
private sobriety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed
or not, human tribunals can never know; and therefore
they can never enforce it by any civil sanction. But, with respect
to rights, the case is different. Human laws define and enforce
as well those rights which belong to a man considered as an individual,
as those which belong to him considered as related to
others.

For the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in
the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in
them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be
preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse,
which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities.
Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human
laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.
Such rights as are social and relative result from, and are
posterior to, the formation of states and societies: so that to
maintain and regulate these, is clearly a subsequent consideration.
And therefore the principal view of human laws is, or ought always
to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as are
absolute, which in themselves are few and simple; and, then,
such rights as are relative, which arising from a variety of connexions,
will be far more numerous and more complicated. These
will take up a greater space in any code of laws, and hence
may appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are
not, than the rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed
to examine how far all laws ought, and how far the laws of
England actually do, take notice of these absolute rights, and
provide for their lasting security.

The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed
with discernment to know good from evil, and with power
of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable,
are usually summed up in one general appellation, and
denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty
consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without
any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature: being a
right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man
at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of freewill.
But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part
of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and,
in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce,
obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community
has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience
and conformity is infinitely more desirable, than that wild
and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man,
that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and
uncontroled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence
of which is, that every other man would also have the same
power; and then there would be no security to individuals in
any of the enjoyments of life. Political therefore, or civil, liberty,
which is that of a member of society, is no other than
natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as
is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the publick[c].
Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a
man from doing mischief to his fellow citizens, though it diminishes
the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but
every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject,
whether practiced by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly,
is a degree of tyranny. Nay, that even laws themselves,
whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and
constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without
any good end in view, are laws destructive of liberty: whereas if
any public advantage can arise from observing such precepts, the
control of our private inclinations, in one or two particular points,
will conduce to preserve our general freedom in others of more
importance; by supporting that state, of society, which alone can
secure our independence. Thus the statute of king Edward IV[d],
which forbad the fine gentlemen of those times (under the degree
of a lord) to wear pikes upon their shoes or boots of more
than two inches in length, was a law that savoured of oppression;
because, however ridiculous the fashion then in use might appear,
the restraining it by pecuniary penalties could serve no purpose of
common utility. But the statute of king Charles II[e], which prescribes
a thing seemingly as indifferent; viz. a dress for the dead,
who are all ordered to be buried in woollen; is a law consistent
with public liberty, for it encourages the staple trade, on which
in great measure depends the universal good of the nation. So
that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive
but rather introductive of liberty; for (as Mr Locke has well observed[f])
where there is no law, there is no freedom. But then,
on the other hand, that constitution or frame of government,
that system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty,
which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except
in those points wherein the public good requires some direction
or restraint.

The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty flourish
in their highest vigour in these kingdoms, where it falls little
short of perfection, and can only be lost or destroyed by the folly
or demerits of it's owner: the legislature, and of course the
laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of
this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject. Very different
from the modern constitutions of other states, on the continent
of Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law; which
in general are calculated to vest an arbitrary and despotic power
of controlling the actions of the subject in the prince, or in a few
grandees. And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our
constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a
negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection
of the laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes
eo instanti a freeman[g].

The absolute rights of every Englishman (which, taken in a
political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties) as
they are founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with
our form of government; though subject at times to fluctuate
and change: their establishment (excellent as it is) being still
human. At some times we have seen them depressed by overbearing
and tyrannical princes; at others so luxuriant as even to
tend to anarchy, a worse state than tyranny itself, as any government
is better than none at all. But the vigour of our free constitution
has always delivered the nation from these embarrassments,
and, as soon as the convulsions consequent on the struggle
have been over, the ballance of our rights and liberties has settled
to it's proper level; and their fundamental articles have been
from time to time asserted in parliament, as often as they were
thought to be in danger.

First, by the great charter of liberties, which was obtained,
sword in hand, from king John; and afterwards, with some
alterations, confirmed in parliament by king Henry the third, his
son. Which charter contained very few new grants; but, as sir
Edward Coke[h] observes, was for the most part declaratory of the
principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Afterwards
by the statute called confirmatio cartarum[i], whereby the
great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; all
judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered
to be sent to all cathedral churches, and read twice a year
to the people; and sentence of excommunication is directed to
be as constantly denounced against all those that by word, deed,
or counsel act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it.
Next by a multitude of subsequent corroborating statutes, (sir
Edward Coke, I think, reckons thirty two[k],) from the first Edward
to Henry the fourth. Then, after a long interval, by the
petition of right; which was a parliamentary declaration of the
liberties of the people, assented to by king Charles the first in
the beginning of his reign. Which was closely followed by the
still more ample concessions made by that unhappy prince to his
parliament, before the fatal rupture between them; and by the
many salutary laws, particularly the habeas corpus act, passed under
Charles the second. To these succeeded the bill of rights, or
declaration delivered by the lords and commons to the prince and
princess of Orange 13 February 1688; and afterwards enacted in
parliament, when they became king and queen: which declaration
concludes in these remarkable words; "and they do claim,
demand, and insist upon all and singular the premises, as their
undoubted rights and liberties." And the act of parliament itself[l]
recognizes "all and singular the rights and liberties asserted
and claimed in the said declaration to be the true, antient, and
indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom." Lastly,
these liberties were again asserted at the commencement of the
present century, in the act of settlement[m], whereby the crown is
limited to his present majesty's illustrious house, and some new
provisions were added at the same fortunate aera for better securing
our religion, laws, and liberties; which the statute declares
to be "the birthright of the people of England;" according to
the antient doctrine of the common law[n].

Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties.
The rights themselves thus defined by these several statutes, consist
in a number of private immunities; which will appear, from
what has been premised, to be indeed no other, than either that
residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of
society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil
privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the
natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were
formerly, either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind;
but, in most other countries of the world being now more
or less debased and destroyed, they at present may be said to remain,
in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the
people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal
or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right
of personal liberty; and the right of private property: because
as there is no other known method of compulsion, or of abridging
man's natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution
of one or other of these important rights, the preservation
of these, inviolate, may justly be said to include the preservation
of our civil immunities in their largest and most extensive sense.

I. The right of personal security consists in a person's legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation.

1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by
nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law
as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if
a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise,
killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the
child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child;
this, though not murder, was by the antient law homicide or
manslaughter[o]. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so
atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemesnor[p].

An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed
in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having
a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it. It
may have a guardian assigned to it[q]; and it is enabled to have an
estate limited to it's use, and to take afterwards by such limitation,
as if it were then actually born[r]. And in this point the
civil law agrees with ours[s].

2. A man's limbs, (by which for the present we only understand
those members which may be useful to him in sight,
and the loss of which only amounts to mayhem by the common
law) are also the gift of the wise creator; to enable man to protect
himself from external injuries in a state of nature. To these
therefore he has a natural inherent right; and they cannot be
wantonly destroyed or disabled without a manifest breach of civil
liberty.

Both the life and limbs of a man are of such high value,
in the estimation of the law of England, that it pardons even
homicide if committed se defendendo, or in order to preserve them.
For whatever is done by a man, to save either life or member, is
looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion.
Therefore if a man through fear of death or mayhem is prevailed
upon to execute a deed, or do any other legal act; these, though
accompanied with all other the requisite solemnities, are totally
void in law, if forced upon him by a well-grounded apprehension
of losing his life, or even his limbs, in case of his non-compliance[t].
And the same is also a sufficient excuse for the commission
of many misdemesnors, as will appear in the fourth book.

The constraint a man is under in these circumstances is called in
law duress, from the Latin durities, of which there are two sorts;
duress of imprisonment, where a man actually loses his liberty,
of which we shall presently speak; and duress per minas, where
the hardship is only threatened and impending, which is that we
are now discoursing of. Duress per minas is either for fear of loss
of life, or else for fear of mayhem, or loss of limb. And this
fear must be upon sufficient reason; "non" as Bracton expresses
it, "suspicio cujuslibet vani et meticulosi hominis, sed talis qui possit
cadere in virum constantem; talis enim debet esse metus, qui in se
contineat vitae periculum, aut corporis cruciatum.[u]" A fear of
battery, or being beaten, though never so well grounded, is no
duress; neither is the fear of having one's house burnt, or one's
goods taken away and destroyed; because in these cases, should
the threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering
equivalent damages[w]: but no suitable atonement can be made
for the loss of life, or limb. And the indulgence shewn to a man
under this, the principal, sort of duress, the fear of losing his
life or limbs, agrees also with that maxim of the civil law; ignoscitur
ei qui sanguinem suum qualiter qualiter redemptum voluit[x].

The law not only regards life and member, and protects every
man in the enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with every
thing necessary for their support. For there is no man so indigent
or wretched, but he may demand a supply sufficient for all the
necessities of life, from the more opulent part of the community,
by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor,
of which in their proper places. A humane provision; yet, though
dictated by the principles of society, discountenanced by the Roman
laws. For the edicts of the emperor Constantine, commanding
the public to maintain the children of those who were unable
to provide for them, in order to prevent the murder and exposure
of infants, an institution founded on the same principle as our
foundling hospitals, though comprized in the Theodosian code[y],
were rejected in Justinian's collection.

These rights, of life and member, can only be determined
by the death of the person; which is either a civil or natural
death. The civil death commences if any man be banished the
realm[z] by the process of the common law, or enters into religion;
that is, goes into a monastery, and becomes there a monk professed:
in which cases he is absolutely dead in law, and his next
heir shall have his estate. For, such banished man is entirely cut
off from society; and such a monk, upon his profession, renounces
solemnly all secular concerns: and besides, as the popish clergy
claimed an exemption from the duties of civil life, and the commands
of the temporal magistrate, the genius of the English
law would not suffer those persons to enjoy the benefits of society,
who secluded themselves from it, and refused to submit to it's regulations[a].
A monk is therefore accounted civiliter mortuus, and
when he enters into religion may, like other dying men, make
his testament and executors; or, if he makes none, the ordinary
may grant administration to his next of kin, as if he were actually
dead intestate. And such executors and administrators shall
have the same power, and may bring the same actions for debts
due to the religious, and are liable to the same actions for those
due from him, as if he were naturally deceased[b]. Nay, so far
has this principle been carried, that when one was bound in a
bond to an abbot and his successors, and afterwards made his executors
and professed himself a monk of the same abbey, and in
process of time was himself made abbot thereof; here the law
gave him, in the capacity of abbot, an action of debt against his
own executors to recover the money due[c]. In short, a monk or
religious is so effectually dead in law, that a lease made even to
a third person, during the life (generally) of one who afterwards
becomes a monk, determines by such his entry into religion: for
which reason leases, and other conveyances, for life, are usually
made to have and to hold for the term of one's natural life[d].

This natural life being, as was before observed, the immediate
donation of the great creator, cannot legally be disposed of
or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor
by any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.
Yet nevertheless it may, by the divine permission, be
frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws of society, which
are enforced by the sanction of capital punishments; of the nature,
restrictions, expedience, and legality of which, we may
hereafter more conveniently enquire in the concluding book of
these commentaries. At present, I shall only observe, that whenever
the constitution of a state vests in any man, or body of men,
a power of destroying at pleasure, without the direction of laws,
the lives or members of the subject, such constitution is in the
highest degree tyrannical: and that whenever any laws direct
such destruction for light and trivial causes, such laws are likewise
tyrannical, though in an inferior degree; because here the
subject is aware of the danger he is exposed to, and may by prudent
caution provide against it. The statute law of England does
therefore very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict
any punishment extending to life or limb, unless upon the highest
necessity: and the constitution is an utter stranger to any arbitrary
power of killing or maiming the subject without the express
warrant of law. "Nullus liber homo,[**"] says the great charter[e], [**"]aliquo
modo destruatur, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum aut
per legem terrae." Which words, "aliquo modo destruatur," according
to sir Edward Coke[f], include a prohibition not only of
killing, and maiming, but also of torturing (to which our laws are
strangers) and of every oppression by colour of an illegal authority.
And it is enacted by the statute 5 Edw. III. c. 9. that no
man shall be forejudged of life or limb, contrary to the great
charter and the law of the land: and again, by statute 28 Ed. III.
c. 3. that no man shall be put to death, without being brought
to answer by due process of law.

3. Besides those limbs and members that may be necessary
to man, in order to defend himself or annoy his enemy, the rest
of his person or body is also entitled by the same natural right to
security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating,
and wounding; though such insults amount not to destruction of
life or member.

4. The preservation of a man's health from such practices as
may prejudice or annoy it, and

5. The security of his reputation or good name from the arts
of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is intitled,
by reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible
to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or
right. But these three last articles (being of much less importance
than those which have gone before, and those which are yet
to come) it will suffice to have barely mentioned among the rights
of persons; referring the more minute discussion of their several
branches, to those parts of our commentaries which treat of the
infringement of these rights, under the head of personal wrongs.

Blackstone, ss 02

2008-06-30T14:08:00.003-04:00

The Roman pandects will furnish us with a piece of history
not unapplicable to our present purpose. Servius Sulpicius, a
gentleman of the patrician order, and a celebrated orator, had
occasion to take the opinion of Quintus Mutius Scaevola, the
oracle of the Roman law; but for want of some knowlege in
that science, could not so much as understand even the technical
terms, which his friend was obliged to make use of. Upon which
Mutius Scaevola could not forbear to upbraid him with this memorable
reproof[g], "that it was a shame for a patrician, a nobleman,
and an orator of causes, to be ignorant of that law in
which he was so peculiarly concerned." This reproach made so
deep an impression on Sulpicius, that he immediately applied
himself to the study of the law; wherein he arrived to that proficiency, that he left behind him about a hundred and fourscore
volumes of his own compiling upon the subject; and became, in
the opinion of Cicero[h], a much more complete lawyer than even
Mutius Scaevola himself.

I would not be thought to recommend to our English nobility
and gentry to become as great lawyers as Sulpicius; though
he, together with this character, sustained likewise that of an
excellent orator, a firm patriot, and a wise indefatigable senator;
but the inference which arises from the story is this, that ignorance
of the laws of the land hath ever been esteemed dishonourable,
in those who are entrusted by their country to maintain, to
administer, and to amend them.

But surely there is little occasion to enforce this argument
any farther to persons of rank and distinction, if we of this place
may be allowed to form a general judgment from those who are
under our inspection: happy, that while we lay down the rule,
we can also produce the example. You will therefore permit your
professor to indulge both a public and private satisfaction, by
bearing this open testimony; that in the infancy of these studies
among us, they were favoured with the most diligent attendance,
and pursued with the most unwearied application, by those of the
noblest birth and most ample patrimony: some of whom are still
the ornaments of this seat of learning; and others at a greater
distance continue doing honour to it's institutions, by comparing
our polity and laws with those of other kingdoms abroad, or exerting
their senatorial abilities in the councils of the nation at
home.

Nor will some degree of legal knowlege be found in the least
superfluous to persons of inferior rank; especially those of the
learned professions. The clergy in particular, besides the common
obligations they are under in proportion to their rank and
fortune, have also abundant reason, considered merely as clergymen, to be acquainted with many branches of the law, which
are almost peculiar and appropriated to themselves alone. Such
are the laws relating to advowsons, institutions, and inductions;
to simony, and simoniacal contracts; to uniformity, residence,
and pluralities; to tithes and other ecclesiastical dues; to marriages
(more especially of late) and to a variety of other subjects,
which are consigned to the care of their order by the provisions
of particular statutes. To understand these aright, to discern what
is warranted or enjoined, and what is forbidden by law, demands
a sort of legal apprehension; which is no otherwise to be acquired
than by use and a familiar acquaintance with legal writers.

For the gentlemen of the faculty of physic, I must frankly
own that I see no special reason, why they in particular should
apply themselves to the study of the law; unless in common with
other gentlemen, and to complete the character of general and
extensive knowlege; a character which their profession, beyond
others, has remarkably deserved. They will give me leave however
to suggest, and that not ludicrously, that it might frequently
be of use to families upon sudden emergencies, if the physician
were acquainted with the doctrine of last wills and testaments,
at least so far as relates to the formal part of their execution.

But those gentlemen who intend to profess the civil and ecclesiastical
laws in the spiritual and maritime courts of this kingdom,
are of all men (next to common lawyers) the most indispensably
obliged to apply themselves seriously to the study of our
municipal laws. For the civil and canon laws, considered with
respect to any intrinsic obligation, have no force or authority in
this kingdom; they are no more binding in England than our
laws are binding at Rome. But as far as these foreign laws, on
account of some peculiar propriety, have in some particular cases,
and in some particular courts, been introduced and allowed by
our laws, so far they oblige, and no farther; their authority being
wholly founded upon that permission and adoption. In which we
are not singular in our notions; for even in Holland, where the
imperial law is much cultivated and it's decisions pretty generally
followed, we are informed by Van Leeuwen[i], that, "it receives
it's force from custom and the consent of the people, either tacitly
or expressly given: for otherwise,[**"] he adds, [**"]we should no
more be bound by this law, than by that of the Almains, the
Franks, the Saxons, the Goths, the Vandals, and other of the
antient nations." Wherefore, in all points in which the different
systems depart from each other, the law of the land takes
place of the law of Rome, whether antient or modern, imperial
or pontificial. And in those of our English courts wherein a reception
has been allowed to the civil and canon laws, if either
they exceed the bounds of that reception, by extending themselves
to other matters, than are permitted to them; or if such
courts proceed according to the decisions of those laws, in cases
wherein it is controlled by the law of the land, the common law
in either instance both may, and frequently does, prohibit and
annul their proceedings[k]: and it will not be a sufficient excuse
for them to tell the king's courts at Westminster, that their practice
is warranted by the laws of Justinian or Gregory, or is conformable
to the decrees of the Rota or imperial chamber. For
which reason it becomes highly necessary for every civilian and
canonist that would act with safety as a judge, or with prudence
and reputation as an advocate, to know in what cases and how
far the English laws have given sanction to the Roman; in what
points the latter are rejected; and where they are both so intermixed
and blended together, as to form certain supplemental
parts of the common law of England, distinguished by the titles
of the king's maritime, the king's military, and the king's ecclesiastical
law. The propriety of which enquiry the university of
Oxford has for more than a century so thoroughly seen, that in
her statutes[l] she appoints, that one of the three questions to be
annually discussed at the act by the jurist-inceptors shall relate to
the common law; subjoining this reason, "quia juris civilis studiosos
decet haud imperitos esse juris municipalis, & differentias ex-teri patriique juris notas habere." And the statutes[m] of the university
of Cambridge speak expressly to the same effect.

From the general use and necessity of some acquaintance with
the common law, the inference were extremely easy, with regard
to the propriety of the present institution, in a place to which
gentlemen of all ranks and degrees resort, as the fountain of all
useful knowlege. But how it has come to pass that a design of
this sort has never before taken place in the university, and the
reason why the study of our laws has in general fallen into disuse,
I shall previously proceed to enquire.

Sir John Fortescue, in his panegyric on the laws of England,
(which was written in the reign of Henry the sixth) puts[n] a very
obvious question in the mouth of the young prince, whom he is
exhorting to apply himself to that branch of learning; "why the
laws of England, being so good, so fruitful, and so commodious,
are not taught in the universities, as the civil and canon
laws are?" In answer to which he gives[o] what seems, with
due deference be it spoken, a very jejune and unsatisfactory reason;
being in short, that "as the proceedings at common law
were in his time carried on in three different tongues, the
English, the Latin, and the French, that science must be necessarily
taught in those three several languages; but that in
the universities all sciences were taught in the Latin tongue
only;[**"] and therefore he concludes, [**"]that they could not be conveniently
taught or studied in our universities." But without
attempting to examine seriously the validity of this reason, (the
very shadow of which by the wisdom of your late constitutions
is entirely taken away) we perhaps may find out a better, or at
least a more plausible account, why the study of the municipal
laws has been banished from these seats of science, than what the
learned chancellor thought it prudent to give to his royal pupil.

That antient collection of unwritten maxims and customs,
which is called the common law, however compounded or from
whatever fountains derived, had subsisted immemorially in this
kingdom; and, though somewhat altered and impaired by the
violence of the times, had in great measure weathered the rude
shock of the Norman conquest. This had endeared it to the
people in general, as well because it's decisions were universally
known, as because it was found to be excellently adapted to the
genius of the English nation. In the knowlege of this law consisted
great part of the learning of those dark ages; it was then
taught, says Mr Selden[p], in the monasteries, in the universities,
and in the families of the principal nobility. The clergy in particular,
as they then engrossed almost every other branch of learning,
so (like their predecessors the British druids[q]) they were
peculiarly remarkable for their proficiency in the study of the
law. Nullus clericus nisi causidicus, is the character given of them
soon after the conquest by William of Malmsbury[r]. The judges
therefore were usually created out of the sacred order[s], as was
likewise the case among the Normans[t]; and all the inferior offices
were supplied by the lower clergy, which has occasioned their
successors to be denominated clerks to this day.

But the common law of England, being not committed to
writing, but only handed down by tradition, use, and experience,
was not so heartily relished by the foreign clergy; who came
over hither in shoals during the reign of the conqueror and his
two sons, and were utter strangers to our constitution as well as
our language. And an accident, which soon after happened, had
nearly completed it's ruin. A copy of Justinian's pandects, being
newly[u] discovered at Amalfi, soon brought the civil law into

vogue all over the west of Europe, where before it was quite
laid aside[w] and in a manner forgotten; though some traces of it's
authority remained in Italy[x] and the eastern provinces of the empire[y].
This now became in a particular manner the favourite of
the popish clergy, who borrowed the method and many of the
maxims of their canon law from this original. The study of it
was introduced into several universities abroad, particularly that
of Bologna; where exercises were performed, lectures read, and
degrees conferred in this faculty, as in other branches of science:
and many nations on the continent, just then beginning to recover
from the convulsions consequent upon the overthrow of the
Roman empire, and settling by degrees into peaceable forms of
government, adopted the civil law, (being the best written system
then extant) as the basis of their several constitutions; blending
and interweaving it among their own feodal customs, in some
places with a more extensive, in others a more confined authority[z].

Nor was it long before the prevailing mode of the times
reached England. For Theobald, a Norman abbot, being elected
to the see of Canterbury[a], and extremely addicted to this new
study, brought over with him in his retinue many learned proficients
therein; and among the rest Roger sirnamed Vacarius,
whom he placed in the university of Oxford[b], to teach it to the
people of this country. But it did not meet with the same easy
reception in England, where a mild and rational system of laws
had been long established, as it did upon the continent; and,
though the monkish clergy (devoted to the will of a foreign primate)
received it with eagerness and zeal, yet the laity who were
more interested to preserve the old constitution, and had already
severely felt the effect of many Norman innovations, continued
wedded to the use of the common law. King Stephen immediately published a proclamation[c], forbidding the study of the
laws, then newly imported from Italy; which was treated by the
monks[d] as a piece of impiety, and, though it might prevent the
introduction of the civil law process into our courts of justice,
yet did not hinder the clergy from reading and teaching it in
their own schools and monasteries.

From this time the nation seems to have been divided into
two parties; the bishops and clergy, many of them foreigners,
who applied themselves wholly to the study of the civil and canon
laws, which now came to be inseparably interwoven with
each other; and the nobility and laity, who adhered with equal
pertinacity to the old common law; both of them reciprocally
jealous of what they were unacquainted with, and neither of
them perhaps allowing the opposite system that real merit which
is abundantly to be found in each. This appears on the one
hand from the spleen with which the monastic writers[e] speak of
our municipal laws upon all occasions; and, on the other, from
the firm temper which the nobility shewed at the famous parliament
of Merton; when the prelates endeavoured to procure an
act, to declare all bastards legitimate in case the parents intermarried
at any time afterwards; alleging this only reason, because
holy church (that is, the canon law) declared such children legitimate:
but "all the earls and barons[**"] (says the parliament roll[f])
[**"]with one voice answered, that they would not change the laws
of England, which had hitherto been used and approved."
And we find the same jealousy prevailing above a century afterwards[g],
when the nobility declared with a kind of prophetic
spirit, "that the realm of England hath never been unto this
hour, neither by the consent of our lord the king and the lords
of parliament shall it ever be, ruled or governed by the civil
law[h]." And of this temper between the clergy and laity many
more instances might be given.

While things were in this situation, the clergy, finding it
impossible to root out the municipal law, began to withdraw
themselves by degrees from the temporal courts; and to that end,
very early in the reign of king Henry the third, episcopal constitutions
were published[i], forbidding all ecclesiastics to appear as
advocates in foro saeculari; nor did they long continue to act as
judges there, nor caring to take the oath of office which was
then found necessary to be administred, that they should in all
things determine according to the law and custom of this realm[k];
though they still kept possession of the high office of chancellor,
an office then of little juridical power; and afterwards, as it's
business increased by degrees, they modelled the process of the
court at their own discretion.

But wherever they retired, and wherever their authority extended,
they carried with them the same zeal to introduce the
rules of the civil, in exclusion of the municipal law. This appears
in a particular manner from the spiritual courts of all denominations,
from the chancellor's courts in both our universities,
and from the high court of chancery before-mentioned; in all of
which the proceedings are to this day in a course much conformed
to the civil law: for which no tolerable reason can be assigned,
unless that these courts were all under the immediate direction of
the popish ecclesiastics, among whom it was a point of religion
to exclude the municipal law; pope Innocent the fourth having[l]
forbidden the very reading of it by the clergy, because it's decisions
were not founded on the imperial constitutions, but merely
on the customs of the laity. And if it be considered, that our
universities began about that period to receive their present form
of scholastic discipline; that they were then, and continued to
be till the time of the reformation, entirely under the influence
of the popish clergy; (sir John Mason the first protestant, being
also the first lay, chancellor of Oxford) this will lead us to perceive
the reason, why the study of the Roman laws was in those
days of bigotry[m] pursued with such alacrity in these seats of learning;
and why the common law was entirely despised, and esteemed
little better than heretical.

And, since the reformation, many causes have conspired to
prevent it's becoming a part of academical education. As, first,
long usage and established custom; which, as in every thing else,
so especially in the forms of scholastic exercise, have justly great
weight and authority. Secondly, the real intrinsic merit of the
civil law, considered upon the footing of reason and not of obligation,
which was well known to the instructors of our youth;
and their total ignorance of the merit of the common law, though
it's equal at least, and perhaps an improvement on the other.
But the principal reason of all, that has hindered the introduction
of this branch of learning, is, that the study of the common
law, being banished from hence in the times of popery, has
fallen into a quite different chanel, and has hitherto been wholly
cultivated in another place. But as this long usage and established
custom, of ignorance in the laws of the land, begin now to be
thought unreasonable; and as by this means the merit of those
laws will probably be more generally known; we may hope that
the method of studying them will soon revert to it's antient course,
and the foundations at least of that science will be laid in the
two universities; without being exclusively confined to the chanel
which it fell into at the times I have been just describing.

For, being then entirely abandoned by the clergy, a few
stragglers excepted, the study and practice of it devolved of
course into the hands of laymen; who entertained upon their
parts a most hearty aversion to the civil law[n], and made no
scruple to profess their contempt, nay even their ignorance[o] of
it, in the most public manner. But still, as the ballance of learning
was greatly on the side of the clergy, and as the common
law was no longer taught, as formerly, in any part of the kingdom,
it must have been subjected to many inconveniences, and
perhaps would have been gradually lost and overrun by the civil,
(a suspicion well justified from the frequent transcipts of Justinian
to be met with in Bracton and Fleta) had it not been for a
peculiar incident, which happened at a very critical time, and
contributed greatly to it's support.

Blackstone, ss01

2008-06-30T14:03:00.002-04:00

INTRODUCTION.

Section the first.

On the STUDY of the LAW.[A]

Mr Vice-Chancellor, and gentlemen of the
university,

The general expectation of so numerous and respectable
an audience, the novelty, and (I may
add) the importance of the duty required from this
chair, must unavoidably be productive of great diffidence
and apprehensions in him who has the honour
to be placed in it. He must be sensible how much will depend
upon his conduct in the infancy of a study, which is now
first adopted by public academical authority; which has generally
been reputed (however unjustly) of a dry and unfruitful nature;
and of which the theoretical, elementary parts have hitherto received
a very moderate share of cultivation. He cannot but reflect
that, if either his plan of instruction be crude and injudicious,
or the execution of it lame and superficial, it will cast a
damp upon the farther progress of this most useful and most rational
branch of learning; and may defeat for a time the public-*
spirited design of our wise and munificent benefactor. And this
he must more especially dread, when he feels by experience how
unequal his abilities are (unassisted by preceding examples) to
complete, in the manner he could wish, so extensive and arduous
a task; since he freely confesses, that his former more private
attempts have fallen very short of his own ideas of perfection.
And yet the candour he has already experienced, and this last
transcendent mark of regard, his present nomination by the free
and unanimous suffrage of a great and learned university, (an
honour to be ever remembered with the deepest and most affectionate
gratitude) these testimonies of your public judgment must
entirely supersede his own, and forbid him to believe himself totally
insufficient for the labour at least of this employment. One
thing he will venture to hope for, and it certainly shall be his
constant aim, by diligence and attention to atone for his other
defects; esteeming, that the best return, which he can possibly
make for your favourable opinion of his capacity, will be his
unwearied endeavours in some little degree to deserve it.

The science thus committed to his charge, to be cultivated,
methodized, and explained in a course of academical lectures, is
that of the laws and constitution of our own country: a species
of knowlege, in which the gentlemen of England have been
more remarkably deficient than those of all Europe besides. In
most of the nations on the continent, where the civil or imperial
law under different modifications is closely interwoven with the
municipal laws of the land, no gentleman, or at least no scholar,
thinks his education is completed, till he has attended a course or
two of lectures, both upon the institutes of Justinian and the
local constitutions of his native soil, under the very eminent professors
that abound in their several universities. And in the northern
parts of our own island, where also the municipal laws are
frequently connected with the civil, it is difficult to meet with a
person of liberal education, who is destitute of a competent
knowlege in that science, which is to be the guardian of his
natural rights and the rule of his civil conduct.

Nor have the imperial laws been totally neglected even in
the English nation. A general acquaintance with their decisions
has ever been deservedly considered as no small accomplishment
of a gentleman; and a fashion has prevailed, especially of late,
to transport the growing hopes of this island to foreign universities,
in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; which, though
infinitely inferior to our own in every other consideration, have
been looked upon as better nurseries of the civil, or (which is
nearly the same) of their own municipal law. In the mean time
it has been the peculiar lot of our admirable system of laws, to
be neglected, and even unknown, by all but one practical profession;
though built upon the soundest foundations, and approved
by the experience of ages.

Far be it from me to derogate from the study of the civil
law, considered (apart from any binding authority) as a collection
of written reason. No man is more thoroughly persuaded of the
general excellence of it's rules, and the usual equity of it's decisions;
nor is better convinced of it's use as well as ornament to
the scholar, the divine, the statesman, and even the common
lawyer. But we must not carry our veneration so far as to sacrifice
our Alfred and Edward to the manes of Theodosius and Justinian:
we must not prefer the edict of the praetor, or the rescript
of the Roman emperor, to our own immemorial customs,
or the sanctions of an English parliament; unless we can also
prefer the despotic monarchy of Rome and Byzantium, for whose
meridians the former were calculated, to the free constitution of
Britain, which the latter are adapted to perpetuate.

Without detracting therefore from the real merit which
abounds in the imperial law, I hope I may have leave to assert,
that if an Englishman must be ignorant of either the one or the
other, he had better be a stranger to the Roman than the English
institutions. For I think it an undeniable position, that a competent
knowlege of the laws of that society, in which we live,
is the proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar;
an highly useful, I had almost said essential, part of liberal and
polite education. And in this I am warranted by the example of
antient Rome; where, as Cicero informs us[a], the very boys were
obliged to learn the twelve tables by heart, as a carmen necessarium
or indispensable lesson, to imprint on their tender minds an early
knowlege of the laws and constitutions of their country.

But as the long and universal neglect of this study, with us
in England, seems in some degree to call in question the truth of
this evident position, it shall therefore be the business of this introductory
discourse, in the first place to demonstrate the utility of
some general acquaintance with the municipal law of the land,
by pointing out its particular uses in all considerable situations of
life. Some conjectures will then be offered with regard to the
causes of neglecting this useful study: to which will be subjoined
a few reflexions on the peculiar propriety of reviving it in our
own universities.

And, first, to demonstrate the utility of some acquaintance
with the laws of the land, let us only reflect a moment on the
singular frame and polity of that land, which is governed by this
system of laws. A land, perhaps the only one in the universe,
in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the
constitution[b]. This liberty, rightly understood, consists in the
power of doing whatever the laws permit[c]; which is only to be
effected by a general conformity of all orders and degrees to those
equitable rules of action, by which the meanest individual is protected
from the insults and oppression of the greatest. As therefore
every subject is interested in the preservation of the laws, it
is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those at least,
with which he is immediately concerned; lest he incur the censure,
as well as inconvenience, of living in society without knowing
the obligations which it lays him under. And thus much
may suffice for persons of inferior condition, who have neither
time nor capacity to enlarge their views beyond that contracted
sphere in which they are appointed to move. But those, on whom
nature and fortune have bestowed more abilities and greater leisure,
cannot be so easily excused. These advantages are given
them, not for the benefit of themselves only, but also of the public:
and yet they cannot, in any scene of life, discharge properly
their duty either to the public or themselves, without some degree
of knowlege in the laws. To evince this the more clearly,
it may not be amiss to descend to a few particulars.

Let us therefore begin with our gentlemen of independent
estates and fortune, the most useful as well as considerable body
of men in the nation; whom even to suppose ignorant in this
branch of learning is treated by Mr Locke[d] as a strange absurdity.
It is their landed property, with it's long and voluminous
train of descents and conveyances, settlements, entails, and incumbrances,
that forms the most intricate and most extensive object
of legal knowlege. The thorough comprehension of these,
in all their minute distinctions, is perhaps too laborious a task
for any but a lawyer by profession: yet still the understanding of
a few leading principles, relating to estates and conveyancing,
may form some check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior
agents, and preserve him at least from very gross and notorious
imposition.

Again, the policy of all laws has made some forms necessary
in the wording of last wills and testaments, and more with
regard to their attestation. An ignorance in these must always be
of dangerous consequence, to such as by choice or necessity compile
their own testaments without any technical assistance. Those
who have attended the courts of justice are the best witnesses of
the confusion and distresses that are hereby occasioned in families;
and of the difficulties that arise in discerning the true meaning
of the testator, or sometimes in discovering any meaning at all:
so that in the end his estate may often be vested quite contrary to
these his enigmatical intentions, because perhaps he has omitted
one or two formal words, which are necessary to ascertain the
sense with indisputable legal precision, or has executed his will
in the presence of fewer witnesses than the law requires.

But to proceed from private concerns to those of a more
public consideration. All gentlemen of fortune are, in consequence
of their property, liable to be called upon to establish the
rights, to estimate the injuries, to weigh the accusations, and
sometimes to dispose of the lives of their fellow-subjects, by
serving upon juries. In this situation they are frequently to decide,
and that upon their oaths, questions of nice importance,
in the solution of which some legal skill is requisite; especially
where the law and the fact, as it often happens, are intimately
blended together. And the general incapacity, even of our best
juries, to do this with any tolerable propriety has greatly debased
their authority; and has unavoidably thrown more power into
the hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverse
their verdicts, than perhaps the constitution intended.

But it is not as a juror only that the English gentleman is
called upon to determine questions of right, and distribute justice
to his fellow-subjects: it is principally with this order of men
that the commission of the peace is filled. And here a very ample
field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining
good order in his neighbourhood; by punishing the dissolute
and idle; by protecting the peaceable and industrious; and,
above all, by healing petty differences and preventing vexatious
prosecutions. But, in order to attain these desirable ends, it is
necessary that the magistrate should understand his business; and
have not only the will, but the power also, (under which must
be included the knowlege) of administering legal and effectual
justice. Else, when he has mistaken his authority, through passion,
through ignorance, or absurdity, he will be the object of
contempt from his inferiors, and of censure from those to whom
he is accountable for his conduct.

Yet farther; most gentlemen of considerable property, at
some period or other in their lives, are ambitious of representing
their country in parliament: and those, who are ambitious of
receiving so high a trust, would also do well to remember it's
nature and importance. They are not thus honourably distinguished
from the rest of their fellow-subjects, merely that they
may privilege their persons, their estates, or their domestics;
that they may list under party banners; may grant or with-hold
supplies; may vote with or vote against a popular or unpopular
administration; but upon considerations far more interesting and
important. They are the guardians of the English constitution;
the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the English laws;
delegated to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation,
to propose, to adopt, and to cherish any solid and well-weighed
improvement; bound by every tie of nature, of honour,
and of religion, to transmit that constitution and those laws to
their posterity, amended if possible, at least without any derogation.
And how unbecoming must it appear in a member
of the legislature to vote for a new law, who is utterly ignorant
of the old! what kind of interpretation can he be enabled
to give, who is a stranger to the text upon which he
comments!

Indeed it is really amazing, that there should be no other
state of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some
method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only
the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any.
Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial
or mechanical: a long course of reading and study must
form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the
laws: but every man of superior fortune thinks himself born a
legislator. Yet Tully was of a different opinion: "It is necessary,[** "] says he[e], [** "]for a senator to be thoroughly acquainted with
the constitution; and this, he declares, is a knowlege of the
most extensive nature; a matter of science, of diligence, of
reflexion; without which no senator can possibly be fit for his
office."

The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate
alterations in our laws, are too obvious to be called in question;
and how far they have been owing to the defective education
of our senators, is a point well worthy the public attention.
The common law of England has fared like other venerable edifices
of antiquity, which rash and unexperienced workmen have
ventured to new-dress and refine, with all the rage of modern improvement.
Hence frequently it's symmetry has been destroyed,
it's proportions distorted, and it's majestic simplicity exchanged
for specious embellishments and fantastic novelties. For, to say
the truth, almost all the perplexed questions, almost all the niceties,
intricacies, and delays (which have sometimes disgraced the
English, as well as other, courts of justice) owe their original
not to the common law itself, but to innovations that have been
made in it by acts of parliament; "overladen[** "] (as sir Edward
Coke expresses it[f]) [** "]with provisoes and additions, and many
times on a sudden penned or corrected by men of none or very
little judgment in law." This great and well-experienced judge
declares, that in all his time he never knew two questions made
upon rights merely depending upon the common law; and
warmly laments the confusion introduced by ill-judging and unlearned
legislators. "But if,[** "] he subjoins, [** "]acts of parliament were
after the old fashion penned, by such only as perfectly knew
what the common law was before the making of any act of
parliament concerning that matter, as also how far forth former
statutes had provided remedy for former mischiefs, and
defects discovered by experience; then should very few questions in law arise, and the learned should not so often and so
much perplex their heads to make atonement and peace, by
construction of law, between insensible and disagreeing words,
sentences, and provisoes, as they now do." And if this inconvenience
was so heavily felt in the reign of queen Elizabeth, you
may judge how the evil is increased in later times, when the
statute book is swelled to ten times a larger bulk; unless it should
be found, that the penners of our modern statutes have proportionably
better informed themselves in the knowlege of the common
law.

What is said of our gentlemen in general, and the propriety
of their application to the study of the laws of their country,
will hold equally strong or still stronger with regard to the nobility
of this realm, except only in the article of serving upon juries.
But, instead of this, they have several peculiar provinces
of far greater consequence and concern; being not only by birth
hereditary counsellors of the crown, and judges upon their honour
of the lives of their brother-peers, but also arbiters of the
property of all their fellow-subjects, and that in the last resort.
In this their judicial capacity they are bound to decide the nicest
and most critical points of the law; to examine and correct such
errors as have escaped the most experienced sages of the profession,
the lord keeper and the judges of the courts at Westminster.
Their sentence is final, decisive, irrevocable: no appeal, no correction,
not even a review can be had: and to their determination,
whatever it be, the inferior courts of justice must conform;
otherwise the rule of property would no longer be uniform and
steady.

Should a judge in the most subordinate jurisdiction be deficient
in the knowlege of the law, it would reflect infinite contempt
upon himself and disgrace upon those who employ him.
And yet the consequence of his ignorance is comparatively very
trifling and small: his judgment may be examined, and his errors
rectified, by other courts. But how much more serious and
affecting is the case of a superior judge, if without any skill in
the laws he will boldly venture to decide a question, upon which
the welfare and subsistence of whole families may depend! where
the chance of his judging right, or wrong, is barely equal; and
where, if he chances to judge wrong, he does an injury of the
most alarming nature, an injury without possibility of redress!

Yet, vast as this trust is, it can no where be so properly reposed
as in the noble hands where our excellent constitution has
placed it: and therefore placed it, because, from the independence
of their fortune and the dignity of their station, they are
presumed to employ that leisure which is the consequence of
both, in attaining a more extensive knowlege of the laws than
persons of inferior rank: and because the founders of our polity
relied upon that delicacy of sentiment, so peculiar to noble birth;
which, as on the one hand it will prevent either interest or affection
from interfering in questions of right, so on the other it
will bind a peer in honour, an obligation which the law esteems
equal to another's oath, to be master of those points upon which
it is his birthright to decide.

Blackstone, preface

2008-06-30T13:57:00.000-04:00

PREFACE.

The following sheets contain the substance of a
course of lectures on the laws of England, which
were read by the author in the university of OXFORD.
His original plan took it's rise in the year 1753: and,
notwithstanding the novelty of such an attempt in this age
and country, and the prejudices usually conceived against
any innovations in the established mode of education, he had
the satisfaction to find (and he acknowleges[**p3 typo or archaic?] it with a mixture
of pride and gratitude) that his endeavours were
encouraged and patronized by those, both in the university
and out of it, whose good opinion and esteem he was principally
desirous to obtain.

THE death of Mr Viner in 1756, and his ample
benefaction to the university for promoting the study of the
law, produced about two years afterwards a regular and
public establishment of what the author had privately undertaken.
The knowlege of our laws and constitution was
adopted as a liberal science by general academical authority;
competent endowments were decreed for the support
of a lecturer, and the perpetual encouragement of students;
and the compiler of the ensuing commentaries had the honour
to be elected the first Vinerian professor.

IN this situation he was led, both by duty and inclination,
to investigate the elements of the law, and the
grounds of our civil polity, with greater assiduity and attention
than many have thought it necessary to do. And
yet all, who of late years have attended the public administration
of justice, must be sensible that a masterly acquaintance
with the general spirit of laws and the principles
of universal jurisprudence, combined with an accurate
knowlege of our own municipal constitutions, their
original, reason, and history, hath given a beauty and
energy to many modern judicial decisions, with which our
ancestors were wholly unacquainted. If, in the pursuit of
these inquiries, the author hath been able to rectify any errors
which either himself or others may have heretofore
imbibed, his pains will be sufficiently answered: and, if
in some points he is still mistaken, the candid and judicious
reader will make due allowances for the difficulties of
a search so new, so extensive, and so laborious.

THE labour indeed of these researches, and of a regular
attention to his duty, for a series of so many years,
he hath found inconsistent with his health, as well as his
other avocations: and hath therefore desired the university's
permission to retire from his office, after the conclusion
of the annual course in which he is at present engaged.
But the hints, which he had collected for the use of his
pupils, having been thought by some of his more experienced
friends not wholly unworthy of the public eye, it is
therefore with the less reluctance that he now commits them
to the press: though probably the little degree of reputation,
which their author may have acquired by the candor
of an audience (a test widely different from that of a deliberate
perusal) would have been better consulted by a
total suppression of his lectures;----had that been a
matter intirely[**p3 typo or archaic?] within his power.

FOR the truth is, that the present publication is as
much the effect of necessity, as it is of choice. The notes
which were taken by his hearers, have by some of them
(too partial in his favour) been thought worth revising
and transcribing; and these transcripts have been frequently
lent to others. Hence copies have been multiplied,
in their nature imperfect, if not erroneous; some of which
have fallen into mercenary hands, and become the object
of clandestine sale. Having therefore so much reason to
apprehend a surreptitious impression, he chose rather to
submit his own errors to the world, than to seem answerable
for those of other men. And, with this apology, he
commits himself to the indulgence of the public.

Blackstone ss48

2008-05-30T22:49:00.001-04:00

"Section 48. Part 2 of Chapter 18 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 18, Part 2"

II. After a corporation is so formed and named, it acquires
many powers, rights, capacities, and incapacities, which
we are next to consider. Some of these are necessarily and inseparably
incident to every corporation; which incidents, as soon
as a corporation is duly erected, are tacitly annexed of course[y].
As, 1. To have perpetual succession. This is the very end of it's
incorporation: for there cannot be a succession for ever without
an incorporation[z]; and therefore all aggregate corporations have
a power necessarily implied of electing members in the room of
such as go off[a]. 2. To sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded,
grant or receive, by it's corporate name, and do all other acts as
natural persons may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold them, for
the benefit of themselves and their successors: which two are
consequential to the former. 4. To have a common seal. For a
corporation, being an invisible body, cannot manifest it's intentions
by any personal act or oral discourse: it therefore acts and
speaks only by it's common seal. For, though the particular
members may express their private contents to any act, by words,
or signing their names, yet this does not bind the corporation:
it is the fixing of the seal, and that only, which unites the several
assents of the individuals, who compose the community, and
makes one joint assent of the whole[b]. 5. To make by-laws or
private statutes for the better government of the corporation;
which are binding upon themselves, unless contrary to the laws
of the land, and then they are void. This is also included by
law in the very act of incorporation[c]: for, as natural reason is
given to the natural body for the governing it, so by-laws or statutes
are a sort of political reason to govern the body politic.
And this right of making by-laws for their own government, not
contrary to the law of the land, was allowed by the law of the
twelve tables at Rome[d]. But no trading company is, with us,
allowed to make by-laws, which may affect the king's prerogative,
or the common profit of the people, unless they be approved
by the chancellor, treasurer, and chief justices, or the judges
of assise [* ?? what word is this supposed to be? ] in their circuits[e]. These five powers are inseparably incident
to every corporation, at least to every corporation aggregate:
for two of them, though they may be practised, yet are
very unnecessary to a corporation sole; viz. to have a corporate
seal to testify his sole assent, and to make statutes for the regulation
of his own conduct.

There are also certain privileges and disabilities that attend
an aggregate corporation, and are not applicable to such as are
sole; the reason of them ceasing, and of course the law. It must
always appear by attorney; for it cannot appear in person, being,
as sir Edward Coke says[f], invisible, and existing only in intendment
and consideration of law. It can neither maintain, or be
made defendant to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries;
for a corporation can neither beat, nor be beaten, in it's
body politic[g]. A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony,
or other crime, in it's corporate capacity[h]: though it's members
may, in their distinct individual capacities. Neither is it capable
of suffering a traitor's, or felon's punishment, for it is not liable
to corporal penalties, nor to attainder, forfeiture, or corruption
of blood[i]. It cannot be executor or administrator, or perform
any personal duties; for it cannot take an oath for the due execution
of the office. It cannot be a trustee; for such kind of confidence
is foreign to the ends of it's institution: neither can it be
compelled to perform such trust, because it cannot be committed
to prison[k]; for it's existence being ideal, no man can apprehend
or arrest it. And therefore also it cannot be outlawed; for outlawry
always supposes a precedent right of arresting, which has
been defeated by the parties absconding, and that also a corporation
cannot do: for which reasons the proceedings to compel a
corporation to appear to any suit by attorney are always by distress
on their lands and goods[l]. Neither can a corporation be excommunicated;
for it has no soul, as is gravely observed by sir
Edward Coke[m]: and therefore also it is not liable to be summoned
into the ecclesiastical courts upon any account; for those courts
act only pro salute animae, and their sentences can only be inforced
by spiritual censures: a consideration, which, carried to
it's full extent, would alone demonstrate the impropriety of these
courts interfering in any temporal rights whatsoever.

There are also other incidents and powers, which belong to
some sort of corporations, and not to others. An aggregate corporation
may take goods and chattels for the benefit of themselves
and their successors, but a sole corporation cannot[n]: for such
moveable property is liable to be lost or imbezzled, and would
raise a multitude of disputes between the successor and executor;
which the law is careful to avoid. In ecclesiastical and eleemosynary
foundations, the king or the founder may give them rules,
laws, statutes, and ordinances, which they are bound to observe:
but corporations merely lay, constituted for civil purposes, are
subject to no particular statutes; but to the common law, and to
their own by-laws, not contrary to the laws of the realm[o]. Aggregate
corporations also, that have by their constitution a head,
as a dean, warden, master, or the like, cannot do any acts during
the vacancy of the headship, except only appointing another:
neither are they then capable of receiving a grant; for such corporation
is incomplete without a head[p]. But there may be a cor-*
*poration aggregate constituted without a head[q]: as the collegiate
church of Southwell in Nottinghamshire, which consists only of
prebendaries; and the governors of the Charter-house, London,
who have no president or superior, but are all of equal authority.
In aggregate corporations also, the act of the major part is esteemed
the act of the whole[r]. By the civil law this major part must
have consisted of two thirds of the whole; else no act could be
performed[s]: which perhaps may be one reason why they required
three at least to make a corporation. But, with us, any majority
is sufficient to determine the act of the whole body. And whereas,
notwithstanding the law stood thus, some founders of corporations
had made statutes in derogation of the common law, making
very frequently the unanimous assent of the society to be necessary
to any corporate act; (which king Henry VIII found to be a great
obstruction to his projected scheme of obtaining a surrender of
the lands of ecclesiastical corporations) it was therefore enacted
by statute 33 Hen. VIII. c. 27. that all private statutes shall be
utterly void, whereby any grant or election, made by the head,
with the concurrence of the major part of the body, is liable
to be obstructed by any one or more, being the minority: but
this statute extends not to any negative or necessary voice, given
by the founder to the head of any such society.

We before observed that it was incident to every corporation,
to have a capacity to purchase lands for themselves and successors:
and this is regularly true at the common law[t]. But they are excepted
out of the statute of wills[u]; so that no devise of lands to a
corporation by will is good: except for charitable uses, by statute
43 Eliz. c. 4[w]. And also, by a great variety of statutes[x], their
privilege even of purchasing from any living grantor is greatly
abridged; so that now a corporation, either ecclesiastical or lay,
must have a licence from the king to purchase[y], before they can
exert that capacity which is vested in them by the common law:
nor is even this in all cases sufficient. These statutes are generally
called the statutes of mortmain; all purchases made by corporate
bodies being said to be purchases in mortmain, in mortua
manu: for the reason of which appellation sir Edward Coke[z] offers
many conjectures; but there is one which seems more probable
than any that he has given us: viz. that these purchases
being usually made by ecclesiastical bodies, the members of which
(being professed) were reckoned dead persons in law, land therefore,
holden by them, might with great propriety be said to be
held in mortua manu.

I shall defer the more particular exposition of these statutes
of mortmain, till the next book of these commentaries,
when we shall consider the nature and tenures of estates; and
also the exposition of those disabling statutes of queen Elizabeth,
which restrain spiritual and eleemosynary corporations from aliening
such lands as they are present in legal possession of: only
mentioning them in this place, for the sake of regularity, as
statutable incapacities incident and relative to corporations.

The general duties of all bodies politic, considered in their
corporate capacity, may, like those of natural persons, be reduced
to this single one; that of acting up to the end or design, whatever
it be, for which they were created by their founder.

III. I proceed therefore next to enquire, how these corporations
may be visited. For corporations being composed of individuals,
subject to human frailties, are liable, as well as private
persons, to deviate from the end of their institution. And for that
reason the law has provided proper persons to visit, enquire into,
and correct all irregularities that arise in such corporations, either
sole or aggregate, and whether ecclesiastical, civil, or eleemosynary.
With regard to all ecclesiastical corporations, the ordinary
is their visitor, so constituted by the canon law, and from thence
derived to us. The pope formerly, and now the king, as supreme
ordinary, is the visitor of the arch-bishop or metropolitan; the
metropolitan has the charge and coercion of all his suffragan bishops;
and the bishops in their several dioceses are the visitors of
all deans and chapters, of all parsons and vicars, and of all other
spiritual corporations. With respect to all lay corporations, the
founder, his heirs, or assigns, are the visitors, whether the foundation
be civil or eleemosynary; for in a lay incorporation the ordinary
neither can nor ought to visit[a].

I know it is generally said, that civil corporations are subject
to no visitation, but merely to the common law of the land; and
this shall be presently explained. But first, as I have laid it down
as a rule that the founder, his heirs, or assigns, are the visitors
of all lay-corporations, let us enquire what is meant by the founder.
The founder of all corporations in the strictest and original
sense is the king alone, for he only can incorporate a society:
and in civil incorporations, such as mayor and commonalty, &c,
where there are no possessions or endowments given to the body,
there is no other founder but the king: but in eleemosynary
foundations, such as colleges and hospitals, where there is an endowment
of lands, the law distinguishes, and makes two species
of foundation; the one fundatio incipiens, or the incorporation, in
which sense the king is the general founder of all colleges and
hospitals; the other fundatio perficiens, or the dotation of it, in
which sense the first gift of the revenues is the foundation, and
he who gives them is in law the founder: and it is in this last
sense that we generally call a man the founder of a college or hospital[b].
But here the king has his prerogative: for, if the king
and a private man join in endowing an eleemosynary foundation,
the king alone shall be the founder of it. And, in general, the
king being the sole founder of all civil corporations, and the en-*
*dower the perficient founder of all eleemosynary ones, the right
of visitation of the former results, according to the rule laid down,
to the king; and of the latter, to the patron or endower.

The king being thus constituted by law the visitor of all civil
corporations, the law has also appointed the place, wherein he
shall exercise this jurisdiction: which is the court of king's bench;
where, and where only, all misbehaviours of this kind of corporations
are enquired into and redressed, and all their controversies
decided. And this is what I understand to be the meaning of our
lawyers, when they say that these civil corporations are liable to
no visitation; that is, that the law having by immemorial usage
appointed them to be visited and inspected by the king their
founder, in his majesty's court of king's bench, according to the
rules of the common law, they ought not to be visited elsewhere,
or by any other authority. And this is so strictly true, that though
the king by his letters patent had subjected the college of physicians
to the visitation of four very respectable persons, the lord
chancellor, the two chief justices, and the chief baron; though
the college had accepted this charter with all possible marks of
acquiescence, and had acted under it for near a century; yet, in
1753, the authority of this provision coming in dispute, on an
appeal preferred to these supposed visitors, they directed the legality
of their own appointment to be argued: and, as this college
was a mere civil, and not an eleemosynary foundation, they
at length determined, upon several days solemn debate, that they
had no jurisdiction as visitors; and remitted the appellant (if
aggrieved) to his regular remedy in his majesty's court of king's
bench.

As to eleemosynary corporations, by the dotation the founder
and his heirs are of common right the legal visitors, to see that
that property is rightly employed, which would otherwise have
descended to the visitor himself: but, if the founder has appointed
and assigned any other person to be visitor, then his assignee
so appointed is invested with all the founder's power, in exclusion
of his heir. Eleemosynary corporations are chiefly hospitals, or
colleges in the university. These were all of them considered by
the popish clergy, as of mere ecclesiastical jurisdiction: however,
the law of the land judged otherwise; and, with regard to
hospitals, it has long been held[c], that if the hospital be spiritual,
the bishop shall visit; but if lay, the patron. This right of lay
patrons was indeed abridged by statute 2 Hen. V. c. 1. which ordained,
that the ordinary should visit all hospitals founded by subjects;
though the king's right was reserved, to visit by his commissioners
such as were of royal foundation. But the subject's
right was in part restored by statute 14 Eliz. c. 5. which directs
the bishop to visit such hospitals only, where no visitor is appointed
by the founders thereof: and all the hospitals founded
by virtue of the statute 39 Eliz. c. 5. are to be visited by such
persons as shall be nominated by the respective founders. But
still, if the founder appoints nobody, the bishop of the diocese
must visit[d].

Colleges in the universities (whatever the common law
may now, or might formerly, judge) were certainly considered
by the popish clergy, under whose direction they were, as ecclesiastical,
or at least as clerical, corporations; and therefore the
right of visitation was claimed by the ordinary of the diocese.
This is evident, because in many of our most ancient colleges,
where the founder had a mind to subject them to a visitor of his
own nomination, he obtained for that purpose a papal bulle to
exempt them from the jurisdiction of the ordinary; several of
which are still preserved in the archives of the respective societies.
And I have reason to believe, that in one of our colleges, (wherein
the bishop of that diocese, in which Oxford was formerly comprized,
has immemorially exercised visitatorial authority) there is
no special visitor appointed by the college statutes: so that the
bishop's interposition can be ascribed to nothing else, but his supposed
title as ordinary to visit this, among other ecclesiastical
foundations. And it is not impossible, that the number of col-*
*leges in Cambridge, which are visited by the bishop of Ely, may
in part be derived from the same original.

But, whatever might be formerly the opinion of the clergy,
it is now held as established common law, that colleges are lay-*corporations,
though sometimes totally composed of ecclesiastical
persons; and that the right of visitation does not arise from any
principles of the canon law, but of necessity was created by the
common law[e]. And yet the power and jurisdiction of visitors in
colleges was left so much in the dark at common law, that the
whole doctrine was very unsettled till king William's time; in
the sixth year of whose reign, the famous case of Philips and Bury
happened[f]. In this the main question was, whether the sentence
of the bishop of Exeter, who (as visitor) had deprived doctor
Bury the rector of Exeter college, could be examined and redressed
by the court of king's bench. And the three puisne judges
were of opinion, that it might be reviewed, for that the visitor's
jurisdiction could not exclude the common law; and accordingly
judgment was given in that court. But the lord chief justice,
Holt, was of a contrary opinion; and held, that by the common
law the office of visitor is to judge according to the statutes of
the college, and to expel and deprive upon just occasions, and to
hear all appeals of course; and that from him, and him only,
the party grieved ought to have redress; the founder having reposed
in him so entire a confidence, that he will administer justice
impartially, that his determinations are final, and examinable
in no other court whatsoever. And, upon this, a writ of error
being brought in the house of lords, they reversed the judgment
of the court of king's bench, and concurred in sir John Holt's
opinion. And to this leading case all subsequent determinations
have been conformable. But, where the visitor is under a temporary
disability, there the court of king's bench will interpose, to
prevent a defect of justice. Thus the bishop of Chester is visitor
of Manchester college: but, happening also to be warden, the
court held that his power was suspended during the union of those
offices; and therefore issued a peremptory mandamus to him, as
warden, to admit a person intitled to a chaplainship[g]. Also it is
said[h], that if a founder of an eleemosynary foundation appoints
a visitor, and limits his jurisdiction by rules and statutes, if the
visitor in his sentence exceeds those rules, an action lies against
him; but it is otherwise, where he mistakes in a thing within
his power.

IV. We come now, in the last place, to consider how corporations
may be dissolved. Any particular member may be dis-*franchised,
or lose his place in the corporation, by acting contrary
to the laws of the society, or the laws of the land; or he
may resign it by his own voluntary act[i]. But the body politic
may also itself be dissolved in several ways; which dissolution is
the civil death of the corporation: and in this case their lands
and tenements shall revert to the person, or his heirs, who granted
them to the corporation; for the law doth annex a condition to
every such grant, that if the corporation be dissolved, the grantor
shall have the lands again, because the cause of the grant faileth[k].
The grant is indeed only during the life of the corporation;
which may endure for ever: but, when that life is determined by
the dissolution of the body politic, the grantor takes it back by
reversion, as in the case of every other grant for life. And hence
it appears how injurious, as well to private as public rights, those
statutes were, which vested in king Henry VIII, instead of the
heirs of the founder, the lands of the dissolved monasteries. The
debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished
by it's dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot
recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities[l]:
agreeable to that maxim of the civil law[m], "si quid universitati
debetur, singulis non debetur; nec, quod debet universitas, singuli
debent."

A corporation may be dissolved, 1. By act of parliament,
which is boundless in it's operations; 2. By the natural
death of all it's members, in case of an aggregate corporation;
3. By surrender of it's franchises into the hands of the king,
which is a kind of suicide; 4. By forfeiture of it's charter,
through negligence or abuse of it's franchises; in which case
the law judges that the body politic has broken the condition
upon which it was incorporated, and thereupon the incorporation
is void. And the regular course is to bring a writ of quo warranto,
to enquire by what warrant the members now exercise their corporate
power, having forfeited it by such and such proceedings.
The exertion of this act of law, for the purposes of the state, in
the reigns of king Charles and king James the second, particularly
by seising[**] the charter of the city of London, gave great and just
offence; though perhaps, in strictness of law, the proceedings
were sufficiently regular: but now[n] it is enacted, that the charter
of the city of London shall never more be forfeited for any
cause whatsoever. And, because by the common law corporations
were dissolved, in case the mayor or head officer was not duly
elected on the day appointed in the charter or established by prescription,
it is now provided[o], that for the future no corporation
shall be dissolved upon that account; and ample directions are
given for appointing a new officer, in case there be no election,
or a void one, made upon the charter or prescriptive day.

End of section 48

End of the first book of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, by William Blackstone.

Blackstone ss47

2008-05-30T22:47:00.001-04:00

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Chapter the eighteenth.

Of CORPORATIONS.

We have hitherto considered persons in their natural capacities,
and have treated of their rights and duties. But,
as all personal rights die with the person; and, as the necessary
forms of investing a series of individuals, one after another, with
the same identical rights, would be very inconvenient, if not impracticable;
it has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage
of the public to have any particular rights kept on foot
and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may maintain
a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.

These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate,
(corpora corporata) or corporations: of which there is a
great variety subsisting, for the advancement of religion, of learning,
and of commerce; in order to preserve entire and for ever
those rights and immunities, which, if they were granted only
to those individuals of which the body corporate is composed,
would upon their death be utterly lost and extinct. To shew the
advantages of these incorporations, let us consider the case of a
college in either of our universities, founded ad studendum et orandum,
for the encouragement and support of religion and learning.
If this was a mere voluntary assembly, the individuals which compose
it might indeed read, pray, study, and perform scholastic
exercises together, so long as they could agree to do so: but they
could neither frame, nor receive, any laws or rules of their conduct;
none at least, which would have any binding force, for
want of a coercive power to create a sufficient obligation. Neither
could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities:
for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected
assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them?
And, when they are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall
they transfer these advantages to another set of students, equally
unconnected as themselves? So also, with regard to holding estates
or other property, if land be granted for the purposes of religion
or learning to twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no
legal way of continuing the property to any other persons for the
same purposes, but by endless conveyances from one to the other,
as often as the hands are changed. But, when they are consolidated
and united into a corporation, they and their successors are
then considered as one person in law: as one person, they have
one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the
individuals: this one will may establish rules and orders for the
regulation of the whole, which are a sort of municipal laws of
this little republic; or rules and statutes may be prescribed to it
at it's creation, which are then in the place of natural laws: the
privileges and immunities, the estates and possessions, of the corporation,
when once vested in them, will be for ever vested,
without any new conveyance to new successions; for all the individual
members that have existed from the foundation to the present
time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in
law, a person that never dies: in like manner as the river Thames
is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are
changing every instant.

The honour of originally inventing these political constitutions
entirely belongs to the Romans. They were introduced, as
Plutarch says, by Numa; who finding, upon his accession, the
city torn to pieces by the two rival factions of Sabines, and Romans,
thought it a prudent and politic measure, to subdivide these
two into many smaller ones, by instituting separate societies of
every manual trade and profession. They were afterwards much
considered by the civil law[a], in which they were called universitates,
as forming one whole out of many individuals; or collegia,
from being gathered together: they were adopted also by the
canon law, for the maintenance of ecclesiastical discipline; and
from them our spiritual corporations are derived. But our laws
have considerably refined and improved upon the invention, according
to the usual genius of the English nation: particularly
with regard to sole corporations, consisting of one person only,
of which the Roman lawyers had no notion; their maxim being
that "tres faciunt collegium[b]." Though they held, that if a corporation,
originally consisting of three persons, be reduced to one,
"si universitas ad unum redit," it may still subsist as a corporation,
"et stet nomen universitatis[c]."

Before we proceed to treat of the several incidents of corporations,
as regarded by the laws of England, let us first take a
view of the several sorts of them; and then we shall be better
enabled to apprehend their respective qualities.

The first division of corporations is into aggregate and sole.
Corporations aggregate consist of many persons united together
into one society, and are kept up by a perpetual succession of
members, so as to continue for ever: of which kind are the
mayor and commonalty of a city, the head and fellows of a college,
the dean and chapter of a cathedral church. Corporations
sole consist of one person only and his successors, in some particular
station, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them
some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity,
which in their natural persons they could not have had.
In this sense the king is a sole corporation[d]: so is a bishop: so
are some deans, and prebendaries, distinct from their several
chapters: and so is every parson and vicar. And the necessity,
or at least use, of this institution will be very apparent, if we
consider the case of a parson of a church. At the original endowment
of parish churches, the freehold of the church, the churchyard,
the parsonage house, the glebe, and the tithes of the parish,
were vested in the then parson by the bounty of the donor,
as a temporal recompence to him for his spiritual care of the inhabitants,
and with intent that the same emoluments should ever
afterwards continue as a recompense for the same care. But how
was this to be effected? The freehold was vested in the parson;
and, if we suppose it vested in his natural capacity, on his death
it might descend to his heir, and would be liable to his debts and
incumbrances: or, at best, the heir might be compellable, at
some trouble and expense, to convey these rights to the succeeding
incumbent. The law therefore has wisely ordained, that the
parson, quatenus parson, shall never die, any more than the king;
by making him and his successors a corporation. By which means
all the original rights of the parsonage are preserved entire to the
successor: for the present incumbent, and his predecessor who
lived seven centuries ago, are in law one and the same person;
and what was given to the one was given to the other also.

Another division of corporations, either sole or aggregate,
is into ecclesiastical and lay. Ecclesiastical corporations are where
the members that compose it are entirely spiritual persons; such
as bishops; certain deans, and prebendaries; all archdeacons,
parsons, and vicars; which are sole corporations: deans and
chapters at present, and formerly prior and convent, abbot and
monks, and the like, bodies aggregate. These are erected for the
furtherance of religion, and the perpetuating the rights of the
church. Lay corporations are of two sorts, civil and eleemosynary.
The civil are such as are erected for a variety of temporal purposes.
The king, for instance, is made a corporation to prevent in
general the possibility of an interregnum or vacancy of the throne,
and to preserve the possessions of the crown entire; for, immediately
upon the demise of one king, his successor is, as we have
formerly seen, in full possession of the regal rights and dignity.
Other lay corporations are erected for the good government of a
town or particular district, as a mayor and commonalty, bailiff
and burgesses, or the like: some for the advancement and regulation
of manufactures and commerce; as the trading companies
of London, and other towns: and some for the better carrying
on of divers special purposes; as churchwardens, for conservation
of the goods of the parish; the college of physicians and company
of surgeons in London, for the improvement of the medical
science; the royal society, for the advancement of natural
knowlege; and the society of antiquarians, for promoting the
study of antiquities. And among these I am inclined to think the
general corporate bodies of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge
must be ranked: for it is clear they are not spiritual or
ecclesiastical corporations, being composed of more laymen than
clergy: neither are they eleemosynary foundations, though stipends
are annexed to particular magistrates and professors, any
more than other corporations where the acting officers have standing
salaries; for these are rewards pro opera et labore, not charitable
donations only, since every stipend is preceded by service and
duty: they seem therefore to be merely civil corporations. The
eleemosynary sort are such as are constituted for the perpetual distribution
of the free alms, or bounty, of the founder of them
to such persons as he has directed. Of this kind are all hospitals
for the maintenance of the poor, sick, and impotent; and all
colleges, both in our universities and out[e] of them: which colleges
are founded for two purposes; 1. For the promotion of piety
and learning by proper regulations and ordinances. 2. For imparting
assistance to the members of those bodies, in order to
enable them to prosecute their devotion and studies with greater
ease and assiduity. And all these eleemosynary corporations are,
strictly speaking, lay and not ecclesiastical, even though composed
of ecclesiastical persons[f], and although they in some things
partake of the nature, privileges, and restrictions of ecclesiastical
bodies.

Having thus marshalled the several species of corporations,
let us next proceed to consider, 1. How corporations, in general,
may be created. 2. What are their powers, capacities, and incapacities.
3. How corporations are visited. And 4. How they
may be dissolved.

I. Corporations, by the civil law, seem to have been
created by the mere act, and voluntary association of their members;
provided such convention was not contrary to law, for then
it was illicitum collegium[g]. It does not appear that the prince's
consent was necessary to be actually given to the foundation of
them; but merely that the original founders of these voluntary
and friendly societies (for they were little more than such) should
not establish any meetings in opposition to the laws of the state.

But, with us in England, the king's consent is absolutely necessary
to the erection of any corporation, either impliedly or expressly
given. The king's implied consent is to be found in corporations
which exist by force of the common law, to which our
former kings are supposed to have given their concurrence; common
law being nothing else but custom, arising from the universal
agreement of the whole community. Of this sort are the
king himself, all bishops, parsons, vicars, churchwardens, and
some others; who by common law have ever been held (as far as
our books can shew us) to have been corporations, virtute officii:
and this incorporation is so inseparably annexed to their offices,
that we cannot frame a complete legal idea of any of these persons,
but we must also have an idea of a corporation, capable to
transmit his rights to his successors, at the same time. Another
method of implication, whereby the king's consent is presumed,
is as to all corporations by prescription, such as the city of London,
and many others[h], which have existed as corporations, time
whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary; and
therefore are looked upon in law to be well created. For though
the members thereof can shew no legal charter of incorporation,
yet in cases of such high antiquity the law presumes there once
was one; and that by the variety of accidents, which a length of
time may produce, the charter is lost or destroyed. The methods,
by which the king's consent is expressly given, are either by act
of parliament or charter. By act of parliament, of which the
royal assent is a necessary ingredient, corporations may undoubtedly
be created[i]: but it is observable, that most of those statutes,
which are usually cited as having created corporations, do either
confirm such as have been before created by the king; as in the
case of the college of physicians, erected by charter 10 Hen. VIII[k],
which charter was afterwards confirmed in parliament[l]; or, they
permit the king to erect a corporation in futuro with such and
such powers; as is the case of the bank of England[m], and the
society of the British fishery[n]. So that the immediate creative act
is usually performed by the king alone, in virtue of his royal
prerogative[o].

All the other methods therefore whereby corporations exist,
by common law, by prescription, and by act of parliament, are
for the most part reducible to this of the king's letters patent,
or charter of incorporation. The king's creation may be
performed by the words "creamus, erigimus, fundamus, incorporamus,"
or the like. Nay it is held, that if the king grants to a
set of men to have gildam mercatoriam, a mercantile meeting or
assembly[p], this is alone sufficient to incorporate and establish them
for ever[q].

The parliament, we observed, by it's absolute and transcendent
authority, may perform this, or any other act whatsoever:
and actually did perform it to a great extent, by statute 39 Eliz.
c. 5. which incorporated all hospitals and houses of correction
founded by charitable persons, without farther trouble: and the
same has been done in other cases of charitable foundations. But
otherwise it is not usual thus to intrench upon the prerogative of
the crown, and the king may prevent it when he pleases. And,
in the particular instance before-mentioned, it was done, as sir
Edward Coke observes[r], to avoid the charges of incorporation
and licences of mortmain in small benefactions; which in his
days were grown so great, that it discouraged many men to undertake
these pious and charitable works.

The king may grant to a subject the power of erecting corporations[s],
though the contrary was formerly held[t]: that is, he
may permit the subject to name the persons and powers of the
corporation at his pleasure; but it is really the king that erects,
and the subject is but the instrument: for though none but
the king can make a corporation, yet qui facit per alium, facit
per se[v]. In this manner the chancellor of the university of Oxford
has power by charter to erect corporations; and has actually
often exerted it, in the erection of several matriculated companies,
now subsisting, of tradesmen subservient to the students.

When a corporation is erected, a name must be given it;
and by that name alone it must sue, and be sued, and do all legal
acts; though a very minute variation therein is not material[u].
Such name is the very being of it's constitution; and, though it
is the will of the king that erects the corporation, yet the name
is the knot of it's combination, without which it could not perform
it's corporate functions[w]. The name of incorporation, says
sir Edward Coke, is as a proper name, or name of baptism; and
therefore when a private founder gives his college or hospital a
name, he does it only as godfather; and by that same name the
king baptizes the incorporation[x].

End of section 47

Blackstone ss46

2008-05-30T22:46:00.002-04:00

"Section 46. Chapter 17 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 17"

Chapter the seventeenth.

Of GUARDIAN and WARD.

The only general private relation, now remaining to be discussed,
is that of guardian and ward; which bears a very
near resemblance to the last, and is plainly derived out of it: the
guardian being only a temporary parent; that is, for so long
time as the ward is an infant, or under age. In examining this
species of relationship, I shall first consider the different kinds of
guardians, how they are appointed, and their power and duty:
next, the different ages of persons, as defined by the law: and,
lastly, the privileges and disabilities of an infant, or one under
age and subject to guardianship.

1. The guardian with us performs the office both of the tutor
and curator of the Roman laws; the former of which had
the charge of the maintenance and education of the minor, the
latter the care of his fortune; or, according to the language of
the court of chancery, the tutor was the committee of the person,
the curator the committee of the estate. But this office was frequently
united in the civil law[a]; as it is always in our law with
regard to minors, though as to lunatics and idiots it is commonly
kept distinct.

Of the several species of guardians, the first are guardians by
nature: viz. the father and (in some cases) the mother of the
child. For, if an estate be left to an infant, the father is by common
law the guardian, and must account to his child for the profits[b].
And, with regard to daughters, it seems by construction of
the statute 4 & 5 Ph. & Mar. c. 8. that the father might by deed
or will assign a guardian to any woman-child under the age of
sixteen, and if none be so assigned, the mother shall in this case
be guardian[c]. There are also guardians for nurture[d], which are,
of course, the father or mother, till the infant attains the age of
fourteen years[e]: and, in default of father or mother, the ordinary
usually assigns some discreet person to take care of the infant's
personal estate, and to provide for his maintenance and education[f].
Next are guardians in socage, (an appellation which will
be fully explained in the second book of these commentaries) who
are also called guardians by the common law. These take place only
when the minor is entitled to some estate in lands, and then by
the common law the guardianship devolves upon his next of kin,
to whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend; as, where the
estate descended from his father, in this case his uncle by the
mother's side cannot possibly inherit this estate, and therefore
shall be the guardian[g]. For the law judges it improper to trust
the person of an infant in his hands, who may by possibility become
heir to him; that there may be no temptation, nor even
suspicion of temptation, for him to abuse his trust[h]. The Roman
laws proceed on a quite contrary principle, committing the
care of the minor to him who is the next to succeed to the inheritance,
presuming that the next heir would take the best care of
an estate, to which he has a prospect of succeeding: and this
they boast to be "summa providentia[i]." But in the mean time
they forget, how much it is the guardian's interest to remove the
incumbrance of his pupil's life from that estate, for which he is
supposed to have so great a regard[k]. And this affords Fortescue[l],
and sir Edward Coke[m], an ample opportunity for triumph; they
affirming, that to commit the custody of an infant to him that is
next in succession, is "quasi agnum committere lupo, ad devorandum[n]."
These guardians in socage, like those for nurture, continue
only till the minor is fourteen years of age; for then, in
both cases, he is presumed to have discretion, so far as to choose
his own guardian. This he may do, unless one be appointed by
father, by virtue of the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24. which, considering
the imbecillity of judgment in children of the age of fourteen,
and the abolition of guardianship in chivalry (which lasted
till the age of twenty one, and of which we shall speak hereafter)
enacts, that any father, under age or of full age, may by deed
or will dispose of the custody of his child, either born or unborn,
to any person, except a popish recusant, either in possession or reversion,
till such child attains the age of one and twenty years.
These are called guardians by statute, or testamentary guardians.
There are also special guardians by custom of London, and other
places[o]; but they are particular exceptions, and do not fall under
the general law.

The power and reciprocal duty of a guardian and ward are
the same, pro tempore, as that of a father and child; and therefore
I shall not repeat them: but shall only add, that the guardian,
when the ward comes of age, is bound to give him an account
of all that he has transacted on his behalf, and must answer for
all losses by his wilful default or negligence. In order therefore
to prevent disagreeable contests with young gentlemen, it has become
a practice for many guardians, of large estates especially, to
indemnify themselves by applying to the court of chancery, acting
under it's direction, and accounting annually before the officers
of that court. For the lord chancellor is, by right derived
from the crown, the general and supreme guardian of all infants,
as well as idiots and lunatics; that is, of all such persons as have
not discretion enough to manage their own concerns. In case
therefore any guardian abuses his trust, the court will check and
punish him; nay sometimes proceed to the removal of him, and
appoint another in his stead[p].

2. Let us next consider the ward, or person within age, for
whose assistance and support these guardians are constituted by
law; or who it is, that is said to be within age. The ages of
male and female are different for different purposes. A male at
twelve years old may take the oath of allegiance; at fourteen is
at years of discretion, and therefore may consent or disagree to
marriage, may choose his guardian, and, if his discretion be actually
proved, may make his testament of his personal estate; at
seventeen may be an executor; and at twenty one is at his own
disposal, and may aliene his lands, goods, and chattels. A female
also at seven years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage;
at nine is entitled to dower; at twelve is at years of maturity, and
therefore may consent or disagree to marriage, and, if proved to
have sufficient discretion, may bequeath her personal estate; at
fourteen is at years of legal discretion, and may choose a guardian;
at seventeen may be executrix; and at twenty one may dispose of
herself and her lands. So that full age in male or female, is twenty
one years, which age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary
of a person's birth[q]; who till that time is an infant, and
so stiled in law. Among the antient Greeks and Romans women
were never of age, but subject to perpetual guardianship[r], unless
when married, "nisi convenissent in manum viri:" and, when that
perpetual tutelage wore away in process of time, we find that, in
females as well as males, full age was not till twenty five years[s].
Thus, by the constitutions of different kingdoms, this period,
which is merely arbitrary, and juris positivi, is fixed at different
times. Scotland agrees with England in this point; (both probably
copying from the old Saxon constitutions on the continent,
which extended the age of minority "ad annum vigesimum primum,
et eo usque juvenes sub tutelam reponunt[t]") but in Naples they
are of full age at eighteen; in France, with regard to marriage,
not till thirty; and in Holland at twenty five.

3. Infants have various privileges, and various disabilities:
but their very disabilities are privileges; in order to secure them
from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts. An infant
cannot be sued but under the protection, and joining the
name, of his guardian; for he is to defend him against all attacks
as well by law as otherwise[u]: but he may sue either by his
guardian, or prochein amy, his next friend who is not his guardian.
This prochein amy may be any person who will undertake the infant's
cause; and it frequently happens, that an infant, by his
prochein amy, institutes a suit in equity against a fraudulent guardian.
In criminal cases, an infant of the age of fourteen years may be
capitally punished for any capital offence[w]: but under the age of
seven he cannot. The period between seven and fourteen is subject
to much incertainty: for the infant shall, generally speaking,
be judged prima facie innocent; yet if he was doli capax, and
could discern between good and evil at the time of the offence
committed, he may be convicted and undergo judgment and execution
of death, though he hath not attained to years of puberty
or discretion[x]. And sir Matthew Hale gives us two instances,
one of a girl of thirteen, who was burned for killing her mistress;
another of a boy still younger, that had killed his companion,
and hid himself, who was hanged; for it appeared by his
hiding that he knew he had done wrong, and could discern between
good and evil; and in such cases the maxim of law is, that
malitia supplet aetatem.

With regard to estates and civil property, an infant hath
many privileges, which will be better understood when we come
to treat more particularly of those matters: but this may be said
in general, that an infant shall lose nothing by non-claim, or neglect
of demanding his right; nor shall any other laches or negligence
be imputed to an infant, except in some very particular
cases.

It is generally true, that an infant can neither aliene his
lands, nor do any legal act, nor make a deed, nor indeed any
manner of contract, that will bind him. But still to all these rules
there are some exceptions; part of which were just now mentioned
in reckoning up the different capacities which they assume
at different ages: and there are others, a few of which it may
not be improper to recite, as a general specimen of the whole.
And, first, it is true, that infants cannot aliene their estates:
but[y] infant trustees, or mortgagees, are enabled to convey, under
the direction of the court of chancery or exchequer, the estates
they hold in trust or mortgage, to such person as the court shall
appoint. Also it is generally true, that an infant can do no legal
act: yet an infant who has an advowson, may present to the
benefice when it becomes void[z]. For the law in this case dispenses
with one rule, in order to maintain others of far greater
consequence: it permits an infant to present a clerk (who, if
unfit, may be rejected by the bishop) rather than either suffer
the church to be unserved till he comes of age, or permit the in-*
*fant to be debarred of his right by lapse to the bishop. An infant
may also purchase lands, but his purchase is incomplete: for,
when he comes to age, he may either agree or disagree to it, as
he thinks prudent or proper, without alleging any reason; and
so may his heirs after him, if he dies without having completed
his agreement[a]. It is, farther, generally true, that an infant,
under twenty one, can make no deed that is of any force or effect:
yet[b] he may bind himself apprentice by deed indented, or
indentures, for seven years; and[c] he may by deed or will appoint
a guardian to his children, if he has any. Lastly, it is generally
true, that an infant can make no other contract that will bind
him: yet he may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat,
drink, apparel, physic, and such other necessaries; and likewise
for his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit
himself afterwards[d]. And thus much, at present, for the privileges
and disabilities of infants.

End of section 46

Blackstone ss45

2008-05-30T22:46:00.001-04:00

"Section 45. Chapter 16 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 16"

Chapter the sixteenth.

Of PARENT and CHILD.

The next, and the most universal relation in nature, is immediately
derived from the preceding, being that between
parent and child.

Children are of two sorts; legitimate, and spurious, or
bastards: each of which we shall consider in their order; and
first of legitimate children.

I.[**1?] A legitimate child is he that is born in lawful wedlock,
or within a competent time afterwards. "Pater est quem
nuptiae demonstrant," is the rule of the civil law[a]; and this
holds with the civilians, whether the nuptials happen before, or
after, the birth of the child. With us in England the rule is
narrowed, for the nuptials must be precedent to the birth; of
which more will be said when we come to consider the case of
bastardy. At present let us enquire into, 1. The legal duties of
parents to their legitimate children. 2. Their power over them.
3. The duties of such children to their parents.

1. And, first, the duties of parents to legitimate children:
which principally consist in three particulars; their maintenance,
their protection, and their education.

The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their
children is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf[b],
laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their
own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would
be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only
gave the children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.
By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary
obligation, to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which
they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus
the children will have a perfect right of receiving maintenance
from their parents. And the president Montesquieu[c] has a very
just observation upon this head: that the establishment of marriage
in all civilized states is built on this natural obligation of the
father to provide for his children; for that ascertains and makes
known the person who is bound to fulfil this obligation: whereas,
in promiscuous and illicit conjunctions, the father is unknown;
and the mother finds a thousand obstacles in her way;--shame,
remorse, the constraint of her sex, and the rigor of laws;--that
stifle her inclinations to perform this duty: and besides, she
generally wants ability.

The municipal laws of all well-regulated states have taken
care to enforce this duty: though providence has done it more
effectually than any laws, by implanting in the breast of every
parent that natural [Greek: sorgê],[**misprint for storgê?] or insuperable degree of affection,
which not even the deformity of person or mind, not even the
wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children, can totally
suppress or extinguish.

The civil law[d] obliges the parent to provide maintenance for
his child; and, if he refuses, "judex de ea re cognoscet." Nay, it
carries this matter so far, that it will not suffer a parent at his
death totally to disinherit his child, without expressly giving his
reason for so doing; and there are fourteen such reasons reckoned
up[e] which may justify such disinherison. If the parent alleged
no reason, or a bad, or false one, the child might set the will aside,
tanquam testamentum inofficiosum, a testament contrary to the natural
duty of the parent. And it is remarkable under what colour
the children were to move for relief in such a case: by suggesting
that the parent had lost the use of his reason, when he made
the inofficious testament. And this, as Puffendorf observes[f], was
not to bring into dispute the testator's power of disinheriting his
own offspring; but to examine the motives upon which he did
it: and, if they were found defective in reason, then to set them
aside. But perhaps this is going rather too far: every man has,
or ought to have, by the laws of society, a power over his own
property: and, as Grotius very well distinguishes[s], natural right
obliges to give a necessary maintenance to children; but what is
more than that, they have no other right to, than as it is given
them by the favour of their parents, or the positive constitutions
of the municipal law.

Let us next see what provision our own laws have made for
this natural duty. It is a principle of law[h], that there is an obligation
on every man to provide for those descended from his
loins: and the manner, in which this obligation shall be performed,
is thus pointed out[i]. The father, and mother, grandfather,
and grandmother of poor impotent persons shall maintain them
at their own charges, if of sufficient ability, according as the
quarter sessions shall direct: and[k] if a parent runs away, and
leaves his children, the churchwardens and overseers of the parish
shall seise his rents, goods, and chattels, and dispose of them towards
their relief. By the interpretations which the courts of
law have made upon these statutes, if a mother or grandmother
marries again, and was before such second marriage of sufficient
ability to keep the child, the husband shall be charged to main-*
*tain it[l]: for this being a debt of hers, when single, shall like
others extend to charge the husband. But at her death, the relation
being dissolved, the husband is under no farther obligation.

No person is bound to provide a maintenance for his issue,
unless where the children are impotent and unable to work, either
through infancy, disease, or accident; and then is only obliged
to find them with necessaries, the penalty on refusal being no
more than 20s. a month. For the policy of our laws, which
are ever watchful to promote industry, did not mean to compel
a father to maintain his idle and lazy children in ease and indolence:
but thought it unjust to oblige the parent, against his will,
to provide them with superfluities, and other indulgences of fortune;
imagining they might trust to the impulse of nature, if
the children were deserving of such favours. Yet, as nothing is
so apt to stifle the calls of nature as religious bigotry, it is enacted[m],
that if any popish parent shall refuse to allow his protestant
child a fitting maintenance, with a view to compel him to change
his religion, the lord chancellor shall by order of court constrain
him to do what is just and reasonable. But this did not extend
to persons of another religion, of no less bitterness and bigotry
than the popish: and therefore in the very next year we find an
instance of a Jew of immense riches, whose only daughter having
embraced christianity, he turned her out of doors; and on her
application for relief, it was held she was intitled to none[n]. But
this gave occasion[o] to another statute[p], which ordains, that if
jewish parents refuse to allow their protestant children a fitting
maintenance, suitable to the fortune of the parent, the lord chancellor
on complaint may make such order therein as he shall see
proper.

Our law has made no provision to prevent the disinheriting
of children by will; leaving every man's property in his own
disposal, upon a principle of liberty in this, as well as every other,
action: though perhaps it had not been amiss, if the parent had
been bound to leave them at the least a necessary subsistence. By
the custom of London indeed, (which was formerly universal
throughout the kingdom) the children of freemen are entitled to
one third of their father's effects, to be equally divided among
them; of which he cannot deprive them. And, among persons
of any rank or fortune, a competence is generally provided for
younger children, and the bulk of the estate settled upon the
eldest, by the marriage-articles. Heirs also, and children, are
favourites of our courts of justice, and cannot be disinherited by
any dubious or ambiguous words; there being required the utmost
certainty of the testator's intentions to take away the right
of an heir[q].

From the duty of maintenance we may easily pass to that of
protection; which is also a natural duty, but rather permitted than
enjoined by any municipal laws: nature, in this respect, working
so strongly as to need rather a check than a spur. A parent
may, by our laws, maintain and uphold his children in their lawsuits,
without being guilty of the legal crime of maintaining
quarrels[r]. A parent may also justify an assault and battery in defence
of the persons of his children[s]: nay, where a man's son
was beaten by another boy, and the father went near a mile to
find him, and there revenged his son's quarrel by beating the
other boy, of which beating he afterwards died; it was not held
to be murder, but manslaughter merely[t]. Such indulgence does
the law shew to the frailty of human nature, and the workings
of parental affection.

The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving
them an education suitable to their station in life: a duty pointed
out by reason, and of far the greatest importance of any. For,
as Puffendorf very well observes[u], it is not easy to imagine or
allow, that a parent has conferred any considerable benefit upon
his child, by bringing him into the world; if he afterwards entirely
neglects his culture and education, and suffers him to grow
up like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to others, and shameful
to himself. Yet the municipal laws of most countries seem to
be defective in this point, by not constraining the parent to bestow
a proper education upon his children. Perhaps they thought
it punishment enough to leave the parent, who neglects the instruction
of his family, to labour under those griefs and inconveniences,
which his family, so uninstructed, will be sure to bring
upon him. Our laws, though their defects in this particular cannot
be denied, have in one instance made a wise provision for
breeding up the rising generation; since the poor and laborious
part of the community, when past the age of nurture, are taken
out of the hands of their parents, by the statutes for apprenticing
poor children[w]; and are placed out by the public in such a manner,
as may render their abilities, in their several stations, of the
greatest advantage to the commonwealth. The rich indeed are
left at their own option, whether they will breed up their children
to be ornaments or disgraces to their family. Yet in one case,
that of religion, they are under peculiar restrictions: for[x] it is
provided, that if any person sends any child under his government
beyond the seas, either to prevent it's good education in
England, or in order to enter into or reside in any popish college,
or to be instructed, persuaded, or strengthened in the popish religion;
in such case, besides the disabilities incurred by the child
so sent, the parent or person sending shall forfeit 100l. which[y]
shall go to the sole use and benefit of him that shall discover the
offence. And[z] if any parent, or other, shall send or convey any
person beyond sea, to enter into, or be resident in, or trained up
in, any priory, abbey, nunnery, popish university, college, or school,
or house of jesuits, or priests, or in any private popish family, in
order to be instructed, persuaded, or confirmed in the popish religion;
or shall contribute any thing towards their maintenance
when abroad by any pretext whatever, the person both sending
and sent shall be disabled to sue in law or equity, or to be executor
or administrator to any person, or to enjoy any legacy or deed
of gift, or to bear any office in the realm, and shall forfeit all his
goods and chattels, and likewise all his real estate for life.

2. The power of parents over their children is derived from
the former consideration, their duty; this authority being given
them, partly to enable the parent more effectually to perform his
duty, and partly as a recompence for his care and trouble in the
faithful discharge of it. And upon this score the municipal laws
of some nations have given a much larger authority to the parents,
than others. The antient Roman laws gave the father a power
of life and death over his children; upon this principle, that he
who gave had also the power of taking away[a]. But the rigor of
these laws was softened by subsequent constitutions; so that[b] we
find a father banished by the emperor Hadrian for killing his son,
though he had committed a very heinous crime, upon this maxim,
that "patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate, consistere."
But still they maintained to the last a very large and absolute authority:
for a son could not acquire any property of his own during
the life of his father; but all his acquisitions belonged to the
father, or at least the profits of them for his life[c].

The power of a parent by our English laws is much more
moderate; but still sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience.
He may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in
a reasonable manner[d]; for this is for the benefit of his education.
The consent or concurrence of the parent to the marriage of
his child under age, was also directed by our antient law to be obtained:
but now it is absolutely necessary; for without it the contract
is void[e]. And this also is another means, which the law
has put into the parent's hands, in order the better to discharge
his duty; first, of protecting his children from the snares of artful
and designing persons; and, next, of settling them properly
in life, by preventing the ill consequences of too early and precipitate
marriages. A father has no other power over his sons estate,
than as his trustee or guardian; for, though he may receive
the profits during the child's minority, yet he must account for
them when he comes of age. He may indeed have the benefit of his
children's labour while they live with him, and are maintained
by him: but this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices
or servants. The legal power of a father (for a mother,
as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect)
the power of a father, I say, over the persons of his children
ceases at the age of twenty one: for they are then enfranchised
by arriving at years of discretion, or that point which the
law has established (as some must necessarily be established) when
the empire of the father, or other guardian, gives place to the
empire of reason. Yet, till that age arrives, this empire of the
father continues even after his death; for he may by his will appoint
a guardian to his children. He may also delegate part of
his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster
of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion
of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz.
that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer
the purposes for which he is employed.

3. The duties of children to their parents arise from a principle
of natural justice and retribution. For to those, who gave
us existence, we naturally owe subjection and obedience during
our minority, and honour and reverence ever after; they, who
protected the weakness of our infancy, are entitled to our protection
in the infirmity of their age; they who by sustenance and
education have enabled their offspring to prosper, ought in return
to be supported by that offspring, in case they stand in need of
assistance. Upon this principle proceed all the duties of children
to their parents, which are enjoined by positive laws. And the
Athenian laws[f] carried this principle into practice with a scrupulous
kind of nicety: obliging all children to provide for their
father, when fallen into poverty; with an exception to spurious
children, to those whose chastity had been prostituted by consent
of the father, and to those whom he had not put in any way
of gaining a livelyhood. The legislature, says baron Montesquieu[g],
considered, that in the first case the father, being uncertain, had
rendered the natural obligation precarious; that, in the second
case, he had sullied the life he had given, and done his children
the greatest of injuries, in depriving them of their reputation;
and that, in the third case, he had rendered their life (so far as
in him lay) an insupportable burthen, by furnishing them with no
means of subsistence.

Our laws agree with those of Athens with regard to the first
only of these particulars, the case of spurious issue. In the other
cases the law does not hold the tie of nature to be dissolved by
any misbehaviour of the parent; and therefore a child is equally
justifiable in defending the person, or maintaining the cause or
suit, of a bad parent, as a good one; and is equally compellable[h],
if of sufficient ability, to maintain and provide for a wicked and
unnatural progenitor, as for one who has shewn the greatest tenderness
and parental piety.

II. We are next to consider the case of illegitimate children,
or bastards; with regard to whom let us inquire, 1. Who are
bastards. 2. The legal duties of the parents towards a bastard
child. 3. The rights and incapacities attending such bastard
children.

1. Who are bastards. A bastard, by our English laws, is one
that is not only begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony. The
civil and canon laws do not allow a child to remain a bastard, if
the parents afterwards intermarry[i]: and herein they differ most
materially from our law; which, though not so strict as to require
that the child shall be begotten, yet makes it an indispensable
condition that it shall be born, after lawful wedlock. And the
reason of our English law is surely much superior to that of the
Roman, if we consider the principal end and design of establishing
the contract of marriage, taken in a civil light; abstractedly
from any religious view, which has nothing to do with the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the children. The main end and design
of marriage therefore being to ascertain and fix upon some certain
person, to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance, and
the education of the children should belong; this end is undoubtedly
better answered by legitimating all issue born after wedlock,
than by legitimating all issue of the same parties, even born before
wedlock, so as wedlock afterwards ensues: 1. Because of
the very great uncertainty there will generally be, in the proof
that the issue was really begotten by the same man; whereas, by
confining the proof to the birth, and not to the begetting, our
law has rendered it perfectly certain, what child is legitimate,
and who is to take care of the child. 2. Because by the Roman
laws a child may be continued a bastard, or made legitimate, at
the option of the father and mother, by a marriage ex post facto;
thereby opening a door to many frauds and partialities, which by
our law are prevented. 3. Because by those laws a man may remain
a bastard till forty years of age, and then become legitimate,
by the subsequent marriage of his parents; whereby the main
end of marriage, the protection of infants, is totally frustrated.
4. Because this rule of the Roman laws admits of no limitations
as to the time, or number, of bastards so to be legitimated; but
a dozen of them may, twenty years after their birth, by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, be admitted to all the privileges
of legitimate children. This is plainly a great discouragement
to the matrimonial state; to which one main inducement is usually
not only the desire of having children, but also the desire of procreating
lawful heirs. Whereas our constitutions guard against this
indecency, and at the same time give sufficient allowance to the
frailties of human nature. For, if a child be begotten while the
parents are single, and they will endeavour to make an early reparation
for the offence, by marrying within a few months after,
our law is so indulgent as not to bastardize the child, if it be
born, though not begotten, in lawful wedlock: for this is an incident
that can happen but once; since all future children will be
begotten, as well as born, within the rules of honour and civil
society. Upon reasons like these we may suppose the peers to have
acted at the parliament of Merton, when they refused to enact
that children born before marriage should be esteemed legitimate[k].

From what has been said it appears, that all children born
before matrimony are bastards by our law; and so it is of all
children born so long after the death of the husband, that, by the
usual course of gestation, they could not be begotten by him.
But, this being a matter of some uncertainty, the law is not exact
as to a few days[l]. And this gives occasion to a proceeding at
common law, where a widow is suspected to feign herself with
child, in order to produce a supposititious heir to the estate: an
attempt which the rigor of the Gothic constitutions esteemed
equivalent to the most atrocious theft, and therefore punished
with death[m]. In this case with us the heir presumptive may have
a writ de ventre inspiciendo, to examine whether she be with child,
or not[n]; which is entirely conformable to the practice of the civil
law[o]: and, if the widow be upon due examination found not
pregnant, any issue she may afterwards produce, though within
nine months, will be bastard. But if a man dies, and his widow
soon after marries again, and a child is born within such a time,
as that by the course of nature it might have been the child of
either husband; in this case he is said to be more than ordinarily
legitimate; for he may, when he arrives to years of discretion,
choose which of the fathers he pleases[p]. To prevent this, among
other inconveniences, the civil law ordained that no widow should
marry infra annum luctus[q]; a rule which obtained so early as the
reign of Augustus[r], if not of Romulus: and the same constitution
was probably handed down to our early ancestors from
the Romans, during their stay in this island; for we find it established
under the Saxon and Danish governments[s].

As bastards may be born before the coverture, or marriage
state, is begun, or after it is determined, so also children born
during wedlock may in some circumstances be bastards. As if the
husband be out of the kingdom of England (or, as the law
somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor maria) for above nine
months, so that no access to his wife can be presumed, her issue
during that period shall be bastard[t]. But, generally, during the
coverture access of the husband shall be presumed, unless the
contrary can be shewn[u]; which is such a negative as can only be
proved by shewing him to be elsewhere: for the general rule is,
praesumitur pro legitimatione[w]. In a divorce a mensa et thoro, if
the wife breeds children, they are bastards; for the law will presume
the husband and wife conformable to the sentence of separation,
unless access be proved: but, in a voluntary separation by
agreement, the law will suppose access, unless the negative be
shewn[x]. So also if there is an apparent impossibility of procreation
on the part of the husband, as if he be only eight years old,
or the like, there the issue of the wife shall be bastard[y]. Likewise,
in case of divorce in the spiritual court a vinculo matrimonii,
all the issue born during the coverture are bastards[z]; because such
divorce is always upon some cause, that rendered the marriage
unlawful and null from the beginning.

2. Let us next see the duty of parents to their bastard children,
by our law; which is principally that of maintenance. For,
though bastards are not looked upon as children to any civil purposes,
yet the ties of nature, of which maintenance is one, are
not so easily dissolved: and they hold indeed as to many other
intentions; as, particularly, that a man shall not marry his bastard
sister or daughter[a]. The civil law therefore, when it denied
maintenance to bastards begotten under certain atrocious circumstances[b],
was neither consonant to nature, nor reason, however
profligate and wicked the parents might justly be esteemed.

The method in which the English law provides maintenance
for them is as follows[c]. When a woman is delivered, or declares
herself with child, of a bastard, and will by oath before a justice
of peace charge any person having got her with child, the justice
shall cause such person to be apprehended, and commit him till
he gives security, either to maintain the child, or appear at the
next quarter sessions to dispute and try the fact. But if the woman
dies, or is married before delivery, or miscarries, or proves
not to have been with child, the person shall be discharged:
otherwise the sessions, or two justices out of sessions, upon original
application to them, may take order for the keeping of the
bastard, by charging the mother, or the reputed father with the
payment of money or other sustentation for that purpose. And
if such putative father, or lewd mother, run away from the parish,
the overseers by direction of two justices may seize their
rents, goods, and chattels, in order to bring up the said bastard
child. Yet such is the humanity of our laws, that no woman can
be compulsively questioned concerning the father of her child, till
one month after her delivery: which indulgence is however
very frequently a hardship upon parishes, by suffering the parents
to escape.

3. I proceed next to the rights and incapacities which
appertain to a bastard. The rights are very few, being only such
as he can acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon
as the son of nobody, and sometimes called filius nullius, sometimes
filius populi[d]. Yet he may gain a sirname by reputation[e],
though he has none by inheritance. All other children have a
settlement in their father's parish; but a bastard in the parish
where born, for he hath no father[f]. However, in case of fraud,
as if a woman be sent either by order of justices, or comes to beg
as a vagrant, to a parish which she does not belong to, and drops
her bastard there; the bastard shall, in the first case, be settled in
the parish from whence she was illegally removed[g]; or, in the
latter case, in the mother's own parish, if the mother be apprehended
for her vagrancy[h]. The incapacity of a bastard consists
principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can
he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filius, he
is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom
any inheritable blood can be derived. A bastard was also, in strictness,
incapable of holy orders; and, though that were dispensed
with, yet he was utterly disqualified from holding any dignity in
the church[i]: but this doctrine seems now obsolete; and in all
other respects, there is no distinction between a bastard and another
man. And really any other distinction, but that of not inheriting,
which civil policy renders necessary, would, with regard
to the innocent offspring of his parents' crimes, be odious,
unjust, and cruel to the last degree: and yet the civil law, so
boasted of for it's equitable decisions, made bastards in some cases
incapable even of a gift from their parents[k]. A bastard may,
lastly, be made legitimate, and capable of inheriting, by the
transcendent power of an act of parliament, and not otherwise[l]:
as was done in the case of John of Gant's bastard children, by a
statute of Richard the second.

End of section 45

Blackstone ss44

2008-05-30T22:45:00.000-04:00

"Section 44. Chapter 15 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 15"

Chapter the fifteenth.

Of HUSBAND and WIFE.

The second private relation of persons is that of marriage,
which includes the reciprocal duties of husband and wife;
or, as most of our elder law books call them, of baron and feme.
In the consideration of which I shall in the first place enquire,
how marriages may be contracted or made; shall next point out
the manner in which they may be dissolved; and shall, lastly,
take a view of the legal effects and consequence of marriage.

I. Our law considers marriage in no other light than as a
civil contract. The holiness of the matrimonial state is left entirely
to the ecclesiastical law: the temporal courts not having
jurisdiction to consider unlawful marriages as a sin, but merely
as a civil inconvenience. The punishment therefore, or annulling,
of incestuous or other unscriptural marriages, is the province of
the spiritual courts; which act pro salute animae[a]. And, taking
it in this civil light, the law treats it as it does all other contracts;
allowing it to be good and valid in all cases, where the parties at
the time of making it were, in the first place, willing to contract;
secondly, able to contract; and, lastly, actually did contract, in
the proper forms and solemnities required by law.

First, they must be willing to contract. "Consensus, non concubitus,
facit nuptias," is the maxim of the civil law in this
case[b]: and it is adopted by the common lawyers[c], who indeed
have borrowed (especially in antient times) almost all their notions
of the legitimacy of marriage from the canon and civil laws.

Secondly, they must be able to contract. In general, all
persons are able to contract themselves in marriage, unless they
labour under some particular disabilities, and incapacities. What
those are, it will here be our business to enquire.

Now these disabilities are of two sorts: first, such as are canonical,
and therefore sufficient by the ecclesiastical laws to avoid
the marriage in the spiritual court; but these in our law only
make the marriage voidable, and not ipso facto void, until sentence
of nullity be obtained. Of this nature are pre-contract;
consanguinity, or relation by blood; and affinity, or relation by
marriage; and some particular corporal infirmities. And these
canonical disabilities are either grounded upon the express words
of the divine law, or are consequences plainly deducible from
thence: it therefore being sinful in the persons, who labour under
them, to attempt to contract matrimony together, they are
properly the object of the ecclesiastical magistrate's coercion; in
order to separate the offenders, and inflict penance for the offence,
pro salute animarum. But such marriages not being void ab initio,
but voidable only by sentence of separation, they are esteemed
valid to all civil purposes, unless such separation is actually made
during the life of the parties. For, after the death of either of
them, the courts of common law will not suffer the spiritual court
to declare such marriages to have been void; because such declaration
cannot now tend to the reformation of the parties[d]. And
therefore when a man had married his first wife's sister, and after
her death the bishop's court was proceeding to annul the mar-*
*riage and bastardize the issue, the court of king's bench granted
a prohibition quoad hoc; but permitted them to proceed to punish
the husband for incest[e]. These canonical disabilities, being entirely
the province of the ecclesiastical courts, our books are perfectly
silent concerning them. But there are a few statutes, which
serve as directories to those courts, of which it will be proper to
take notice. By statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 38. it is declared, that
all persons may lawfully marry, but such as are prohibited by
God's law; and that all marriages contracted by lawful persons in
the face of the church, and consummate with bodily knowlege, and
fruit of children, shall be indissoluble. And (because in the times
of popery a great variety of degrees of kindred were made impediments
to marriage, which impediments might however be
bought off for money) it is declared by the same statute, that nothing
(God's law except) shall impeach any marriage, but within
the Levitical degrees; the farthest of which is that between uncle
and niece[f]. By the same statute all impediments, arising from
pre-contracts to other persons, were abolished and declared of
none effect, unless they had been consummated with bodily knowlege:
in which case the canon law holds such contract to be a
marriage de facto. But this branch of the statute was repealed by
statute 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 23. How far the act of 26 Geo. II. c. 33.
(which prohibits all suits in ecclesiastical courts to compel a marriage,
in consequence of any contract) may collaterally extend
to revive this clause of Henry VIII's statute, and abolish the
impediment of pre-contract, I leave to be considered by the
canonists.

The other sort of disabilities are those which are created, or
at least enforced, by the municipal laws. And, though some of
them may be grounded on natural law, yet they are regarded by
the laws of the land, not so much in the light of any moral offence,
as on account of the civil inconveniences they draw after
them. These civil disabilities make the contract void ab initio,
and not merely voidable: not that they dissolve a contract already
formed, but they render the parties incapable of forming any
contract at all: they do not put asunder those who are joined together,
but they previously hinder the junction. And, if any
persons under these legal incapacities come together, it is a meretricious,
and not a matrimonial, union.

1. The first of these legal disabilities is a prior marriage, or
having another husband or wife living; in which case, besides the
penalties consequent upon it as a felony, the second marriage is
to all intents and purposes void[g]: polygamy being condemned
both by the law of the new testament, and the policy of all prudent
states, especially in these northern climates. And Justinian,
even in the climate of modern Turkey, is express[h], that "duas
uxores eodem tempore habere non licet."

2. The next legal disability is want of age. This is sufficient
to avoid all other contracts, on account of the imbecillity of judgment
in the parties contracting; a fortiori therefore it ought to
avoid this, the most important contract of any. Therefore if a
boy under fourteen, or a girl under twelve years of age, marries,
this marriage is only inchoate and imperfect; and, when either of
them comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they may disagree
and declare the marriage void, without any divorce or sentence in
the spiritual court. This is founded on the civil law[i]. But the
canon law pays a greater regard to the constitution, than the age,
of the parties[k]: for if they are habiles ad matrimonium, it is a
good marriage, whatever their age may be. And in our law it is
so far a marriage, that, if at the age of consent they agree to continue
together, they need not be married again[l]. If the husband
be of years of discretion, and the wife under twelve, when she
comes to years of discretion he may disagree as well as she may:
for in contracts the obligation must be mutual; both must be
bound, or neither: and so it is, vice versa, when the wife is of
years of discretion, and the husband under[m].

3. Another incapacity arises from want of consent of parents
or guardians. By the common law, if the parties themselves
were of the age of consent, there wanted no other concurrence
to make the marriage valid: and this was agreeable to the
canon law. But, by several statutes[n], penalties of 100l. are laid
on every clergyman who marries a couple either without publication
of banns (which may give notice to parents or guardians) or
without a licence, to obtain which the consent of parents or
guardians must be sworn to. And by the statute 4 & 5 Ph. & M.
c. 8. whosoever marries any woman child under the age of sixteen
years, without consent of parents or guardians, shall be subject to
fine, or five years imprisonment: and her estate during the husband's
life shall go to and be enjoyed by the next heir. The civil
law indeed required the consent of the parent or tutor at all ages;
unless the children were emancipated, or out of the parents power[o]:
and, if such consent from the father was wanting, the marriage
was null, and the children illegitimate[p]; but the consent of the
mother or guardians, if unreasonably withheld, might be redressed
and supplied by the judge, or the president of the province[q]:
and if the father was non compos, a similar remedy was given[r].
These provisions are adopted and imitated by the French and
Hollanders, with this difference: that in France the sons cannot
marry without consent of parents till thirty years of age, nor the
daughters till twenty five[s]; and in Holland, the sons are at their
own disposal at twenty five, and the daughters at twenty[t]. Thus
hath stood, and thus at present stands, the law in other neighbouring
countries. And it has been lately thought proper to introduce
somewhat of the same policy into our laws, by statute 26 Geo. II.
c. 33. whereby it is enacted, that all marriages celebrated by licence
(for banns suppose notice) where either of the parties is
under twenty one, (not being a widow or widower, who are
supposed emancipated) without the consent of the father, or, if
he be not living, of the mother or guardians, shall be absolutely
void. A like provision is made as in the civil law, where the
mother or guardian is non compos, beyond sea, or unreasonably
froward, to dispense with such consent at the discretion of the
lord chancellor: but no provision is made, in case the father should
labour under any mental or other incapacity. Much may be, and
much has been, said both for and against this innovation upon our
antient laws and constitution. On the one hand, it prevents the
clandestine marriages of minors, which are often a terrible inconvenience
to those private families wherein they happen. On the
other hand, restraints upon marriage, especially among the lower
class, are evidently detrimental to the public, by hindering the
encrease of people; and to religion and morality, by encouraging
licentiousness and debauchery among the single of both sexes;
and thereby destroying one end of society and government, which
is, concubitu probibere vago. And of this last inconvenience the
Roman laws were so sensible, that at the same time that they forbad
marriage without the consent of parents or guardians, they
were less rigorous upon that very account with regard to other
restraints: for, if a parent did not provide a husband for his
daughter, by the time she arrived at the age of twenty five, and
she afterwards made a slip in her conduct, he was not allowed to
disinherit her upon that account; "quia non sua culpa, sed parentum,
id commisisse cognoscitur[u]."

4. A fourth incapacity is want of reason; without a competent
share of which, as no other, so neither can the matrimonial
contract, be valid. Idiots and lunatics, by the old common
law, might have married[w]; wherein it was manifestly defective.
The civil law judged much more sensibly, when it made such
deprivations of reason a previous impediment; though not a cause
of divorce, if they happened after marriage[x]. This defect in
our laws is however remedied with regard to lunatics, and persons
under frenzies, by the express words of the statute 15 Geo. II.
c. 30. and idiots, if not within the letter of the statute, are at
least within the reason of it.

Lastly, the parties must not only be willing, and able, to
contract, but actually must contract themselves in due form of
law, to make it a good civil marriage. Any contract made, per
verba de praesenti, or in words of the present tense, and in case
of cohabitation per verba de futuro also, between persons able to
contract, was before the late act deemed a valid marriage to many
purposes; and the parties might be compelled in the spiritual
courts to celebrate it in facie ecclesiae. But these verbal contracts
are now of no force, to compel a future marriage[y]. Neither is
any marriage at present valid, that is not celebrated in some parish
church or public chapel, unless by dispensation from the arch-*bishop
of Canterbury. It must also be preceded by publication
of banns, or by licence from the spiritual judge. Many other
formalities are likewise prescribed by the act; the neglect of
which, though penal, does not invalidate the marriage. It is
held to be also essential to a marriage, that it be performed by a
person in orders[z]; though the intervention of a priest to solemnize
this contract is merely juris positivi, and not juris naturalis
aut divini: it being said that pope Innocent the third was the
first who ordained the celebration of marriage in the church[a];
before which it was totally a civil contract. And, in the times
of the grand rebellion, all marriages were performed by the
justices of the peace; and these marriages were declared valid,
without any fresh solemnization, by statute 12 Car. II. c. 33.
But, as the law now stands, we may upon the whole collect, that
no marriage by the temporal law is ipso facto void, that is celebrated
by a person in orders,--in a parish church or public
chapel (or elsewhere, by special dispensation)--in pursuance
of banns or a licence,--between single persons,--consenting,--of
sound mind,--and of the age of twenty one years;--or
of the age of fourteen in males and twelve in females, with
consent of parents or guardians, or without it, in case of widow-*hood.
And no marriage is voidable by the ecclesiastical law, after
the death of either of the parties; nor during their lives, unless
for the canonical impediments of pre-contract, if that indeed still
exists; of consanguinity; and of affinity, or corporal imbecillity,
subsisting previous to the marriage.

II. I am next to consider the manner in which marriages
may be dissolved; and this is either by death, or divorce. There
are two kinds of divorce, the one total, the other partial; the
one a vinculo matrimonii, the other merely a mensa et thoro. The
total divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, must be for some of the canonical
causes of impediment before-mentioned; and those, existing
before the marriage, as is always the case in consanguinity;
not supervenient, or arising afterwards, as may be the case in affinity
or corporal imbecillity. For in cases of total divorce, the
marriage is declared null, as having been absolutely unlawful ab
initio; and the parties are therefore separated pro salute animarum:
for which reason, as was before observed, no divorce can
be obtained, but during the life of the parties. The issue of such
marriage, as is thus entirely dissolved, are bastards[b].

Divorce a mensa et thoro is when the marriage is just and
lawful ab initio, and therefore the law is tender of dissolving it;
but, for some supervenient cause, it becomes improper or impossible
for the parties to live together: as in the case of intolerable ill
temper, or adultery, in either of the parties. For the canon law,
which the common law follows in this case, deems so highly and
with such mysterious reverence of the nuptial tie, that it will not
allow it to be unloosed for any cause whatsoever, that arises after
the union is made. And this is said to be built on the divine re-*
*vealed law; though that expressly assigns incontinence as a cause,
and indeed the only cause, why a man may put away his wife
and marry another[c]. The civil law, which is partly of pagan
original, allows many causes of absolute divorce; and some of
them pretty severe ones, (as if a wife goes to the theatre or the
public games, without the knowlege and consent of the husband[d])
but among them adultery is the principal, and with reason named
the first[e]. But with us in England adultery is only a cause of separation
from bed and board[f]: for which the best reason that
can be given, is, that if divorces were allowed to depend upon
a matter within the power of either the parties, they would probably
be extremely frequent; as was the case when divorces were
allowed for canonical disabilities, on the mere confession of the
parties[g], which is now prohibited by the canons[h]. However,
divorces a vinculo matrimonii, for adultery, have of late years been
frequently granted by act of parliament.

In case of divorce a mensa et thoro, the law allows alimony to the
wife; which is that allowance, which is made to a woman
for her support out of the husband's estate; being settled at the
discretion of the ecclesiastical judge, on consideration of all the
circumstances of the case. This is sometimes called her estovers;
for which, if he refuses payment, there is (besides the ordinary
process of excommunication) a writ at common law de estoveriis
habendis, in order to recover it[i]. It is generally proportioned to
the rank and quality of the parties. But in case of elopement,
and living with an adulterer, the law allows her no alimony[k].

III. Having thus shewn how marriages may be made, or
dissolved, I come now, lastly, to speak of the legal consequences
of such making, or dissolution.

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law[l]:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in
our law-french a feme-covert; is said to be covert-baron, or under
the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or
lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
Upon this principle, of an union of person in husband and
wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities,
that either of them acquire by the marriage. I speak not at present
of the rights of property, but of such as are merely personal.
For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter
into covenant with her[m]: for the grant would be to suppose
her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be only
to covenant with himself: and therefore it is also generally true,
that all compacts made between husband and wife, when single,
are voided by the intermarriage[n]. A woman indeed may be attorney
for her husband[o]; for that implies no separation from, but
is rather a representation of, her lord. And a husband may also
bequeath any thing to his wife by will; for that cannot take effect
till the coverture is determined by his death[p]. The husband
is bound to provide his wife with necessaries by law, as much as
himself; and if she contracts debts for them, he is obliged to
pay them[q]: but for any thing besides necessaries, he is not chargeable[r].
Also if a wife elopes, and lives with another man, the
husband is not chargeable even for necessaries[s]; at least if the
person, who furnishes them, is sufficiently apprized of her elopement[t].
If the wife be indebted before marriage, the husband is
bound afterwards to pay the debt; for he has adopted her and
her circumstances together[u]. If the wife be injured in her person
or her property, she can bring no action for redress without
her husband's concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own[w]:
neither can she be sued, without making the husband a defendant[x].
There is indeed one case where the wife shall sue and be
sued as a feme sole, viz. where the husband has abjured the realm,
or is banished[y]: for then he is dead in law; and, the husband
being thus disabled to sue for or defend the wife, it would be
most unreasonable if she had no remedy, or could make no defence
at all. In criminal prosecutions, it is true, the wife may
be indicted and punished separately[z]; for the union is only a civil
union. But, in trials of any sort, they are not allowed to be evidence
for, or against, each other[a]: partly because it is impossible
their testimony should be indifferent; but principally because of
the union of person: and therefore, if they were admitted to be
witnesses for each other, they would contradict one maxim of
law, "nemo in propria causa testis esse debet;" and if against each
other, they would contradict another maxim, "nemo tenetur seipsum[**P2: typo here, se and ipsum are actually separate words]
accusare." But where the offence is directly against the
person of the wife, this rule has been usually dispensed with[b]:
and therefore, by statute 3 Hen. VII. c. 2. in case a woman be
forcibly taken away, and married, she may be a witness against
such her husband, in order to convict him of felony. For in this
case she can with no propriety be reckoned his wife; because a
main ingredient, her consent, was wanting to the contract: and
also there is another maxim of law, that no man shall take advantage
of his own wrong; which the ravisher here would do,
if by forcibly marrying a woman, he could prevent her from
being a witness, who is perhaps the only witness, to that very
fact.

In the civil law the husband and wife are considered as two
distinct persons; and may have separate estates, contracts, debts,
and injuries[c]: and therefore, in our ecclesiastical courts, a woman
may sue and be sued without her husband[d].

But, though our law in general considers man and wife as
one person, yet there are some instances in which she is separately
considered; as inferior to him, and acting by his compulsion.
And therefore all deeds executed, and acts done, by her, during
her coverture, are void, or at least voidable; except it be a fine,
or the like matter of record, in which case she must be solely and
secretly examined, to learn if her act be voluntary[e]. She cannot
by will devise lands to her husband, unless under special circumstances;
for at the time of making it she is supposed to be under
his coercion[f]. And in some felonies, and other inferior crimes,
committed by her, through constraint of her husband, the law
excuses her[g]: but this extends not to treason or murder.

The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate
correction[h]. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour,
the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of
restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation
that a man is allowed to correct his servants or children; for
whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer.
But this power of correction was confined within reasonable
bounds[i]; and the husband was prohibited to use any violence to
his wife, aliter quam ad virum, ex causa regiminis et castigationis
uxoris suae, licite et rationabiliter pertinet[k]. The civil law gave
the husband the same, or a larger, authority over his wife; allowing
him, for some misdemesnors, flagellis et fustibus acriter verberare
uxorem; for others, only modicam castigationem adhibere[l].
But, with us, in the politer reign of Charles the second, this
power of correction began to be doubted[m]: and a wife may now
have security of the peace against her husband[n]; or, in return, a
husband against his wife[o]. Yet the lower rank of people, who
were always fond of the old common law, still claim and exert
their antient privilege: and the courts of law will still permit a
husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross
misbehaviour[p].

These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture;
upon which we may observe, that even the disabilities,
which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her
protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of
the laws of England.

End of section 44

Blackstone ss43

2008-05-30T22:44:00.000-04:00

"Section 43. Chapter 14 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 14"

Chapter the fourteenth.

Of MASTER and SERVANT.

Having thus commented on the rights and duties of
persons, as standing in the public relations of magistrates
and people; the method I have marked out now leads me to
consider their rights and duties in private oeconomical relations.

The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of master
and servant; which is founded in convenience, whereby a
man is directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own
skill and labour will not be sufficient to answer the cares incumbent
upon him. 2. That of husband and wife; which is founded
in nature, but modified by civil society: the one directing man
to continue and multiply his species, the other prescribing the
manner in which that natural impulse must be confined and regulated.
3. That of parent and child, which is consequential to
that of marriage, being it's principal end and design: and it is
by virtue of this relation that infants are protected, maintained,
and educated. But, since the parents, on whom this care is primarily
incumbent, may be snatched away by death or otherwise,
before they have completed their duty, the law has therefore provided
a fourth relation; 4. That of guardian and ward, which
is a kind of artificial parentage, in order to supply the deficiency,
whenever it happens, of the natural. Of all these relations in
their order.

In discussing the relation of master and servant, I shall, first,
consider the several sorts of servants, and how this relation is
created and destroyed: secondly, the effects of this relation with
regard to the parties themselves: and, lastly, it's effect with regard
to other persons.

I. As to the several sorts of servants: I have formerly observed[a]
that pure and proper slavery does not, nay cannot, subsist in
England; such I mean, whereby an absolute and unlimited power
is given to the master over the life and fortune of the slave. And
indeed it is repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural
law, that such a state should subsist any where. The three origins
of the right of slavery assigned by Justinian[b], are all of them
built upon false foundations. As, first, slavery is held to arise
"jure gentium," from a state of captivity in war; whence slaves
are called manicipia, quasi manu capti. The conqueror, say the
civilians, had a right to the life of his captive; and, having spared
that, has a right to deal with him as he pleases. But it is an
untrue position, when taken generally, that, by the law of nature
or nations, a man may kill his enemy: he has only a right
to kill him, in particular cases; in cases of absolute necessity,
for self-defence; and it is plain this absolute necessity did not
subsist, since the victor did not actually kill him, but made him
prisoner. War is itself justifiable only on principles of self-preservation;
and therefore it gives no other right over prisoners,
but merely to disable them from doing harm to us, by confining
their persons: much less can it give a right to kill, torture, abuse,
plunder, or even to enslave, an enemy, when the war is over.
Since therefore the right of making slaves by captivity, depends
on a supposed right of slaughter, that foundation failing, the consequence
drawn from it must fail likewise. But, secondly, it is
said that slavery may begin "jure civili;" when one man sells
himself to another. This, if only meant of contracts to serve or
work for another, is very just: but when applied to strict slavery,
in the sense of the laws of old Rome or modern Barbary, is also
impossible. Every sale implies a price, a quid pro quo, an equivalent
given to the seller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer:
but what equivalent can be given for life, and liberty, both of
which (in absolute slavery) are held to be in the master's disposal?
His property also, the very price he seems to receive, devolves
ipso facto to his master, the instant he becomes his slave. In this
case therefore the buyer gives nothing, and the seller receives nothing:
of what validity then can a sale be, which destroys the
very principles upon which all sales are founded? Lastly, we are
told, that besides these two ways by which slaves "fiunt," or are
acquired, they may also be hereditary: "servi nascuntur;" the
children of acquired slaves are, jure naturae, by a negative kind
of birthright, slaves also. But this being built on the two former
rights must fall together with them. If neither captivity, nor the
sale of oneself, can by the law of nature and reason, reduce the
parent to slavery, much less can it reduce the offspring.

Upon these principles the law of England abhors, and will
not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation: so that
when an attempt was made to introduce it, by statute 1 Edw. VI.
c. 3. which ordained, that all idle vagabonds should be made
slaves, and fed upon bread, water, or small drink, and refuse meat;
should wear a ring of iron round their necks, arms, or legs; and
should be compelled by beating, chaining, or otherwise, to perform
the work assigned them, were it never so vile; the spirit of
the nation could not brook this condition, even in the most abandoned
rogues; and therefore this statute was repealed in two years
afterwards[c]. And now it is laid down[d], that a slave or negro, the
instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman; that is, the
law will protect him in the enjoyment of his person, his liberty,
and his property. Yet, with regard to any right which the master
may have acquired, by contract or the like, to the perpetual
service of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same
state as before: for this is no more than the same state of subjection
for life, which every apprentice submits to for the space of
seven years, or sometimes for a longer term. Hence too it follows,
that the infamous and unchristian practice of withholding
baptism from negro servants, lest they should thereby gain their
liberty, is totally without foundation, as well as without excuse.
The law of England acts upon general and extensive principles:
it gives liberty, rightly understood, that is, protection, to a jew,
a turk, or a heathen, as well as to those who profess the true religion
of Christ; and it will not dissolve a civil contract, either
express or implied, between master and servant, on account of the
alteration of faith in either of the contracting parties: but the
slave is entitled to the same liberty in England before, as after,
baptism; and, whatever service the heathen negro owed to his
English master, the same is he bound to render when a christian.

1. The first sort of servants therefore, acknowleged by the
laws of England, are menial servants; so called from being intra
moenia, or domestics. The contract between them and their
masters arises upon the hiring. If the hiring be general without
any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for
a year[e]; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall
serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions
of the respective seasons; as well when there is work to be
done, as when there is not[f]: but the contract may be made for
any larger or smaller term. All single men between twelve years
old and sixty, and married ones under thirty years of age, and all
single women between twelve and forty, not having any visible
livelihood, are compellable by two justices to go out to service,
for the promotion of honest industry: and no master can put
away his servant, or servant leave his master, either before or at
the end of his term, without a quarter's warning; unless upon
reasonable cause to be allowed by a justice of the peace[g]: but
they may part by consent, or make a special bargain.

2. Another species of servants are called apprentices (from
apprendre, to learn) and are usually bound for a term of years, by
deed indented or indentures, to serve their masters, and be maintained
and instructed by them: for which purpose our statute
law[h] has made minors capable of binding themselves. This is
usually done to persons of trade, in order to learn their art and
mystery; and sometimes very large sums are given with them, as
a premium for such their instruction: but it may be done to husbandmen,
nay to gentlemen, and others. And[i] children of poor
persons may be apprenticed out by the overseers, with consent of
two justices, till twenty four years of age, to such persons as are
thought fitting; who are also compellable to take them: and it
is held, that gentlemen of fortune, and clergymen, are equally
liable with others to such compulsion[k]. Apprentices to trades
may be discharged on reasonable cause, either at request of themselves
or masters, at the quarter sessions, or by one justice, with
appeal to the sessions[l]: who may, by the equity of the statute,
if they think it reasonable, direct restitution of a ratable share of
the money given with the apprentice[m]. And parish apprentices
may be discharged in the same manner, by two justices[n].

3. A third species of servants are labourers, who are only
hired by the day or the week, and do not live intra moenia, as
part of the family; concerning whom the statute so often cited[o]
has made many very good regulations; 1. Directing that all persons
who have no visible effects may be compelled to work:
2. Defining how long they must continue at work in summer
and winter: 3. Punishing such as leave or desert their work:
4. Empowering the justices at sessions, or the sheriff of the
county, to settle their wages: and 5. Inflicting penalties on such
as either give, or exact, more wages than are so settled.
4. There is yet a fourth species of servants, if they may be
so called, being rather in a superior, a ministerial, capacity; such
as stewards, factors, and bailiffs: whom however the law considers
as servants pro tempore, with regard to such of their acts, as
affect their master's or employer's property. Which leads me to
consider,

II. The manner in which this relation, of service, affects either
the master or servant. And, first, by hiring and service for
a year, or apprenticeship under indentures, a person gains a settlement
in that parish wherein he last served forty days[p]. In the next
place persons serving as apprentices to any trade have an exclusive
right to exercise that trade in any part of England[q]. This law,
with regard to the exclusive part of it, has by turns been looked
upon as a hard law, or as a beneficial one, according to the prevailing
humour of the times: which has occasioned a great variety
of resolutions in the courts of law concerning it; and attempts
have been frequently made for it's repeal, though hitherto
without success. At common law every man might use what
trade he pleased; but this statute restrains that liberty to such as
have served as apprentices: the adversaries to which provision
say, that all restrictions (which tend to introduce monopolies) are
pernicious to trade; the advocates for it alledge, that unskilfulness
in trades is equally detrimental to the public, as monopolies.
This reason indeed only extends to such trades, in the exercise
whereof skill is required: but another of their arguments goes
much farther; viz. that apprenticeships are useful to the commonwealth,
by employing of youth, and learning them to be
early industrious; but that no one would be induced to undergo
a seven years servitude, if others, though equally skilful, were
allowed the same advantages without having undergone the same
discipline: and in this there seems to be much reason. However,
the resolutions of the courts have in general rather confined than
extended the restriction. No trades are held to be within the sta-
tute, but such as were in being at the making of it[r]: for trading
in a country village, apprenticeships are not requisite[s]: and
following the trade seven years is sufficient without any binding;
for the statute only says, the person must serve as an apprentice,
and does not require an actual apprenticeship to have existed[t].

A master may by law correct his apprentice or servant for
negligence or other misbehaviour, so it be done with moderation[u]:
though, if the master's wife beats him, it is good cause of departure[w].
But if any servant, workman, or labourer assaults his
master or dame, he shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and other
open corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb[x].

By service all servants and labourers, except apprentices, become
entitled to wages: according to their agreement, if menial
servants; or according to the appointment of the sheriff or sessions,
if labourers or servants in husbandry: for the statutes for
regulation of wages extend to such servants only[y]; it being impossible
for any magistrate to be a judge of the employment of
menial servants, or of course to assess their wages.

III. Let us, lastly, see how strangers may be affected by this
relation of master and servant: or how a master may behave towards
others on behalf of his servant; and what a servant may
do on behalf of his master.

And, first, the master may maintain, that is, abet and assist
his servant in any action at law against a stranger: whereas, in
general, it is an offence against public justice to encourage suits
and animosities, by helping to bear the expense of them, and is
called in law maintenance[z]. A master also may bring an action
against any man for beating or maiming his servant; but in such
case he must assign, as a special reason for so doing, his own damage
by the loss of his service; and this loss must be proved
upon the trial[a]. A master likewise may justify an assault in defence
of his servant, and a servant in defence of his master[b]: the
master, because he has an interest in his servant, not to be deprived
of his service; the servant, because it is part of his duty,
for which he receives his wages, to stand by and defend his
master[c]. Also if any person do hire or retain my servant, being
in my service, for which the servant departeth from me and goeth
to serve the other, I may have an action for damages against both
the new master and the servant, or either of them: but if the
new master did not know that he is my servant, no action lies;
unless he afterwards refuse to restore him upon information and
demand[d]. The reason and foundation upon which all this doctrine
is built, seem to be the property that every man has in the
service of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and
purchased by giving them wages.

As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his
master, they seem all to proceed upon this principle, that the
master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his
command, either expressly given, or implied: nam qui facit per
alium, facit per se[e]. Therefore, if the servant commit a trespass
by the command or encouragement of his master, the master shall
be guilty of it: not that the servant is excused, for he is only to
obey his master in matters that are honest and lawful. If an innkeeper's
servants rob his guests, the master is bound to restitution[f]:
for as there is a confidence reposed in him, that he will take care
to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied
consent to the robbery; nam, qui non prohibet, cum prohibere possit,
jubet. So likewise if the drawer at a tavern sells a man bad
wine, whereby his health is injured, he may bring an action
against the master[g]: for, although the master did not expressly
order the servant to sell it to that person in particular, yet his
permitting him to draw and sell it at all is impliedly a general
command.

In the same manner, whatever a servant is permitted to do in
the usual course of his business, is equivalent to a general command.
If I pay money to a banker's servant, the banker is answerable
for it: if I pay it to a clergyman's or a physician's servant,
whose usual business it is not to receive money for his master,
and he imbezzles it, I must pay it over again. If a steward
lets a lease of a farm, without the owner's knowlege, the owner
must stand to the bargain; for this is the steward's business. A
wife, a friend, a relation, that use to transact business for a man,
are quoad hoc his servants; and the principal must answer for their
conduct: for the law implies, that they act under a general command;
and, without such a doctrine as this, no mutual intercourse
between man and man could subsist with any tolerable convenience.
If I usually deal with a tradesman by myself, or constantly
pay him ready money, I am not answerable for what my
servant takes up upon trust; for here is no implied order to the
tradesman to trust my servant: but if I usually send him upon
trust, or sometimes on trust, and sometimes with ready money, I
am answerable for all he takes up; for the tradesman cannot possibly
distinguish when he comes by my order, and when upon his
own authority[h].

If a servant, lastly, by his negligence does any damage to a
stranger, the master shall answer for his neglect: if a smith's
servant lames a horse while he is shoing him, an action lies against
the master, and not against the servant. But in these cases the
damage must be done, while he is actually employed in the master's
service; otherwise the servant shall answer for his own mis-*
behaviour. Upon this principle, by the common law[i], if a servant
kept his master's fire negligently, so that his neighbour's
house was burned down thereby, an action lay against the master;
because this negligence happened in his service: otherwise,
if the servant, going along the street with a torch, by negligence
sets fire to a house; for there he is not in his master's immediate
service, and must himself answer the damage personally. But
now the common law is, in the former case, altered by statute
6 Ann. c. 3. which ordains that no action shall be maintained
against any, in whose house or chamber any fire shall accidentally
begin; for their own loss is sufficient punishment for their
own or their servants' carelessness. But if such fire happens
through negligence of any servant (whose loss is commonly very
little) such servant shall forfeit 100l., to be distributed among
the sufferers; and, in default of payment, shall be committed to
some workhouse and there kept to hard labour for eighteen
months[k]. A master is, lastly, chargeable if any of his family
layeth or casteth any thing out of his house into the street or
common highway, to the damage of any individual, or the common
nusance[**typo for nuisance?] of his majesty's liege people[l]: for the master hath
the superintendance and charge of all his houshold[**typo for household?]. And this
also agrees with the civil law[m]; which holds, that the pater
familias, in this and similar cases, "ob alterius culpam tenetur, sive
servi, sive liberi."

We may observe, that in all the cases here put, the master
may be frequently a loser by the trust reposed in his servant, but
never can be a gainer: he may frequently be answerable for his
servant's misbehaviour, but never can shelter himself from punishment
by laying the blame on his agent. The reason of this
is still uniform and the same; that the wrong done by the ser-*
*vant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself;
and it is a standing maxim, that no man shall be allowed to make
any advantage of his own wrong.

End of section 43

Blackstone ss42

2008-05-30T22:43:00.003-04:00

"Section 42. Chapter 13 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 13"

Chapter the thirteenth.

Of the MILITARY and MARITIME
STATES.

The military state includes the whole of the soldiery; or,
such persons as are peculiarly appointed among the rest of
the people, for the safeguard and defence of the realm.

In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct
order of the profession of arms. In absolute monarchies
this is necessary for the safety of the prince, and arises from the
main principle of their constitution, which is that of governing
by fear: but in free states the profession of a soldier, taken
singly and merely as a profession, is justly an object of jealousy.
In these no man should take up arms, but with a view to defend
his country and it's laws: he puts not off the citizen when he
enters the camp; but it is because he is a citizen, and would
wish to continue so, that he makes himself for a while a soldier.
The laws therefore and constitution of these kingdoms know
no such state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to
no other profession than that of war: and it was not till the reign
of Henry VII, that the kings of England had so much as a
guard about their persons.

In the time of our Saxon ancestors, as appears from Edward
the confessor's laws[a], the military force of this kingdom was in
the hands of the dukes or heretochs, who were constituted
through every province and county in the kingdom; being taken
out of the principal nobility, and such as were most remarkable
for being "sapientes, fideles, et animosi." Their duty was to lead
and regulate the English armies, with a very unlimited power;
"prout eis visum fuerit, ad honorem coronae et utilitatem regni."
And because of this great power they were elected by the people
in their full assembly, or folkmote, in the same manner as sheriffs
were elected: following still that old fundamental maxim of the
Saxon constitution, that where any officer was entrusted with such
power, as if abused might tend to the oppression of the people,
that power was delegated to him by the vote of the people themselves[b].
So too, among the antient Germans, the ancestors of our
Saxon forefathers, they had their dukes, as well as kings, with
an independent power over the military, as the kings had over
the civil state. The dukes were elective, the kings hereditary:
for so only can be consistently understood that passage of Tacitus[c],
"reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt;" in constituting their
kings, the family, or blood royal, was regarded, in chusing[**typo for chosing/choosing?] their
dukes or leaders, warlike merit: just as Caesar relates of their
ancestors in his time, that whenever they went to war, by way
either of attack or defence, they elected leaders to command
them[d]. This large share of power, thus conferred by the people,
though intended to preserve the liberty of the subject, was perhaps
unreasonably detrimental to the prerogative of the crown:
and accordingly we find a very ill use made of it by Edric duke
of Mercia, in the reign of king Edmond Ironside; who, by his
office of duke or heretoch, was entitled to a large command in
the king's army, and by his repeated treacheries at last transferred
the crown to Canute the Dane.

It seems universally agreed by all historians, that king Alfred
first settled a national militia in this kingdom, and by his prudent
discipline made all the subjects of his dominion soldiers: but
we are unfortunately left in the dark as to the particulars of this
his so celebrated regulation; though, from what was last observed,
the dukes seem to have been left in possession of too large
and independent a power: which enabled duke Harold on the
death of Edward the confessor, though a stranger to the royal
blood, to mount for a short space the throne of this kingdom, in
prejudice of Edgar Atheling, the rightful heir.

Upon the Norman conquest the feodal law was introduced
here in all it's rigor, the whole of which is built on a military
plan. I shall not now enter into the particulars of that constitution,
which belongs more properly to the next part of our commentaries:
but shall only observe, that, in consequence thereof,
all the lands in the kingdom were divided into what were called
knight's fees, in number above sixty thousand; and for every
knight's fee a knight or soldier, miles, was bound to attend the
king in his wars, for forty days in a year; in which space of time,
before war was reduced to a science, the campaign was generally
finished, and a kingdom either conquered or victorious[e]. By this
means the king had, without any expense, an army of sixty thousand
men always ready at his command. And accordingly we find
one, among the laws of William the conqueror[f], which in the
king's name commands and firmly enjoins the personal attendance
of all knights and others; "quod habeant et teneant se semper in
armis et equis, ut decet et oportet; et quod semper sint prompti et
parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum et peragendum,
cum opus adfuerit, secundum quod debent de feodis et tenementis suis
de jure nobis facere." This personal service in process of time
degenerated into pecuniary commutations or aids, and at last the
military part of the feodal system was abolished at the restoration,
by statute 12 Car. II. c. 24.

In the mean time we are not to imagine that the kingdom was
left wholly without defence, in case of domestic insurrections, or
the prospect of foreign invasions. Besides those, who by their
military tenures were bound to perform forty days service in the
field, the statute of Winchester[g] obliged every man, according
to his estate and degree, to provide a determinate quantity of such
arms as were then in use, in order to keep the peace: and constables
were appointed in all hundreds to see that such arms were
provided. These weapons were changed, by the statute 4 & 5 Ph.
& M. c. 2. into others of more modern service; but both this
and the former provision were repealed in the reign of James I[h].
While these continued in force, it was usual from time to time
for our princes to to[**P2: one "to" too many, I think] issue commissions of array, and send into
every county officers in whom they could confide, to muster and
array (or set in military order) the inhabitants of every district:
and the form of the commission of array was settled in parliament
in the 5 Hen. IV[i]. But at the same time it was provided[k],
that no man should be compelled to go out of the kingdom at
any rate, nor out of his shire but in cases of urgent necessity;
nor should provide soldiers unless by consent of parliament. About
the reign of king Henry the eighth, and his children, lord lieutenants
began to be introduced, as standing representatives of the
crown, to keep the counties in military order; for we find them
mentioned as known officers in the statute 4 & 5 Ph. & M. c. 3.
though they had not been then long in use, for Camden speaks
of them[l], in the time of queen Elizabeth, as extraordinary magistrates
constituted only in times of difficulty and danger.

In this state things continued, till the repeal of the statutes of
armour in the reign of king James the first: after which, when
king Charles the first had, during his northern expeditions, issued
commissions of lieutenancy and exerted some military powers
which, having been long exercised, were thought to belong to
the crown, it became a question in the long parliament, how far
the power of the militia did inherently reside in the king; being
now unsupported by any statute, and founded only upon immemorial
usage. This question, long agitated with great heat
and resentment on both sides, became at length the immediate
cause of the fatal rupture between the king and his parliament:
the two houses not only denying this prerogative of the crown,
the legality of which right perhaps might be somewhat doubtful;
but also seizing into their own hands the intire[**typo for entire?] power of the
militia, the illegality of which step could never be any doubt
at all.

Soon after the restoration of king Charles the second, when
the military tenures were abolished, it was thought proper to ascertain
the power of the militia, to recognize the sole right of the
crown to govern and command them, and to put the whole into
a more regular method of military subordination[m]: and the order,
in which the militia now stands by law, is principally built
upon the statutes which were then enacted. It is true the two last
of them are apparently repealed; but many of their provisions are
re-enacted, with the addition of some new regulations, by the
present militia laws: the general scheme of which is to discipline
a certain number of the inhabitants of every county, chosen by lot
for three years, and officered by the lord lieutenant, the deputy
lieutenants, and other principal landholders, under a commission
from the crown. They are not compellable to march out of their
counties, unless in case of invasion or actual rebellion, nor in any
case compellable to march out of the kingdom. They are to be
exercised at stated times: and their discipline in general is liberal
easy; but, when drawn out into actual service, they are subject
to the rigours of martial law, as necessary to keep them in order.
This is the constitutional security, which our laws have provided
for the public peace, and for protecting the realm against foreign
or domestic violence; and which the statutes[n] declare is essentially
necessary to the safety and prosperity of the kingdom.

When the nation is engaged in a foreign war, more veteran
troops and more regular discipline may perhaps be necessary, than
can be expected from a mere militia. And therefore at such times
particular provisions have been usually made for the raising of armies
and the due regulation and discipline of the soldiery: which
are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences bred out of
the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent
and perpetual laws of the kingdom. For martial law, which is
built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in it's
decisions, is, as sir Matthew Hale observes[o], in truth and reality
no law, but something indulged, rather than allowed as a law:
the necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing
which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be
permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for
all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land.
Wherefore Edmond earl of Kent being taken at Pontefract,
15 Edw. II. and condemned by martial law, his attainder was reversed
1 Edw. III. because it was done in time of peace. And it
is laid down[p], that if a lieutenant, or other, that hath commission
of martial authority, doth in time of peace hang or otherwise
execute any man by colour of martial law, this is murder; for it is
against magna carta[q]. And the petition of right[r] enacts, that no
soldier shall be quartered on the subject without his own consent[s];
and that no commission shall issue to proceed within this land according
to martial law. And whereas, after the restoration, king
Charles the second kept up about five thousand regular troops, by
his own authority, for guards and garrisons; which king James
the second by degrees increased to no less than thirty thousand,
all paid from his own civil list; it was made one of the articles
of the bill of rights[t], that the raising or keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of
parliament, is against law.

But, as the fashion of keeping standing armies has universally
prevailed over all Europe of late years (though some of it's potentates,
being unable themselves to maintain them, are obliged to
have recourse to richer powers, and receive subsidiary pensions for
that purpose) it has also for many years past been annually judged
necessary by our legislature, for the safety of the kingdom, the
defence of the possessions of the crown of Great Britain, and the
preservation of the balance of power in Europe, to maintain even
in time of peace a standing body of troops, under the command
of the crown; who are however ipso facto disbanded at the expiration
of every year, unless continued by parliament.

To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress,
says baron Montesquieu[u], it is requisite that the armies with
which it is entrusted should consist of the people, and have the
same spirit with the people; as was the case at Rome, till Marius
new-modelled the legions by enlisting the rabble of Italy, and
laid the foundation of all the military tyranny that ensued. Nothing
then, according to these principles, ought to be more guarded
against in a free state, than making the military power, when
such a one is necessary to be kept on foot, a body too distinct from
the people. Like ours therefore, it should wholly be composed
of natural subjects; it ought only to be enlisted for a short and
limited time; the soldiers also should live intermixed with the
people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses should
be allowed. And perhaps it might be still better, if, by dismissing
a stated number and enlisting others at every renewal of their
term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the
people, and the citizen and the soldier be more intimately connected
together.

To keep this body of troops in order, an annual act of parliament
likewise passes, "to punish mutiny and desertion, and for
the better payment of the army and their quarters." This regulates
the manner in which they are to be dispersed among the
several inn-keepers and victuallers throughout the kingdom; and
establishes a law martial for their government. By this, among
other things, it is enacted, that if any officer and soldier shall
excite, or join any mutiny, or, knowing of it, shall not give
notice to the commanding officer; or shall defect, or list in any
other regiment, or sleep upon his post, or leave it before he is
relieved, or hold correspondence with a rebel or enemy, or strike
or use violence to his superior officer, or shall disobey his lawful
commands; such offender shall suffer such punishment as a court
martial shall inflict, though it extend to death itself.

However expedient the most strict regulations may be in
time of actual war, yet, in times of profound peace, a little relaxation
of military rigour would not, one should hope, be productive
of much inconvenience. And, upon this principle, though
by our standing laws[w] (still remaining in force, though not attended
to) desertion in time of war is made felony, without benefit
of clergy, and the offence is triable by a jury and before the
judges of the common law; yet, by our militia laws beforementioned,
a much lighter punishment is inflicted for desertion in
time of peace. So, by the Roman law also, desertion in time of
war was punished with death, but more mildly in time of tranquillity[x].
But our mutiny act makes no such distinction: for
any of the faults therein mentioned are, equally at all times,
punishable with death itself, if a court martial shall think proper.
This discretionary power of the court martial is indeed to be
guided by the directions of the crown; which, with regard to
military offences, has almost an absolute legislative power. "His
majesty,[** "] says the act, [** "]may form articles of war, and constitute
courts martial, with power to try any crime by such articles,
and inflict such penalties as the articles direct." A vast and most
important trust! an unlimited power to create crimes, and annex
to them any punishments, not extending to life or limb! These
are indeed forbidden to be inflicted, except for crimes declared to
be so punishable by this act; which crimes we have just enumerated,
and, among which, we may observe that any disobedience to
lawful commands is one. Perhaps in some future revision of this
act, which is in many respects hastily penned, it may be thought
worthy the wisdom of parliament to ascertain the limits of military
subjection, and to enact express articles of war for the government
of the army, as is done for the government of the navy:
especially as, by our present constitution, the nobility and gentry of
the kingdom, who serve their country as militia officers, are annually
subjected to the same arbitrary rule, during their time of exercise.

One of the greatest advantages of our English law is, that
not only the crimes themselves which it punishes, but also the
penalties which it inflicts, are ascertained and notorious: nothing
is left to arbitrary discretion: the king by his judges dispenses
what the law has previously ordained; but is not himself
the legislator. How much therefore is it to be regretted that a
set of men, whose bravery has so often preserved the liberties of
their country, should be reduced to a state of servitude in the
midst of a nation of freemen! for sir Edward Coke will inform
us[y], that it is one of the genuine marks of servitude, to have the
law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or precarious:
"misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incognitum." Nor is
this state of servitude quite consistent with the maxims of sound
policy observed by other free nations. For, the greater the general
liberty is which any state enjoys, the more cautious has it usually
been of introducing slavery in any particular order or profession.
These men, as baron Montesquieu observes[z] seeing the liberty
which others possess, and which they themselves are excluded from,
are apt (like eunuchs in the eastern seraglios) to live in a state of
perpetual envy and hatred towards the rest of the community; and
indulge a malignant pleasure in contributing to destroy those privileges,
to which they can never be admitted. Hence have many
free states, by departing from this rule, been endangered by the
revolt of their slaves: while, in absolute and despotic governments
where there no real liberty exists, and consequently no invidious
comparisons can be formed, such incidents are extremely rare.
Two precautions are therefore advised to be observed in all prudent
and free governments; 1. To prevent the introduction of slavery at
all: or, 2. If it be already introduced, not to intrust those slaves
with arms; who will then find themselves an overmatch for the
freemen. Much less ought the soldiery to be an exception to the
people in general, and the only state of servitude in the nation.

But as soldiers, by this annual act, are thus put in a worse
condition than any other subjects, so, by the humanity of our
standing laws, they are in some cases put in a much better. By
statute 43 Eliz. c. 3. a weekly allowance is to be raised in every
county for the relief of soldiers that are sick, hurt, and maimed:
not forgetting the royal hospital at Chelsea for such as are worn
out in their duty. Officers and soldiers, that have been in the
king's service, are by several statutes, enacted at the close of several
wars, at liberty to use any trade or occupation they are fit
for, in any town in the kingdom (except the two universities)
notwithstanding any statute, custom, or charter to the contrary.
And soldiers in actual military service may make their wills, and
dispose of their goods, wages, and other personal chattels, without
those forms, solemnities, and expenses, which the law requires
in other cases[a]. Our law does not indeed extend this privilege
so far as the civil law; which carried it to an extreme that
borders upon the ridiculous. For if a soldier, in the article of
death, wrote any thing in bloody letters on his shield, or in the
dust of the field with his sword, it was a very good military testa-
ment[b]. And thus much for the military state, as acknowleged
by the laws of England.

The maritime state is nearly related to the former; though
much more agreeable to the principles of our free constitution.
The royal navy of England hath ever been it's greatest defence
and ornament: it is it's antient[**sp?] and natural strength; the floating
bulwark of the island; an army, from which, however strong
and powerful, no danger can ever be apprehended to liberty:
and accordingly it has been assiduously cultivated, even from the
earliest ages. To so much perfection was our naval reputation
arrived in the twelfth century, that the code of maritime laws,
which are called the laws of Oleron, and are received by all nations
in Europe as the ground and substruction of all their marine
constitutions, was confessedly compiled by our king Richard the
first, at the isle of Oleron on the coast of France, then part of
the possessions of the crown of England[c]. And yet, so vastly inferior
were our ancestors in this point to the present age, that
even in the maritime reign of queen Elizabeth, sir Edward Coke[d]
thinks it matter of boast, that the royal navy of England then
consisted of three and thirty ships. The present condition of our
marine is in great measure owing to the salutary provisions of the
statutes, called the navigation-acts; whereby the constant increase
of English shipping and seamen was not only encouraged, but rendered
unavoidably necessary. By the statute 5 Ric. II. c. 3. in
order to augment the navy of England, then greatly diminished,
it was ordained, that none of the king's liege people should ship
any merchandize out of or into the realm but only in ships of the
king's ligeance, on pain of forfeiture. In the next year, by statute
6 Ric. II. c. 8. this wise provision was enervated, by only obliging
the merchants to give English ships, (if able and sufficient) the
preference. But the most beneficial statute for the trade and com-
merce of these kingdoms is that navigation-act, the rudiments of
which were first framed in 1650[e], with a narrow partial view:
being intended to mortify the sugar islands, which were disaffected
to the parliament and still held out for Charles II, by stopping
the gainful trade which they then carried on with the Dutch[f];
and at the same time to clip the wings of those our opulent and
aspiring neighbours. This prohibited all ships of foreign nations
from trading with any English plantations[**plantation?][**P3-looks fine] without licence from
the council of state. In 1651[g] the prohibition was extended also
to the mother country; and no goods were suffered to be imported
into England, or any of it's dependencies, in any other than
English bottoms; or in the ships of that European nation of
which the merchandize imported was the genuine growth or manufacture.
At the restoration, the former provisions were continued,
by statute 12 Car. II. c. 18. with this very material improvement,
that the master and three fourths of the mariners
shall also be English subjects.

Many laws have been made for the supply of the royal navy
with seamen; for their regulation when on board; and to confer
privileges and rewards on them during and after their service.

1. First, for their supply. The power of impressing men
for the sea service by the king's commission, has been a matter
of some dispute, and submitted to with great reluctance; though
it hath very clearly and learnedly been shewn, by sir Michael
Foster[h], that the practise of impressing, and granting powers to
the admiralty for that purpose, is of very antient date, and hath
been uniformly continued by a regular series of precedents to the
present time: whence he concludes it to be part of the common
law[i]. The difficulty arises from hence, that no statute has expressly
declared this power to be in the crown, though many of
them very strongly imply it. The statute 2 Ric. II. c. 4. speaks
of mariners being arrested and retained for the king's service, as
of a thing well known, and practised without dispute; and provides
a remedy against their running away. By a later statute[k], if
any waterman, who uses the river Thames, shall hide himself
during the execution of any commission of pressing for the king's
service, he is liable to heavy penalties. By another[l], no fisherman
shall be taken by the queen's commission to serve as a mariner;
but the commission shall be first brought to two justices of
the peace, inhabiting near the sea coast where the mariners are
to be taken, to the intent that the justices may chuse out and return
such a number of ablebodied men, as in the commission are
contained, to serve her majesty. And, by others[m], especial protections
are allowed to seamen in particular circumstances, to prevent
them from being impressed. All which do most evidently
imply a power of impressing to reside somewhere; and, if any
where, it must from the spirit of our constitution, as well as from
the frequent mention of the king's commission, reside in the
crown alone.

But, besides this method of impressing, (which is only defensible
from public necessity, to which all private considerations
must give way) there are other ways that tend to the increase of
seamen, and manning the royal navy. Parishes may bind out poor
boys apprentices to masters of merchantmen, who shall be protected
from impressing for the first three years; and if they are
impressed afterwards, the masters shall be allowed their wages[n]:
great advantages in point of wages are given to volunteer seamen
in order to induce them to enter into his majesty's service[o]: and
every foreign seaman, who during a war shall serve two years in
any man of war, merchantman, or privateer, is naturalized ipso
facto[p]. About the middle of king William's reign, a scheme was
set on foot[q] for a register of seamen to the number of thirty
thousand, for a constant and regular supply of the king's fleet;
with great privileges to the registered men, and, on the other
hand, heavy penalties in case of their non-appearance when called
for: but this registry, being judged to be rather a badge of slavery,
was abolished by statute 9 Ann. c. 21.

2. The method of ordering seamen in the royal fleet, and
keeping up a regular discipline there, is directed by certain express
rules, articles and orders, first enacted by the authority of parliament
soon after the restoration[r]; but since new-modelled and altered,
after the peace of Aix la Chapelles[s], to remedy some defects
which were of fatal consequence in conducting the preceding
war. In these articles of the navy almost every possible offence
is set down, and the punishment thereof annexed: in which
respect the seamen have much the advantage over their brethren
in the land service; whose articles of war are not enacted by
parliament, but framed from time to time at the pleasure of the
crown. Yet from whence this distinction arose, and why the
executive power, which is limited so properly with regard to the
navy, should be so extensive with regard to the army, it is hard
to assign a reason: unless it proceeded from the perpetual establishment
of the navy, which rendered a permanent law for their
regulation expedient; and the temporary duration of the army,
which subsisted only from year to year; and might therefore with
less danger be subjected to discretionary government. But, whatever
was apprehended at the first formation of the mutiny act,
the regular renewal of our standing force at the entrance of every
year has made this distinction idle. For, if from experience past
we may judge of future events, the army is now lastingly ingrafted
into the British constitution; with this singularly fortunate
circumstance, that any branch of the legislature may annually
put an end to it's legal existence, by refusing to concur in it's
continuance.

3. With regard to the privileges conferred on sailors, they
are pretty much the same with those conferred on soldiers; with
regard to relief, when maimed, or wounded, or superannuate,
either by county rates, or the royal hospital at Greenwich; with
regard also to the exercise of trades, and the power of making
informal testaments: and, farther[t] no seaman aboard his majesty's
ships can be arrested for any debt, unless the same be sworn
to amount to at least twenty pounds; though, by the annual
mutiny acts, a soldier may be arrested for a debt which extends
to half that value, but not to a less amount.

End of section 42

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Blackstone ss41

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"Section 41. Chapter 12 of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1. - This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit: librivox DOT org" "Recording by [your name]" "Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone (pronounced "Blexstun"), book 1. Chapter 12"

Chapter the twelfth.

Of the CIVIL STATE.

The lay part of his majesty's subjects, or such of the people
as are not comprehended under the denomination of clergy,
may be divided into three distinct states, the civil, the military,
and the maritime.

That part of the nation which falls under our first and most
comprehensive division, the civil state, includes all orders of men,
from the highest nobleman to the meanest peasant; that are not
included under either our former division, of clergy, or under
one of the two latter, the military and maritime states: and it
may sometimes include individuals of the other three orders;
since a nobleman, a knight, a gentleman, or a peasant, may become
either a divine, a soldier, or a seaman.

The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty.
Of the nobility, the peerage of Great Britain, or lords temporal,
as forming (together with the bishops) one of the supreme branches
of the legislature, I have before sufficiently spoken: we are here
to consider them according to their several degrees, or titles of
honour.

All degrees of nobility and honour are derived from the
king as their fountain[a]: and he may institute what new titles
he pleases. Hence it is that all degrees of honour are not of equal
antiquity. Those now in use are dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts,
and barons[b].

1. A duke, though it be with us, as a mere title of nobility,
inferior in point of antiquity to many others, yet it is superior to
all of them in rank; being the first title of dignity after the royal
family[c]. Among the Saxons the Latin name of dukes, duces, is
very frequent, and signified, as among the Romans, the commanders
or leaders of their armies, whom in their own language
they called [**Old English: h[Þ]eretocha][d]; and in the laws of Henry I (as translated
by Lambard) we find them called heretochii. But after the Norman
conquest, which changed the military polity of the nation,
the kings themselves continuing for many generations dukes of
Normandy, they would not honour any subjects with that title,
till the time of Edward III; who, claiming to be king of France,
and thereby losing the ducal in the royal dignity, in the eleventh
year of his reign created his son, Edward the black prince, duke
of Cornwall: and many, of the royal family especially, were
afterwards raised to the same honour. However, in the reign of
queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1572[c], the whole order became utterly
extinct: but it was revived about fifty years afterwards by her
successor, who was remarkably prodigal of honours, in the person
of George Villiers duke of Buckingham.

2. A marquess, marchio, is the next degree of nobility. His
office formerly was (for dignity and duty were never separated by
our ancestors) to guard the frontiers and limits of the kingdom;
which were called the marches, from the teutonic word, marche,
a limit: as, in particular, were the marches of Wales and Scotland,
while they continued to be enemies countries. The persons
who had command there, were called lords marchers, or
marquesses; whole authority was abolished by statute 27 Hen. VIII.
c. 27: though the title had long before been made a mere ensign
of honour; Robert Vere, earl of Oxford, being created marquess
of Dublin, by Richard II in the eighth year of his reign[f].

3. An earl is a title of nobility so antient, that it's original
cannot clearly be traced out. Thus much seems tolerably certain:
that among the Saxons they were called ealdormen, quasi elder
men, signifying the same as senior or senator among the Romans;
and also schiremen, because they had each of them the civil government
of a several division or shire. On the irruption of the
Danes, they changed the name to eorles, which, according to
Camden[g], signified the same in their language. In Latin they
are called comites (a title first used in the empire) from being the
king's attendants; "a societate nomen sumpserunt, reges enim tales
sibi associant[h]." After the Norman conquest they were for some
time called counts, or countees, from the French; but they did
not long retain that name themselves, though their shires are from
thence called counties to this day. It is now become a mere title,
they having nothing to do with the government of the county;
which, as has been more than once observed, is now entirely devolved
on the sheriff, the earl's deputy, or vice-comes. In all writs,
and commissions, and other formal instruments, the king, when
he mentions any peer of the degree of an earl, always stiles him
"trusty and well beloved cousin:" an appellation as antient as the
reign of Henry IV; who being either by his wife, his mother,
or his sisters, actually related or allied to every earl in the kingdom,
artfully and constantly acknowleged that connexion in all
his letters and other public acts; from whence the usage has descended
to his successors, though the reason has long ago failed.

4. The name of vice-comes or viscount was afterwards made
use of as an arbitrary title of honour, without any shadow of office
pertaining to it, by Henry the sixth; when in the eighteenth
year of his reign, he created John Beaumont a peer, by the name
of viscount Beaumont, which was the first instance of the kind[i].

5. A baron's is the most general and universal title of nobility;
for originally every one of the peers of superior rank had
also a barony annexed to his other titles[k]. But it hath sometimes
happened that, when an antient baron hath been raised to a new
degree of peerage, in the course of a few generations the two titles
have descended differently; one perhaps to the male descendants,
the other to the heirs general; whereby the earldom or other
superior title hath subsisted without a barony: and there are also
modern instances where earls and viscounts have been created
without annexing a barony to their other honours: so that now
the rule does not hold universally, that all peers are barons. The
original and antiquity of baronies has occasioned great enquiries
among our English antiquarians. The most probable opinion
seems to be, that they were the same with our present lords of
manors; to which the name of court baron, (which is the lord's
court, and incident to every manor) gives some countenance. It
may be collected from king John's magna carta[l], that originally
all lords of manors, or barons, that held of the king in capite,
had seats in the great council or parliament, till about the reign
of that prince the conflux of them became so large and troublesome,
that the king was obliged to divide them, and summon
only the greater barons in person; leaving the small ones to be
summoned by the sheriff, and (as it is said) to sit by representation
in another house; which gave rise to the separation of the
two houses of parliament[m]. By degrees the title came to be confined
to the greater barons, or lords of parliament only; and there
were no other barons among the peerage but such as were summoned
by writ, in respect of the tenure of their lands or baronies,
till Richard the second first made it a mere title of honor,
by conferring it on divers persons by his letters patent[n].

Having made this short enquiry into the original of
our several degrees of nobility, I shall next consider the manner
in which they may be created. The right of peerage
seems to have been originally territorial; that is, annexed to
lands, honors, castles, manors, and the like, the proprietors and
possessors of which were (in right of those estates) allowed to be
peers of the realm, and were summoned to parliament to do suit
and service to their sovereign: and, when the land was alienated,
the dignity passed with it as appendant. Thus the bishops still sit
in the house of lords in right of succession to certain antient baronies
annexed, or supposed to be annexed, to their episcopal
lands[o]: and thus, in 11 Hen. VI, the possession of the castle of
Arundel was adjudged to confer an earldom on it's possessor[p]. But
afterwards, when alienations grew to be frequent, the dignity of
peerage was confined to the lineage of the party ennobled, and
instead of territorial became personal. Actual proof of a tenure
by barony became no longer necessary to constitute a lord of parliament;
but the record of the writ of summons to them or their
ancestors was admitted as a sufficient evidence of the tenure.

Peers are now created either by writ, or by patent: for
those who claim by prescription must suppose either a writ or patent
made to their ancestors; though by length of time it is lost.
The creation by writ, or the king's letter, is a summons to attend
the house of peers, by the stile and title of that barony,
which the king is pleased to confer: that by patent is a royal
grant to a subject of any dignity and degree of peerage. The
creation by writ is the more antient way; but a man is not ennobled
thereby, unless he actually takes his seat in the house of
lords: and therefore the most usual, because the surest, way is
to grant the dignity by patent, which enures to a man and his
heirs according to the limitations thereof, though he never himself
makes use of it[q]. Yet it is frequent to call up the eldest son
of a peer to the house of lords by writ of summons, in the name
of his father's barony: because in that case there is no danger
of his children's losing the nobility in case he never takes his seat;
for they will succeed to their grand-father. Creation by writ has
also one advantage over that by patent: for a person created by
writ holds the dignity to him and his heirs, without any words
to that purport in the writ; but in letters patent there must be
words to direct the inheritance, else the dignity enures only to
the grantee for life[r]. For a man or woman may be created noble
for their own lives, and the dignity not descend to their heirs at
all, or descend only to some particular heirs: as where a peerage
is limited to a man, and the heirs male of his body by Elizabeth
his present lady, and not to such heirs by any former or future
wife.

Let us next take a view of a few of the principal incidents
attending the nobility, exclusive of their capacity as members of
parliament, and as hereditary counsellors of the crown; both of
which we have before considered. And first we must observe,
that in criminal cases, a nobleman shall be tried by his peers.
The great are always obnoxious to popular envy: were they to
be judged by the people, they might be in danger from the prejudice
of their judges; and would moreover be deprived of the
privilege of the meanest subjects, that of being tried by their[**delete . (or spot?)][**spot--outside right margin--removed it. ~P3]
equals, which is secured to all the realm by magna carta, c. 29.
It is said, that this does not extend to bishops; who, though they
are lords of parliament, and sit there by virtue of their baronies
which they hold jure ecclesiae, yet are not ennobled in blood,
and consequently not peers with the nobility[s]. As to peeresses,
no provision was made for their trial when accused of treason or
felony, till after Eleanor dutchess of Gloucester, wife to the lord
protector, had been accused of treason and found guilty of witchcraft,
in an ecclesiastical synod, through the intrigues of cardinal
Beaufort. This very extraordinary trial gave occasion to a special
statute, 20 Hen. VI. c. 9. which enacts that peeresses either in their
own right, or by marriage, shall be tried before the same judicature
as peers of the realm. If a woman, noble in her own
right, marries a commoner, she still remains noble, and shall be
tried by her peers: but if she be only noble by marriage, then
by a second marriage, with a commoner, she loses her dignity;
for as by marriage it is gained, by marriage it is also lost. Yet if
a duchess dowager marries a baron, she continues a duchess still;
for all the nobility are pares, and therefore it is no degradation[t].
A peer, or peeress (either in her own right or by marriage) cannot
be arrested in civil cases[u]: and they have also many peculiar
privileges annexed to their peerage in the course of judicial proceedings.
A peer, sitting in judgment, gives not his verdict upon
oath, like an ordinary juryman, but upon his honour[w]: he answers
also to bills in chancery upon his honour, and not upon his
oath[x]; but, when he is examined as a witness either in civil or
criminal cases, he must be sworn[y]: for the respect, which the
law shews to the honour of a peer, does not extend so far as to
overturn a settled maxim, that in judicio non creditur nisi juratis[z].
The honour of peers is however so highly tendered by the law,
that it is much more penal to spread false reports of them, and
certain other great officers of the realm, than of other men:
scandal against them being called by the peculiar name of scandalum
magnatum; and subjected to peculiar punishment by divers
antient statutes[a].

A peer cannot lose his nobility, but by death or attainder;
though there was an instance, in the reign of Edward the fourth,
of the degradation of George Nevile duke of Bedford by act of
parliament[b], on account of his poverty, which rendered him unable
to support his dignity[c]. But this is a singular instance:
which serves at the same time, by having happened, to shew the
power of parliament; and, by having happened but once, to
shew how tender the parliament hath been, in exerting so high
a power. It hath been said indeed[d], that if a baron waste his
estate, so that he is not able to support the degree, the king may
degrade him: but it is expressly held by later authorities[e], that
a peer cannot be degraded but by act of parliament.

The commonalty, like the nobility, are divided into several
degrees; and, as the lords, though different in rank, yet all of
them are peers in respect of their nobility, so the commoners,
though some are greatly superior to others, yet all are in law peers,
in respect of their want of nobility[f].

The first name of dignity, next beneath a peer, was anciently
that of vidames, vice domini, or valvasors[g]: who are mentioned
by our antient lawyers[h] as viri magnae dignitatis; and sir Edward
Coke[i] speaks highly of them. Yet they are now quite out of
use; and our legal antiquarians are not so much as agreed upon
their original or ancient office.

Now therefore the first dignity after the nobility, is a knight
of the order of St. George, or of the garter; first instituted by
Edward III, A.D. 1344[k]. Next follows a knight banneret; who
indeed by statutes 5 Ric. II. st. 2. c. 4. and 14 Ric. II. c. 11. is
ranked next after barons: and that precedence was confirmed to
him by order of king James I, in the tenth year of his reign[l].
But, in order to intitle himself to this rank, he must have been
created by the king in person, in the field, under the royal banners,
in time of open war[m]. Else he ranks after baronets; who
are the next order: which title is a dignity of inheritance,
created by letters patent, and usually descendible to the issue male.
It was first instituted by king James the first, A. D. 1611. in
order to raise a competent sum for the reduction of the province
of Ulster in Ireland; for which reason all baronets have the arms
of Ulster superadded to their family coat. Next follow knights of
the bath; an order instituted by king Henry IV, and revived by
king George the first. They are so called from the ceremony of
bathing, the night before their creation. The last of these inferior
nobility are knights bachelors; the most antient, though the
lowest, order of knighthood amongst us: for we have an instance[n]
of king Alfred's conferring this order on his son Athelstan.
The custom of the antient Germans was to give their
young men a shield and a lance in the great council: this was
equivalent to the toga virilis of the Romans: before this they
were not permitted to bear arms, but were accounted as part of
the father's houshold; after it, as part of the public[o]. Hence
some derive the usage of knighting, which has prevailed all over
the western world, since it's reduction by colonies from those northern
heroes. Knights are called in Latin equites aurati; aurati,
from the gilt spurs they wore; and equites, because they always
served on horseback: for it is observable[p], that almost all nations
call their knights by some appellation derived from an horse.
They are also called in our law milites, because they formed a
part, or indeed the whole of the royal army, in virtue of their
feodal tenures; one condition of which was, that every one who
held a knights fee (which in Henry the second's time[q] amounted
to 20l. per annum) was obliged to be knighted, and attend the
king in his wars, or fine for his non-compliance. The exertion
of this prerogative, as an expedient to raise money in the reign
of Charles the first, gave great offence; though warranted by
law, and the recent example of queen Elizabeth: but it was, at
the restoration, together with all other military branches of the
feodal law, abolished; and this kind of knighthood has, since
that time, fallen into great disregard.

These, sir Edward Coke says[r], are all the names of dignity
in this kingdom, esquires and gentlemen being only names of
worship. But before these last the heralds rank all colonels, serjeants
at law, and doctors in the three learned professions.

Esquires and gentlemen are confounded together by sir
Edward Coke, who observes[s], that every esquire is a gentleman,
and a gentleman is defined to be one qui arma gerit, who bears
coat armour, the grant of which adds gentility to a man's family:
in like manner as civil nobility, among the Romans, was founded
in the jus imaginum, or having the image of one ancestor at least,
who had borne some curule office. It is indeed a matter somewhat
unsettled, what constitutes the distinction, or who is a real
esquire: for it is not an estate, however large, that confers this
rank upon it's owner. Camden, who was himself a herald, distinguishes
them the most accurately; and he reckons up four sorts
of them[t]: 1. The eldest sons of knights, and their eldest sons,
in perpetual succession[u]. 2. The younger sons of peers, and their
eldest sons, in like perpetual succession: both which species of
esquires sir H. Spelman entitles armigeri natalitii[w]. 3. Esquires
created by the king's letters patent, or other investiture; and
their eldest sons. 4. Esquires by virtue of their offices; as justices
of the peace, and others who bear any office of trust under the
crown. To these may be added the esquires of knights of the bath,
each of whom constitutes three at his installation; and all foreign,
nay, Irish peers; and the eldest sons of peers of Great Britain,
who, though generally titular lords, are only esquires in the law,
and must so be named in all legal proceedings[x]. As for gentlemen,
says sir Thomas Smith[y], they be made good cheap in this
kingdom: for whosoever studieth the laws of the realm, who
studieth in the universities, who professeth liberal sciences, and
(to be short) who can live idly, and without manual labour, and
will bear the port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he
shall be called master, and shall be taken for a gentleman. A
yeoman is he that hath free land of forty shillings by the year;
who is thereby qualified to serve on juries, vote for knights of the
shire, and do any other act, where the law requires one that is
probus et legalis homo[z].

The rest of the commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and labourers;
who (as well as all others) must in pursuance of the statute
1 Hen. V. c. 5. be stiled by the name and addition of their
estate, degree, or mystery, in all actions and other legal proceedings.

End of section 41

Jc's Librivox Texts

The Charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava

Snow in the Suburbs, by Thomas Hardy

Poem: Lips That Touch Liquor Shall Never Touch Mine

Essais 1, ch 18

CHAPITRE XVIIIQu'il ne faut juger de notre heur qu'après la mort

Essais 1, ch 17

CHAPITRE XVIIDe la peur

Essais 1, ch 16

CHAPITRE XVIUn traict de quelques Ambassadeurs

Essais 1, ch 15

CHAPITRE XVDe la punition de la couardise

Essais 1, ch 14

CHAPITRE XIVOn est puni pour s'opiniâtrer en une place sans raison

Essais 1, ch 13

CHAPITRE XIIICérémonie de l'entrevue des Rois

Essais 1, ch 12

CHAPITRE XIIDe la constance

Essais 1, ch 11

CHAPITRE XIDes Prognostications

Essais 1, ch 9

CHAPITRE IXDes Menteurs

Essais 1, ch 10

CHAPITRE XDu parler prompt ou tardif

Essais 1, ch 8

CHAPITRE VIIIDe l'Oysiveté

Essais 1, ch 7

CHAPITRE VIIQue l'intention juge nos actions

Essais ch 6

CHAPITRE VIL'heure des parlemens dangereuse

Essais, Ch 5

CHAPITRE VSi le chef d'une place assiegee, doit sortir pour parlementer

Essais, Ch 4

CHAPITRE IVComme l'ame descharge ses passionssur des objects faux, quand les vrais luy defaillent

Essais, Ch 3

CHAPITRE IIINos affections s'emportent au delà de nous

Essais 1, Ch 2

CHAPITRE IIDe la Tristesse

Essais 1, Ch 1

Chapitre 1

Par divers moyens on arrive à pareille fin

Livre 1 - Au lecteur

Essais, par Montaigne - INDEX

Blackstone, ss 14

Blackstone, ss 13

Blackstone, ss 02

Blackstone, ss01

Blackstone, preface

Blackstone ss48

Blackstone ss47

Blackstone ss46

Blackstone ss45

Blackstone ss44

Blackstone ss43

Blackstone ss42

Blackstone ss41

CHAPITRE XVIII
Qu'il ne faut juger de notre heur qu'après la mort

CHAPITRE XVII
De la peur

CHAPITRE XVI
Un traict de quelques Ambassadeurs

CHAPITRE XV
De la punition de la couardise

CHAPITRE XIV
On est puni pour s'opiniâtrer en une place sans raison

CHAPITRE XIII
Cérémonie de l'entrevue des Rois

CHAPITRE XII
De la constance

CHAPITRE XI
Des Prognostications

CHAPITRE IX
Des Menteurs

CHAPITRE X
Du parler prompt ou tardif

CHAPITRE VIII
De l'Oysiveté

CHAPITRE VII
Que l'intention juge nos actions

CHAPITRE VI
L'heure des parlemens dangereuse

CHAPITRE V
Si le chef d'une place assiegee, doit sortir pour parlementer

CHAPITRE IV
Comme l'ame descharge ses passions
sur des objects faux, quand les vrais luy defaillent

CHAPITRE III
Nos affections s'emportent au delà de nous

CHAPITRE II
De la Tristesse